SEC vs Chanos: Another Silly Sideshow

Has the SEC learned nothing? Its investigations of David Einhorn, rather than the companies he was shorting, were idiotic. Its ban on short-selling financial stocks was idiotic. (The XLF financials ETF was at $22 when the ban was implemented; it’s now at $9.) In general, the SEC has historically been much more inclined to investigate short-sellers than it has been to investigate the companies they’re shorting — which is also idiotic.

And so today we receive the news that the SEC is investigating Jim Chanos regarding short-sales of Fairfax Financial:

The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether several hedge funds traded improperly after being given advance notice by a research analyst of his negative report on a prominent insurer, people familiar with the agency’s investigation said.

Blodget has chapter and verse on the allegations, which center on the fact that Chanos seems to have known all about a Morgan Keegan research report before it was published. But nobody — not Blodget, not Bloomberg, not Chittum — bothers to note that advance information about a Morgan Keegan research report is not inside information about Fairfax Financial.

Now I’m no lawyer, and I have no idea whether the report constitutes material information, or what exactly the SEC considers "publishing" a report to entail. (How many clients need to receive a research report before it’s considered public?) It’s also very common for research analysts to talk frequently with their buy-side clients such as Chanos in order to swap ideas and strengthen their investment theses. If many of the ideas in the Morgan Keegan report ultimately came from Chanos’s shop — and there’s nothing wrong about that, so long as the Morgan Keegan analyst independently believes and verifies them — then it’s understandable that the analyst might tell Chanos that he’s going to put the ideas in an upcoming report.

The SEC case here seems nit-picky to me: the insider information they’re so concerned about isn’t the content of the Morgan Keegan report, but rather the knowledge of its impending publication. Which raises rather obvious questions of doesn’t-the-SEC-have-anything-better-to-do, given the massive frauds which are increasingly being uncovered at real companies, including especially financials.

Posted in regulation | 1 Comment

Stanford: The MSM’s Caution

While it’s somewhat heartening to see the MSM pick up the Stanford story, one can’t help but be struck by the ultracautious way in which they’re doing so. The WSJ, for instance, finally gets on the case today, under the bland headline "Investment Firm Is Probed", buried on page C6. The story is entirely about the regulatory investigations, rather than the widespread belief that Stanford International Bank has to be a fraudulent organization.

Bloomberg, too, is taking the SEC investigation angle: its headlines are "Billionaire Stanford’s Firm Said to Face U.S. Probe" and "Allen Stanford Vows ‘Fight With Every Breath’ Amid U.S. Probes". And the NYT decided to run with "U.S. Agents Scrutinize Texas Firm".

The closest thing to a MSM article accusing SIB of looking fraudulent is the BusinessWeek story — "Is Stanford Financial’s Offer Too Good to Be True?" — although even that one notably refuses to even mention Alex Dalmady and his thesis on the bank. (The reporter, Matthew Goldstein, did talk to Dalmady, as has seemingly every other major news organization: it’s clear they’re not ignoring him, but it’s equally clear they’re hesitant to trust his analysis, or at least to print articles based on it.)

A hint of what’s going on behind the scenes can be seen in the Alphaville chat transcript from yesterday. PM and NH are Paul Murphy and Neil Hume, Alphaville editors:

PM:

Well, been looking at this SIB — Sir Allen Stanford story

PM:

rather fruity

PM:

Anyway — think we are cleared to publish our stuff now

NH:

only taken 12 hours…

NH:

for our story we just need sign off from the editor now

Nothing appeared yesterday, beyond a single blog entry reporting what was going on elsewhere in the media. (It did, however, mention Dalmady’s report.) Finally, today, the FT pushed forward with a serious article headlined "Cricket fanatic suddenly on a sticky wicket" which features Dalmady’s allegations front and center. (To put that timing in perspective, my first blog entry on the subject –which talked about Stanford and Dalmady in some detail — appeared Tuesday morning.)

When you’re dealing with fraud allegations, especially at banks, it’s important to be cautious. A single fraud allegation from a reputable source can spark a run on any bank, even if the bank in question is entirely kosher. And I’m sure that next week the story will gain legs. But the MSM would love it if they can pin everything on the SEC or some other regulator — even the Antiguan regulator would do, at a pinch. They really hate making allegations themselves, or even giving much credence to the allegations of independent analysts like Dalmady. Or Markopolos.

Update: I just found this astonishingly milquetoast article from Reuters, datelined today:

After reviewing Stanford’s financial statements, Dalmady concluded that it used borrowed money, or leverage, to pump up investment returns.

Er, no: after reviewing Stanford’s financial statements, Dalmady concluded that it was a Ponzi scheme and that Stanford really doesn’t have the money it claims it has.

Anecdotally, the MSM is just now getting serious about this story, with reporters in places like Antigua and Caracas looking for something solid; most of them are convinced that there’s something extremely fishy about Stanford. But the gulf between what they believe and what they feel comfortable actually reporting is enormous.

Posted in fraud, Media | 1 Comment

Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Confessions of a Reluctant Whistleblower, Or how the Blogosphere took on Stanford: Alex Dalmady blogs! Lots of interesting inside-media tidbits, too, if you like that kind of thing.

Half of all CDOs of ABS failed: Looks like the markets were right after all, rather than "overshooting" as the don’t-mark-to-market types liked to think.

How I made over $2 million with this blog: Dave Winer makes a good point in a slightly obnoxious way.

Buy a House, Get a Visa: Increase immigration, decrease unemployment!

Don’t skip Vista — please! Microsoft resorts to threats of "falling into a hole" to get its corporate clients to buy Vista.

Posted in remainders | 1 Comment

The Moody’s USA Downgrade

Can the yield on US Treasuries be considered the "risk free rate of return" if there are other securities which are lower-risk than US Treasuries?

Moody’s now admits two things: firstly that triple-A doesn’t mean risk-free (thanks, guys, I think we’d worked that out by now), and secondly — more interestingly — that the US is not the safest triple-A credit.

There are now three levels of triple-A, when it comes to sovereign bonds. The weakest — which have been classed as “vulnerable” to a downgrade — are Spain and Ireland. The strongest — which have been classed as “resistant” to a downgrade — are Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Singapore, and New Zealand. And in the middle — stronger than the “vulnerable” countries but weaker than the “resistant” countries — are the two “resilient” countries: the UK and the US.

Which means that Moody’s now considers the USA to be a weaker credit than Finland or Singapore: a handy datapoint for anybody who thinks the US empire is crumbling.

(HT: Alea)

Posted in credit ratings | 1 Comment

The Tragedy of Political Reality

I taped a Bloggingheads diavlog with Jesse Eisinger this afternoon, which should go up on Monday. We ended up in a pessimistic place: a Japanese outcome to this economic and financial crisis seems much more likely than a Swedish outcome, and the base case scenario is an L-shaped recession.

