More Questions Than Answers in CPDO Default

Now that financial reporters are back to work after the Thanksgiving holiday,

I’m hoping that somebody will write a story about the CPDO

which defaulted last week. The Reuters story raises more questions than

it answers, foremost among them the question of what a CPDO was doing with multiple

tranches in the first place. Isn’t the whole point of CPDOs that they were AAA-rated?

So if this tranche was downgraded by Moody’s from Ba2 to C, is that only after

it was downgraded from AAA to Ba2? Or is this merely the equity tranche, in

which case it’s much less of a big deal?

After all, the equity tranche of CPDOs is meant to be the part which takes

losses. What’s more, if 10% of the value of this lowest-rated tranche is still

remaining, does that mean that all the other investors in the deal are still

whole? And what caused these losses? Was it the general gapping-out in spreads

of the financial companies in which the CPDO invested? Because CPDOs were meant

to be relatively immune to spread widening. Or were there problems

with the roll-over? All answers gratefully accepted.

(Full disclosure: Back when CPDOs were flavor of the month, I was one of the

very few journalists who stepped up to defend the structure. I was, clearly,

wrong. I will never again trust a credit-rating agency when it tells me that

a structured product has a AAA rating. Even if the CPDO market is still, allegedly,

"alive

and kicking".)

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