One of the reasons is what I called "institutional constraints" on the White House, or what can also just be called political realities: no matter how much Change you promise to bring to Washington, some things are set in stone — as Obama himself conceded last month, when he said that he would continue the incomprehensible yet time-honored practice of appointing cronies rather than career diplomats to key ambassadorial positions.

The lastest example of politics-as-usual asserting themselves is the withdrawal of Judd Gregg as the nominee for Commerce. Mark Ambinder has some interesting hearsay:

A Republican associate of Gregg’s says that he knew "from the beginning" that "it was not going to work"…

The friend speculates that Gregg was waiting for the right moment to withdraw. That said, Gregg wanted the job in the first place, and presumably knew what he was getting into.

The moral of this story is that you should never put yourself forward for a high-profile political position if you’re harboring serious misgivings about doing so: Judd Gregg is really the Republican Caroline Kennedy, in this regard, although this whole thing is being handled much more graciously on both sides than Kennedy’s withdrawal from consideration for the New York senate seat.

It’s increasingly looking as though bipartisanship is one of those ideals which just isn’t going to work — that’s a shame, and a big problem. Because without bipartisanship, you can’t really ever have fiscal balance: each side overspends to boost its own popularity in the short term and beggar the other side when they get into power. Fiscal responsibility is all about politicians behaving like grown-ups, and that seems, today, as far away as ever.

Posted in Politics | 1 Comment

Stanford’s Self-Incriminating Memo

Memo to Allen Stanford: Be careful what you write in memos, because they leak. Bloomberg’s Alison Fitzgerald has her hands on his latest missive to employees:

R. Allen Stanford, the billionaire chairman of Houston-based investment firm Stanford Group Co., said he will “fight with every breath to continue to uphold our good name” in the face of investigations by U.S. securities regulators.

“We are all aware that former disgruntled employees have gone to the regulators questioning our work and our processes,” Stanford said today in an e-mail to staff members that was obtained by Bloomberg News. “This could have compounded an otherwise routine examination.”

“On the issue of Stanford International Bank, I want to be very clear,” Stanford said in the e-mail. “SIB remains a strong institution, and even without the benefit of billions in U.S. taxpayers’ dollars we are taking a number of decisive steps to reinforce our financial strength. We will take the necessary actions to protect our depositors.”

This is all very fishy. Here’s what one would expect Stanford to be saying and doing if he was entirely kosher: he would be welcoming the SEC and Finra investigations, and promising to cooperate fully with them. He would be talking openly to the press about why a billionaire needs to borrow money at 7.5% and how exactly he’d managed to get such spectacular returns. He would be wheeling out two gruntled former employees for every disgruntled one. And he would immediately replace his now-deceased auditor with a respectable international firm.

What would he not do? Well, vow to "fight", for one: who, exactly, does he think he’s fighting? He wouldn’t talk about "protecting" his depositors: protect them from what? According to his official accounts, Stanford International Bank was profitable last year, and that’s all the "protection" they need. And, of course, he wouldn’t fail to return money to depositors who ask for it, as I’ve heard tell has already started to happen.

Say what you like about Bernie Madoff, he knew when the gig was up and didn’t try to hide it. Since the truth about SIB is going to come out sooner rather than later anyway, Stanford should just open up and tell us all what’s been going on himself.

Posted in fraud | 1 Comment

Malaria: Easterly vs Gates

Bill Easterly is on the warpath, accusing Bill and Melinda Gates of using "phony numbers" when they claim small victories in the war on malaria:

False victories can mislead and distract critical malaria efforts. Alas, Mr. and Mrs. Gates are repeating numbers that have already been discredited.

Gates repeated similar numbers at his TED talk:

Bed nets are a great tool. What it means is the mother and child stay under the bed net at night, so the mosquitoes that bite late at night can’t get at them. And when you use indoor spraying with DDT and those nets you can cut deaths by over 50 percent. And that’s happened now in a number of countries. It’s great to see.

So who’s right, Easterly or Gates? Is Gates deluding himself, and not being honest about the weakness of the data? I asked Bill Brieger, who runs the Malaria Matters blog, what he thought of Easterly’s allegations. And he didn’t even need to venture an opinion: he just started pointing me to pretty solid peer-reviewed research.

This paper, for instance, shows bed nets causing a 67% reduction in child malaria deaths in Rwanda, and a 62% reduction in Ethiopia, with similar reductions in infections.

In this paper, which looks at hospital admissions before and after a community-based malaria control program in rural Rwanda, there were 287 admissions due to suspected malaria before the program was introduced, of which 80.4% were confirmed by a lab to be malaria. After the intervention, the number of admissions due to suspected malaria fell to just 150 — and only 48.1% turned out to actually be malaria.

And this paper, looking at Mali, shows a highly effective cure for malaria which also "showed an additional benefit of preventing new infections".

To read Easterly’s blog, you’d think that a couple of WHO reports were all the information in existence on the success or otherwise of reducing malaria. That’s really not true. We’re talking about the poorest countries in the world, here: yes, it’s going to be difficult to pin down accurate nationwide statistics on malaria infection, although the WHO does the best it can. But just because those nationwide statistics aren’t particularly reliable doesn’t mean that anti-malaria campaigns aren’t working. In fact, looking at smaller-scale studies, they’ve been proved to work very well.

Posted in development | 1 Comment

Low-Probability Disaster of the Day, Exosphere Edition

From Andy Pazstor:

Pentagon brass, satellite industry executives and NASA leaders for years have publicly expressed concern about the dangers of orbital debris. But the odds of a direct hit between satellites were considered so small as to be basically unthinkable.

Is there a way of distinguishing, ex post, between (a) the ex ante probabilities having been wrong, and (b) the collision having been genuinely improbable? I’m going with (a).

Posted in statistics | 1 Comment

Stanford Update

The Stanford Group story is finally, slowly, making its way into the mainstream media, with BusinessWeek and Bloomberg both reporting that the group is undergoing a new SEC investigation.

BusinessWeek’s Matthew Goldstein also has the news that Charlesworth A.S. Hewlett, the eponymous CEO of C.A.S. Hewlett & Co., Stanford International Bank’s auditor for the past 20 years, recently died, although his office manager reports that there "plenty of qualified people" still doing auditing work.

Goldstein gets more out of Stanford’s spokesman, Brian Bertsch, than I’ve seen anywhere else, even going so far as to characterize his defense of the company as "vigorous". (Which certainly can’t be said about all of his no-comments to me.) So, for the record, here’s the latest from the company itself:

Stanford’s Bertsch says: "Although we were saddened by the death of [Hewlett’s] principal, our year-end audit is on track." He adds: "Our clients have confidence in us."

More damningly, Goldstein gets a former Stanford salesman, Charles Hazlett, on the record:

Stanford brokers who sold at least $2 million of CDs in a quarter kept 2% of the assets, says Hazlett… The high yields "never made any sense to me," he adds. "I never understood how they could generate the performance to justify those rates."

This jibes with an anonymous comment left on my own blog:

I had the dubious honor of briefly working as an analyst at the Stanford Group during the last decade… Although I never went so far as to go to the Feds with my suspicions, I was always skeptical about how the “Bank” generated its returns. Inquiries to the bank staff went unanswered. I made a lot of inquiries around the company HQ in Houston, and was usually rebuffed. And of those persons who would discuss the matter with me – including individuals who were very, very highly placed in the company – nobody seemed able to explain exactly how the “Bank” operated and how it generated the returns to the CD’s. The whole thing was as clear as mud. At the worst, it was a fraud. And even at the best, the “Bank” was actually a hedge fund, and if so, then the CD holders were being woefully undercompensated for their “deposits”…

I did mention my concerns to several of them, but was told by my principal to in no uncertain terms to STFU and stop interfering with his bonuses (Stanford Group rewarded their brokers VERY handsomely for generating new deposits and for persuading CD holders to roll over their deposits).

This does sound awfully like what was going on at Madoff, no?

Meanwhile, the banter over at Alphaville reveals that their crackshot Caribbean expert Stacy-Marie Ishmael is already on a plane to Antigua and that the FT’s lawyers have finally allowed it to start reporting on this story. Now that the UK press has the story in its teeth — the cricket angle alone is irresisitible for them — expect this to go genuinely mainstream very quickly.

Posted in banking, fraud | 1 Comment

Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Dalmady to Stanford International Bank: Show Me The Money! Alex Dalmady comes right out and says that the $8 billion doesn’t exist. Right now, I’m inclined to agree with him: I asked the Stanford spokesman this afternoon if he was sticking by his press release saying that SIB has $8 billion in assets, and he said that he’d have to call me back. He never did.

Related: SIB failed to deliver a $62 million check it had promised to fund the acquisition of Emageon. Emageon stock fell 44% on the news.

Almost 700 Merrill executives paid $1m-plus bonuses: The top four recipients took in a combined $121 million. But hey, look at the money they made for shareholders. Or, you know, don’t.

Bad news from the pasta-industrial complex: Yet another leading indicator, but at least this one’s tasty.

Posted in remainders | 2 Comments

Suze Update

I’ve been blogging for a good seven years now, and I’ve never — not even close — received anything like the amount of positive feedback that I got today for my blog entry on Suze Orman. I clearly touched a nerve, in a good way, and I’ve been wondering a bit about what exactly that nerve is.

My best guess is that just most people in this country care deeply about someone who has an unhealthy, dysfunctional relationship with money and credit, to the degree that it hurts not only themselves but also those around them.

We’re currently suffering the aftermath of the most torrid debt bubble the world has ever seen, and as a result the number of people struggling with financial ill-health is at an all-time high. These people need a doctor, not just a stimulus package. And Suze Orman, no matter how annoying you might find her, is one of very, very few people who are able to turn up with a Gladstone bag, diagnose the problem, and prescribe a cure. Maybe it’s not so hard to see why there’s a lot of gratitude right now for anybody with that kind of vocation.

Posted in personal finance | 1 Comment

Kanjorski and the Money Market Funds: The Facts

With the Kanjorski Meme still spreading (see Ben Smith, Andrew Leonard, Moldbug, and more), I think I’m finally able to squash it with some hard figures: there never was a $500 billion outflow from any asset class in the space of a couple of hours or even weeks, and the Fed never shut down or froze any money-market accounts.

This is not the first time that Kanjorski has made these allegations. But first, it’s worth going through the timeline.

On September 15, Lehman Brothers failed. The Reserve fund — which was $64 billion that morning, and which had a substantial investment in Lehman debt — saw $10 billion of withdrawals that day. The following day, September 16, it saw another $10 billion of withdrawals; on September 17, when withdrawals had reached a total of about $40 billion, it announced that redemptions would take "as long as seven days"; as we all know, that was massively overoptimistic.

The news from The Reserve was gruesome, and total withdrawals from money-market funds reached $104 billion that day, according to Crane Data. Another data provider, ICI, says that as of the close of business on the 17th, money-market funds had a total of $3,549.3 billion, which was a fall of just $30.3 billion from their level a week previously.

The following day, September 18, was bad but not quite as bad, with withdrawals of $57 billion, according to Crane Data. By the 24th, according to ICI, the total was $3,456.2 billion — a drop of another $93.1 billion from the 17th.

On September 19, worried about outflows from money-market funds, the Treasury announced that, for a fee, it would guarantee — not freeze — eligible money-market mutual funds. But the details of the plan still weren’t clear as of September 21, when Treasury said it was "continuing to develop the specific details surrounding the temporary guaranty program".

Substantially all of the outflows came from institutional accounts: retail investors never panicked. If you look at the weekly data for bank savings deposits, including money market deposit accounts, they stood at $3,167.4 billion on the 15th, and rose to $3,191.4 billion on the 22nd.

So where does the $500 billion outflow number come from? Would you believe: the Sunday New York Post, which on September 21 published a story headlined "Almost Armageddon" featuring this paragraph:

According to traders, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, money market funds were inundated with $500 billion in sell orders prior to the opening [on Thursday]. The total money-market capitalization was roughly $4 trillion that morning.

Remember where we’re at here: the end of the longest week in financial-market history, when no one — traders, reporters, Congressmen, you name it — was getting much if any sleep. Simple errors can easily be made, numbers can get fuzzy, everything was moving very fast and confusingly.

In any case, three days later, on September 24, Kanjorski held a hearing on Capitol Hill with Treasury secretary Hank Paulson. Here’s what he said:

I was talking to someone, one of my friends on Wall Street today, asking him to verify the money market run. It was anonymously reported in some of the New York papers, and I think I have evidence of it in some of our conversations, whether it was with you or with other experts, that between 11:00 and 11:30 on Thursday last, the money markets in the United States were hit by a run that amounted to about $500 billion of $4 trillion in accounts and that as I understand it, it was essential for the Federal Reserve to pump $105 billion into the system and to suspend operations or the money market accounts of the country would have, in fact, failed.

One, you should tell us that.

Kanjorski is clearly fishing here: he’s talking about anonymous newspaper reports and vague "conversations" and anonymous Wall Street "friends", and basically asking Paulson to confirm his suspicions. Which, naturally, Paulson doesn’t do, because the suspicions weren’t actually true. That said, however, Paulson’s being-polite-to-the-Congressman answer doesn’t explicitly say that Kanjorski’s numbers are false.

After that, we didn’t here much more about this meme until Kanjorski resuscitated it on C-Span, this time citing the Federal Reserve as his data source, and beefing up the numbers for good measure:

On Thursday at about 11 o’clock in the morning the Federal Reserve noticed a tremendous drawdown of, uh, money market accounts in the United States to the tune of $550-billion was being drawn out in in a matter of an hour or two…

We were having an electronic run on the banks. They decided to close down the operation, to close down the money accounts. … If they had not done that, in their estimation, by 2 PM that afternoon $5.5-trillion would have been withdrawn and would have collapsed the U.S. economy and within 24 hours the world economy would have collapsed.

This is all, frankly, fiction, and it’s not clear where most of it came from, although maybe Kanjorski’s "friends" on Wall Street are the same people as Michael Gray’s sources at the New York Post. Thinking back to that crazy week it’s easy to get details wrong, especially when you’re speaking off the cuff on a call-in show. But let’s stop treating it as though there’s any substance to it. Please.

Posted in Media, Politics | 1 Comment

In Praise of Suze Orman

The kind of people who read Portfolio.com — or, for that matter, The Big Money — are not Suze Orman’s target audience. You, dear reader, are likely an urban sophisticate; you’re probably male; there’s a very good chance you work somewhere in finance or the media; and when you ask questions about money, it’ll be about something specific: the relative merits of index funds and ETFs, for instance, or the amount that mortgage rates have to fall before it makes sense to refinance. You probably think that trying to live on $40,000 a year would be a real hardship.

Suze Orman, by contrast, has a very broad appeal, although it skews very female. Her base is emphatically not urban sophisticates: instead, she talks directly to millions of people that the financial media never normally reach. To give you an idea of the difference in audience, the median US adult female earns $20,014 per year. Even when you look at women with bachelor’s degrees, the median income rises only to $35,094. And yes, these women will, on average, raise 2.03 children.

Orman’s audience is not necessarily stupid — although they can and do make just as many boneheaded decisions as the rest of us — but they’re also not necessarily educated, and many of them lack even basic financial literacy: they have no idea what a percentage is, or an interest rate, or how to read a bank statement to work out how much you’ve been charged this month in fees. When they get promoted to supervisor in a call center, they’re the kind of people who say that whether or not there’s a difference between 0.2 cents and 0.002 cents is "a matter of opinion".

There are very few people who talk to these people and provide them with the financial basics; Suze Orman is by far the most successful, and for doing so she deserves medals rather than the kind of brickbats being thrown at her by James Scurlock in The Big Money.

Scurlock, from the beginning of his piece, clearly has no intention of treating Orman fairly:

How a bottle-blond former waitress and self-described "55-year-old virgin" with a taste for the good life became the financial messiah for millions of Americans might be a fun Lifetime original movie. Why the masses continue to invest their faith in Suze Orman in the wake of a financial meltdown she never saw coming is a more timely question.

Scurlock won’t tell you that the "55-year-old virgin" quote is taken, out of context, from an interview in which Orman is quite open about her life-long lesbianism and the fact that she’s been living with a woman for the past seven years. And yes, most people develop "a taste for the good life" once they’ve made tens of millions of dollars. But more to the point, Orman is not some kind of stock-market pundit whose job is to predict macroeconomic financial meltdown. She’s a personal-finance guru whose job is to help women manage their household finances in a healthy manner.

Yes, Orman lards her books with no small amount of Oprah-level pop-psychology — but when she does so, she’s generally right. It’s easy for the analytically-skilled elite of the information economy to scoff at such things, but something as basic as spending less than you earn really is akin to eating fewer calories than you burn: conceptually easy, but very hard in practice, especially when the world seems to be conspiring against you at every step. And succeeding in such matters requires a level of psychological discipline, while failing in them often has psychological causes.

Scurlock mocks Orman’s statement that "you will never achieve a sense of power over your life until you have power over your money," but it’s a great way of harnessing the imperatives of the otherwise largely destructive self-help movement and putting them to good use. As for "the stock market is like a pot of soup" — that’s as good a way as any to explain diversification. You want she should go into details of capital structure and limited liability corporate entities?

Orman’s audience is struggling with money woes. That’s true pretty much by definition: someone who has these things all worked out is not going to read her books. But it’s also true that most of Orman’s readers and viewers aren’t going to declare bankruptcy: there’s a huge terrain of financial difficulty between bankruptcy and health. It’s simply obtuse to imply, as Scurlock does, that because most bankruptcies are caused by catastrophic events, the people who don’t suffer catastrophic events and who don’t declare bankruptcy are probably fine, on a financial level. They’re not. Many of these people are in desperate need of financial help, and Orman is providing a very valuable service which America’s financial institutions have every incentive not to provide.

Financial wellness is about spending less than you earn, being happy with where you are financially, and not being greedy. Orman fits the bill. Yes, she spends a lot of money — but then again, she earns a lot of money too. In fact, she’s set for life, which means she has no need to risk her money in the stock market. So she doesn’t. There’s no hypocrisy there, only common sense.

On the other hand, it’s true that Orman says that if you need to see your investments grow, in order to be able to live comfortably in the future or provide a nest-egg for your heirs, then the best way of doing that is to reliably and consistently put a certain amount of money into the stock market every month. It’s good, basic advice: she would never advocate trying to pick stocks, or time the market, or anything idiotic like that. And if you’re investing a set dollar amount each month, then you buy more shares when they’re cheap and fewer when they’re expensive.

This is "dollar cost averaging", which for some reason makes Scurlock see red. He asks: "Since when does throwing good money after bad make you rich?", as though the alternatives — selling stocks after they’ve gone down, or not buying stocks when they’re cheap, or investing new money only during bull markets — are obviously better. They’re not: they’re worse.

It’s telling that Scurlock’s criticisms of Orman concentrate overwhelmingly on her investment advice — the one part of the large Orman oeuvre which might be relevant to most Portfolio.com readers, but also the one part which is probably least relevant to Orman’s real audience. Orman is not some get-rich-quick shill: she basically peddles common sense, which is a commodity the country could do with a lot more of.

In this debt-addled country with its lapses into the unsustainable world of negative savings rates, the pressing problem facing most Americans is not the fact that the stock market has fallen 40% from its highs, but rather the fact that they owe more money than they can realistically repay. That’s why Orman spends so much time on credit cards, and credit scores, and other aspects of the world of debt-peddlers. There are millions of Americans out there who fail to pay their credit card in full each month despite the fact that they have money in the bank to do so. There are tens of millions who have stock-market investments in taxable accounts alongside large consumer debts. And there are probably a hundred million or more Americans who are simply having a huge amount of difficulty living within their means, especially after taking into account their financial burdens.

Orman provides hope for these people — an eminently sensible roadmap for the future — in a quintessentially American demotic as opposed to the arcane language of the financial press. Not everyone who buys her books will end up acting on her advice: the temptation to borrow and spend is all around us, after all. But from a financial-literacy perspective, Suze Orman has made America a much better place than any other individual alive. Long may she continue to do so.

Posted in personal finance | 5 Comments

Brandeis, UMIFA, and UPMIFA

The WSJ has a good article today on the UMIFA vs UPMIFA endowment debate, although it sensibly avoids even mentioning the acronyms. In case you’re not a non-profit legislation nerd, it basically comes down to when you can spend your endowment and when you can’t: under UMIFA, which is the law in Massachusetts, non-profits are barred from spending endowment funds if they’re worth less than their initial dollar value. Under UPMIFA, which is rapidly being adopted nationwide but hasn’t yet made it into

Massachusetts law, they’re not.

Of course there’s a big Brandeis/Rose angle here. Brandeis’s stated reason for needing to close the Rose and sell off its art is that it’s not allowed, under Massachusetts law, to spend most of the money in its endowment. Therefore, it says, it has no choice but to liquidate its art museum. At the same time, however, it has not joined the group of non-profits, led by the Massachusetts Audubon Society, who are lobbying to get Massachusetts to make the switch.

Last week, Brandeis’s CFO, Peter French, was asked point-blank about this issue, and basically punted; today, in the Journal, a Brandeis spokesman does the same thing.

Joe Baerlein, a Brandeis spokesman, says much of the Brandeis endowment is under water because it was founded in 1948, making it relatively young for a top-tier university. But Mr. Baerlein says the school doesn’t want to spend endowment principal. "You want to deal in a prudent manner with any deficit," he says. Brandeis hasn’t joined the effort to ease endowment restrictions but is reviewing the Massachusetts legislation.

The fact that the Brandeis endowment is young is key — and it’s worth noting too that most of the Brandeis endowment was raised much more recently than 1948. If you have an old endowment, investment gains and inflation will have brought it to well above its original dollar amount, which means you’re not constrained by UMIFA in the way that younger non-profits are.

UMIFA on its face makes little sense. Why should a young endowment which has dropped by 10% be constrained from spending any money, while an old endowment which has dropped by 70% can still spend away merrily, even if the real value of that endowment is a fraction of what it was worth at gift? And in any case, why is the base case that endowments should always exist in perpetuity? Shouldn’t the world have more people like Bill Gates, who want to see their money spent quite quickly?

Meanwhile, Brandeis is saying that although a move to UPMIFA might allow it to spend more of the endowment and keep the Rose intact, it really doesn’t want to do such a thing. That’s a defensible stance to take — but it flies in the face of statements made when the Rose closure was first announced, when university officials basically blamed UMIFA for their decision. It would be great if Brandeis could come out with a definitive statement saying whether or not UMIFA was responsible for the decision to close the Rose. If the answer is no, then there should be a real debate about the relative merits of selling art versus spending down the endowment. If the answer is yes, then Brandeis should embrace the push to adopt UPMIFA much more aggressively.

Posted in art | 1 Comment

McGraw Hill vs Ritholtz

In the annals of unconvincing excuses, McGraw Hill’s stated reason for dropping Barry Ritholtz’s book comes pretty high up the list:

McGraw Hill spokesman Steven Weiss this afternoon said the publisher dropped the book because of a conflict with Ritholtz over editing, not because of his criticism of S&P. "The material needed extensive corroboration across a range of topics. We could not agree on unified approach with the author for resolving the issues," Weiss said.

This just doesn’t have credibility. Ritholtz is a blogger. He documents every single source, obsessively, at the end of every blog entry he writes. Indeed, he originally submitted a full 90 pages of sources to McGraw Hill to include in the book, which the publisher decided not to include on the grounds that they were "redundant and unnecessary". But if they wanted "extensive corroboration", that long list of sources would be a good place to start.

On the other hand, I can’t quite believe that McGraw Hill dropped an entire book — and wrote off what was surely a substantial advance — over this: 620 sober words on the ratings agencies, backed up with footnotes, which are right in line with the conventional wisdom on the subject, and which are buried in Chapter 14 of the book.

My guess is that this was basically a case of McGraw Hill not having negotiated with Barry Ritholtz before. Sometimes, the chemistry between two sides is so bad that things just deteriorate irreparably; I’m reminded of a striking part of last Sunday’s NYT tick-tock about Merrill Lynch:

Mr. Thain’s point man for the C.D.O. sales alienated a potential buyer, Guggenheim Partners, that had been willing to pay north of $2 billion more in cash than Merrill received.

Wall Street is meant to be all about money: if one buyer is willing to pay $2 billion more than another, that buyer will win the auction. But the messy world of humans all too often messes up such obvious truths.

In the case of Bailout Nation, my feeling is that the publisher never considered Ritholtz to be an adversary until it was too late. The two sides were going back and forth on edits, and Ritholtz was getting increasingly angry — but clearly no one at McGraw Hill realised that. Then, after one too many push-backs, Ritholtz picked up his toys and threw them out of the pram:

At this I drew my line in the sand at this point. My contract gave me FINAL EDIT.

I informed McGraw Hill that at this point, the manuscript was finished, and I was done. It was either “Fill or Kill.” In an email, I gave them until that Friday, to accept or reject the manuscript.

Ritholtz was, I’m sure, within his contractual rights to do this. But McGraw-Hill, which didn’t consider itself even close to signing off on the final manuscript yet — "legal had not even finished reviewing the manuscript at this time," says Ritholtz — at this point was stuck. Ritholtz is nothing if not stubborn, and there was no way that he was going to let them change so much as a comma, now that his line in the sand had been drawn. Faced with such an implacable adversary, they let the book go — and not without some relief, surely, that they wouldn’t need to face angry people from corporate sibling S&P — or, for that matter, Ritholtz himself, who is no mean force to be reckoned with when he turns against you.

Now, none of this explains why McGraw Hill would put out a formal statement saying that Ritholtz’s book "needed extensive corroboration", for all the world as though they were about to embark on some marathon fact-checking process without which the book could never be published. But the history of corporate flackery is full of such mysteries. The real reason the book’s been dropped, I think, is most likely just a matter of chemistry. And in this case the losses to both sides are much lower than $2 billion.

Posted in publishing | 1 Comment

Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Starting Public-Sector Jobs With Parting Gifts in Hand: Tim Geithner is getting about $500k from the New York Fed; Mary Schapiro is getting $7.2 million from Finra.

Disfarmer — The Puppet Version: Richard Lacayo says that bunraku-puppet photographer-bioplays with live banjo and accordion accompaniment are "just the kind of thing that ought to be supported, but won’t be, in any final stimulus package". He’s right.

Live Nation to buy Ticketmaster: Or not. Most likely the merger won’t pass antitrust scrutiny.

January U.S. Rail Traffic: Motor Vehicles Off 63%: Maybe this means fewer passenger-rail delays? Probably not.

A-Rod, the WSJ, and A1: What’s a boring photo of a baseball player doing all over the WSJ’s front page?

Nouriel Roubini and Nassim Taleb on CNBC: Krugman nails it.

Posted in remainders | 2 Comments

Barack Obama for Treasury Secretary!

After Tim Geithner’s uninspired and uninspiring performance today, Barack Obama stepped up to show him how questions about nationalization should be answered:

TERRY MORAN: There are a lot of economists who look at these banks and they say all that garbage that’s in them renders them essentially insolvent. Why not just nationalize the banks?

PRESIDENT OBAMA:Well, you know, it’s interesting. There are two countries who have gone through some big financial crises over the last decade or two. One was Japan, which never really acknowledged the scale and magnitude of the problems in their banking system and that resulted in what’s called "The Lost Decade." They kept on trying to paper over the problems. The markets sort of stayed up because the Japanese government kept on pumping money in. But, eventually, nothing happened and they didn’t see any growth whatsoever.

Sweden, on the other hand, had a problem like this. They took over the banks, nationalized them, got rid of the bad assets, resold the banks and, a couple years later, they were going again. So you’d think looking at it, Sweden looks like a good model. Here’s the problem; Sweden had like five banks. [LAUGHS] We’ve got thousands of banks. You know, the scale of the U.S. economy and the capital markets are so vast and the problems in terms of managing and overseeing anything of that scale, I think, would — our assessment was that it wouldn’t make sense. And we also have different traditions in this country.

Obviously, Sweden has a different set of cultures in terms of how the government relates to markets and America’s different. And we want to retain a strong sense of that private capital fulfilling the core — core investment needs of this country.

And so, what we’ve tried to do is to apply some of the tough love that’s going to be necessary, but do it in a way that’s also recognizing we’ve got big private capital markets and ultimately that’s going to be the key to getting credit flowing again.

Now I’m on the record as being decidedly pro-nationalization, but this is as clear and well-argued a case for not nationalizing as you could hope to get. First, Obama makes it very clear that he understands full well why nationalization is an attractive idea not just at first blush ("Why not just nationalize the banks?") but at second blush too.

Obama then makes the good point that the banking system in the US is orders of magnitude larger and more complex than the banking system in Sweden was when it was nationalized. He doesn’t even need to mention that the Swedish government is good at getting things done in the way that American governments simply aren’t. You try orchestrating something like this as seamlessly as the Swedes managed it. If the US government was in charge of "managing and overseeing" everything from trillions of dollars in bank assets to the amount that banks charge for a bounced check, there might well be all manner of unintended consequences, and indeed pro-nationalizers like myself have generally tried to come up with plans which would keep the banks operating at arm’s length from their shareholder even after they were nationalized.

Obama also talks about "traditions" and "cultures" — and he’s right, the Swedes are much more amenable, on a gut level, to state-owned banks than Americans are. That kind of thing matters more than many economists will admit. America has always prided itself on being the home of private-sector capitalism, and it doesn’t want to signal otherwise.

And so the Obama administration has put together a plan which tries to involve private capital as much as possible — something which really can’t be done if you’re nationalizing. It’s now incumbent upon Tim Geithner to articulate that plan clearly and in detail — something he inexplicably failed at today. I used to go to his press conferences when he was last at Treasury, in the late 1990s, and he was always very much on top of his brief then, so it defeats me why he would take no questions today and generally be so vague about what he intends to do.

Never has it been more important that the markets have faith in the Treasury secretary — and first impressions count for a lot. Today was a very bad start for Geithner. Obama’s doing his best to support him, but really that’s the wrong way round. Things had better start improving markedly very soon, or Geithner might not stay in his job for very long.

Incidentally, Paul Kedrosky is much less impressed by Obama’s response than I am:

All this talk of “culture”, “traditions”, and so on are an opaque way of saying that Democrats are terrified of nationalization because they worry about Republican name-calling. Further, saying that Sweden had five banks and the U.S. has thousands, so nationalization can’t happen here, is misleading. It ignores the relative GDPs of the two countries. What’s more, as measured by asset size, the problem is chiefly in the six largest U.S. banks which collectively account for the preponderance of the banking industry balance sheet. Muddying the issue by saying that we would need to nationalize “thousands of banks” isn’t helpful.

As I say, I think the point about culture and traditions is actually substantive; it’s not party-political. The number of banks in a country has almost nothing to do with its GDP; I don’t know what Kedrosky’s point is there. And Obama never said that we would need to nationalize thousands of banks. But if you nationalize some banks, then you introduce a generalized, and possibly self-fulfilling, fear that you might nationalize any bank. Pointing at smaller banks and saying "we won’t nationalize you" is a recipe for creating multiple bank failures, if there’s no other option for bailing them out. All of which points I’m sure Obama could have made much better himself, had Moran followed up rather than moving on to another topic.

Posted in bailouts, banking | 1 Comment

Can We Trust Statistics?

The Numbers Game, which was something of a surprise bestseller in England, has finally made it stateside. It’s probably the clearest book I’ve yet seen on all the different ways in which numbers can lie or mislead, and as such it can be a bit depressing. So I sent one of the two authors, Michael Blastland, an email, to see if there was any hope:

I take most if not all of this book to be a work of media criticism.

Now more than ever, we’re surrounded by hugely important numbers:

macroeconomic statistics like GDP and unemployment; enormous dollar

amounts for everything from office redecoration to infrastructure

investment to central bank liquidity lines to CDS notionals

outstanding; stock market indices; credit spreads; mortgage rates; etc

etc. But a reader of your book will naturally, and healthily, be

skeptical of all such numbers and especially any spin or meaning which

is put onto them.

So the question is: what is such a reader to do,

when coming across such numbers? Absent a long and deep rummage in raw

data, how can a consumer of the media know who to trust, if anybody?

And if the messenger isn’t trustworthy, should we just ignore that

news source entirely?

Here’s Michael’s reply:

Good question: is there an unforgiving choice between cynicism or becoming your own complete data nerd? I like to think there’s another way.

It starts by remembering that numbers are like words – surprise, surprise – they too can be ambiguous or even untruthful. Does that mean we junk them?

Of course not, no more than we can junk the language. It means we approach them with our wits about us and apply similar standards to those we’d use on, say, the language of politics.

Or at least, we should try. In practice, many of us tend to say that if numbers admit uncertainty or interpretation, they’re no better than lies and damned lies. Words, on the other hand, well, we have no choice but to try to navigate our way through those, using our wit and experience. That’s a self-defeating double standard and no-one is more hurt by it than those who thereby throw up their hands in resignation at every piece of data. The truth is that we can bring wit and experience to bear on numbers too: a few simple tricks and techniques, sometimes a few daft questions and, yes, a sense of who can be relied on to tell it straight(est).

For example, putting big numbers into human proportions is the simplest of ideas, but how often does anyone stop to calculate how much that $1.2 trillion dollar deficit would mean to them personally? That’s not remotely difficult to work out – you share it between the population – and you’d find that it was roughly equal to a guy on average earnings (about $50,000) taking out a loan for a used car (maybe $4,000), but usually only paying the interest (about $60 a year at the rates paid today by governments), because that’s how governments tend to manage these costs. Suddenly that impossible number is comprehensible. This doesn’t tell you whether the stimulus policy is wise, but it helps you put it in far better proportion than if you are left dumbfounded by a row of 11 zeros. There are all kinds of such tricks.

They’re no magician’s wand, but they sure help. For some reason, they’re seldom taught.

Michael’s dividing by 300 million here — the population of the United States, more or less — while I’m generally more inclined to divide by 100 million, which is roughly the number of households in the United States. After all, average earnings across the 300 million individuals in the US, including the elderly and children and the unemployed, are much less than $50,000.

So for me, a $1.2 trillion deficit works out at $12,000 per household — and that’s $12,000 of new borrowing just this year, on top of all the debt we’ve accumulated so far, which is something north of $10 trillion. By the end of this year we’re likely to have a national debt of about $12 trillion, or $120,000 per household — and now you’re talking real money.

Michael also reckons that the government is borrowing money at just 1.5%, which might be true right now, but clearly isn’t going to be true indefinitely. Sooner or later those borrowing costs are going to rise, and the debt service costs on $120,000 at say 5% work out at $6,000 a year, or $500 a month. Again, real money.

And Michael and I are very much looking at things the same way. Get politicians involved, and the arguments will never end, even about how to frame the question. Should we ask, for instance, how much America’s total net worth would fall in the absence of a stimulus package and a $1.2 trillion deficit? How much of the Fed’s "quantitative easing" should we include in the cost of the stimulus? Should we try to put a value on the loan insurance being written by Treasury? What about the present value of future Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security liabilities?

The upshot is really that there’s no easy shortcut through the hard work of trying to understand numbers for yourself. Everybody has an angle, and no one — journalists emphatically included — is particularly reliable.

Update: Michael replies:

In order to put the cost to the US economy of a 1.2 trillion deficit into proportion, I think that we really should compare it with US national income. That after all is what the US is being asked to do, as a nation, to pay $1.2 trillion on this occasion out of its national resources.

To personalise it, that’s about 14.5 trillion national income divided by 300m people compared with 1.2 trillion divided by 300m people. And that gives about $50,000 per head income compared with about $4,000 per head costs. If you want to divide it by household, it’s about $150,000 income, compared with about $12,000 costs. It’s a rough and ready way of doing the job, but it’s not too bad, I think.

But spot on about the interest rates. They are not going to stay this low, and that’s when the problem might really begin to bite. The cost of servicing the accumulated debt could grow quite quickly at that point.

Posted in statistics | 1 Comment

The Kanjorski Meme

This is the way that memes propagate: after appearing on LiveLeak and being picked up by Zero Hedge (twice), Paul Kedrosky, and Clusterstock, it hit BoingBoing, and now it’s everywhere: Panzer, Alphaville, SAR, the Economist, you name it. I’ve been ignoring it until now, but it’s reached ubiquity, and so someone needs to start asking whether it’s true.

Basically, what happened is that Paul Kanjorski, the chairman of the House financial services subcommittee, went on C-Span and said that $550 billion was withdrawn from money-market accounts on September 15 in the space of "an hour or two", that Treasury "closed down the money accounts", and that if they hadn’t done so, "by 2 PM that afternoon $5.5-trillion would have been withdrawn".

The problem is that none of this has been reported anywhere else, and I for one can’t remember any reports of money-market funds being closed down or Treasury suspending withdrawals. Kanjorski is talking anecdotally in the context of a C-Span phone-in, and even Kedrosky describes him as "semi-coherent". So by all means let’s ask him to clarify what he meant, or ask Treasury whether there’s any truth to all this. But let’s not just keep on passing around this videoclip without trying to work out what the facts of the matter are.

Posted in Media, Politics | 1 Comment

Geithner’s Vague Plan

I like the symmetry here. On November 21, when Barack Obama announced that he was nominating Tim Geithner to be his Treasury secretary, the Dow rose 494 points and broke through the 8,000 barrier. On February 10, when Geithner gave his first major speech as Treasury secretary, the Dow fell 273 points and broke through the 8,000 barrier.

The speech was surprising only in its vagueness. It’s been over 11 weeks since Obama’s announcement, and this is the best that Geithner can come up with?

We are exploring a range of different structures for this program, and will seek input from market participants and the public as we design it.

Geithner promises unprecedented levels of transparency for the new plan. So far, all we have is talk. The markets will wait to actually see the details — and, of course, will wait for Congressional approval of all this — before they start believing.

Posted in bailouts | 1 Comment

What’s Going On at Stanford International Bank?

Ray Pellecchia and I think that if Harry Markopolos had put his theories about Bernie Madoff online, Madoff would not have been able to continue his scam much longer. Against that, a lot of people are saying that no matter how detailed Markopolos’s analysis, without the backing of a large institution like the Wall Street Journal or the SEC, nothing would have happened.

So it’ll be interesting to see what happens now that Alex Dalmady has gone public with his suspicions about Stanford International Bank, an Antigua-based private bank with $8 billion in assets. Dalmady’s report can be found here; it makes for quite a rollicking read, and if I had any money with SIB I’d be asking some pointed questions right now.

Stanford International Bank has nothing to do with the university, but everything to do with a Texan billionaire cricket tycoon (yes, really) named Sir Allen Stanford. (His knighthood was the first ever bestowed on an American by the government of Antigua.) Stanford has close ties with Venezuela’s monied classes, who reportedly have some $3 billion in his bank; the Caracas branch of his bank was raided in November by the Venezuelan authorities, who accused him of being a US spy.

But the Americans don’t seem particularly enamored of Sir Allen either: the SEC started issuing subpoenas to Stanford Group in July, after two employees quit, saying "that the company gave clients false historical performance data for its securities".

What is that performance data? Here’s a table from Dalmady’s report:

dalmady.jpg

As you can see, Stanford manages to report extremely consistent returns every year, and it even managed to make a 6% profit on its portfolio in 2008. Which is extremely impressive, given what happened to just about every asset class last year. And which is even more impressive given that Stanford International Bank is a bank which doesn’t make loans.

SIB, it turns out, is a very peculiar fish indeed: it offers extremely high interest rates on its deposits — on the order of 7.5% for a one-year CD. It then takes that money and, rather than lending it out at a higher rate still, invests it in stocks and hedge funds and commodities and the like.

If that sounds dangerous to you, ask yourself whether you’d be remotely reassured by the "Depositor Security" section of Stanford’s website:

SIB has seen consistent profitability and growth every year since the Bank was founded. After first paying its clients a premium return on their deposits and then rewarding employees for their performance, the Bank has reinvested every dollar earned back into retained earnings. This has continuously strengthened SIB’s capital base for future growth and is a significant difference between SIB and other international banks.

Basically, this is Allen Stanford — the bank’s sole shareholder — saying "I’m a billionaire, I’m good for the money".

There’s much more in Dalmady’s report than just suspiciously good returns, however. Check this out:

The bank has 75 employees on the island.

But a small group manages it. There is mention of an investment committee, but the members of the committee are not

named. A few years ago there was an actual investment manager or VP; now the position appears to be vacant. There is one

board member, an 85-year-old cattle rancher and used car dealership owner who has the title of “Investments”…

The financial statements of the bank are

audited. The auditor is a local (island) firm. The principal is a 72-year-old gentleman who has been auditing the bank for many

years (at least ten). PriceWaterhouseCoopers and KPMG have

offices on the island, and it is a good internal control practice to

change auditors every few years, but the bank prefers to stick

with its trusted firm.

The banking authorities which supervise the bank are those

from the island. The same island with the population similar to

Altagracia de Orituco. The bank does not take institutional

deposits or deposits from other banks. This is not necessarily a

bad thing, but corporate depositors would be expected to do

some due diligence on the bank before committing their money.

Right now, Dalmady’s report has been picked up mainly by the Latin blogosphere (see here and here for starters). That makes sense, given that SIB’s investors are mostly Latin Americans looking to keep their money offshore.

Now the SEC has been looking into Stanford since July, and hasn’t announced anything, so maybe there’s really nothing to see here. I have a call in to Stanford’s spokesperson, Lula Rodriguez; I’ll let you know if and when she gets back to me. But certainly the world is more attuned to the possibility that its financial institutions are dodgy than it was even a few months ago. So maybe the real scrutiny of SIB is only beginning.

Update: Brian Bertsch, director of press relations at Stanford Financial Group, phoned me with this statement:

We have seen the report. We believe it is the opinion of one analyst, and we have no further comment at this time.

Well, yes, of course it’s the opinion of one analyst. I don’t think anybody’s disputing that.

Posted in banking, fraud | 2 Comments

Sorkin’s Questions Answered

Andrew Ross Sorkin has a great list of questions this morning for Congress to ask the big banks’ CEOs when they appear in Washington tomorrow. He’s too polite to provide the real answers, so let me try.

1. Try to sell American taxpayers on why they should invest in your firms and what kind of returns they should expect.

As standalone entities, absent a bailout, these banks are likely to collapse. With a bailout, they may not collapse. But if the government prevents collapse, then it should become the owner of the banks in so doing, and get all of any possible upside. As to the probability of any upside, the CEOs’ guesses are no better than anybody else’s. And they’re not in a position to bargain. They’ll take the bailout money on whatever terms it’s offered: they have no choice.

2. The government has lent your firms hundreds of billions each at an annual cost of 5 percent. There is speculation in the marketplace that you have turned around and used the money to buy corporate bonds with yields as high as 20 percent, like Alltel debt, for example. If that is the case, this new “carry trade” is allowing you to arbitrage the difference using taxpayer money. Is this so? And if it is, should it be?

Hey, you wanted us to get lending again; are you saying that Alltel’s not worthy of lending to? The point of the TARP was to unfreeze credit markets; providing a bid for high-yield bonds is a necessary part of that. But if the government would rather lend to Alltel directly, it should certainly feel free to do so.

3. This question is for Mr. Pandit of Citigroup… Why should taxpayers be willing to make a bet on a company that so far you seem unwilling to bet on yourself?

Again, this is really a question for Tim Geithner more than it is a question for Vikram Pandit. Pandit has no moral obligation to buy stock in an insolvent bank just because he’s its CEO. And the taxpayers aren’t speculators: they’re not buying Citi stock in the hope that it will go up. (If they were, they’d be the majority owner, and Geithner clearly doesn’t want that.) All the same, the government is calling the shots, and if it wants Pandit to leave, then Pandit will leave. If it doesn’t, then he might stick around a while yet.

4. Last month, several banks — Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase, among them — lent $22.5 billion to Pfizer to help finance its acquisition of Wyeth. The two drug companies said that part of the motivation of the deal was to cut $4 billion in annual costs. Much of that is likely to come in the form of jobs… Given that Congress is considering a stimulus plan to help create and save jobs, is it consistent to allow TARP-funded banks to make loans to corporations that will inevitably hurt the economy, at least in the short run?

Job losses from M&A deals are the least of the economy’s worries right now: the government should be much more worried about companies which close down with the loss of all jobs, if no potential buyer is willing to step up. Admittedly, that was never a risk with Wyeth. And it’s probably true that the $22.5 billion going to Wyeth shareholders is unlikey to finance a lot of near-term job growth. But ultimately you wanted us to extend credit, and that’s what we’re doing, and you can’t know that absent the Wyeth deal, Pfizer and Wyeth might not have announced equally large job cuts on their own.

5. Since credit card defaults are correlated to employment, what happens if unemployment goes as high as 10 percent or more? What is the highest unemployment level that you’ve used in your forecasting models? And do you have adequate reserves for your worst-case situation? If your assumptions are wrong, what happens?

No bank has reserved enough money to cover credit-card losses in the event that unemployment reaches 10%. If it gets there, anybody with credit-card exposure is going to have to take further write-downs.

6. Do you think Glass-Steagall should have been repealed? Do you think there should be a limit on the amount of leverage, or borrowed money, that your banks can employ? (Not just capital ratios.) What’s appropriate?

As we’ve seen with WaMu and Wachovia, having a commercial bank without an investment-banking subsidiary hardly protects you. The key thing, as you imply, is not whether or not there’s an investment bank, but rather how much leverage you have. And yes, that should be regulated. If everybody else has their leverage strictly capped, we’ll all be competing on a level playing field. Otherwise, banks with prudent amounts of leverage will look like underperformers during good years.

(Update: Wachovia does actually have an investment bank, but it wasn’t responsible for the parent’s losses.)

7. Your compensation structure has been “heads I win, tails I win” for you and many of your employees, despite putting your firm and the nation’s fiscal health in jeopardy. What’s the right model? And how do you feel about forcing your employees to risk their own money, not just the firm’s, when they make a trade or participate in a transaction that puts shareholder capital at risk?

The right model, again, involves capping leverage — which by necessity means capping profits. Once you’ve done that, a lot of the excess paydays will be a thing of the past. As for employees risking their own money, would you lend me money at 4.5% over 30 years to buy a house?

8. Treasury has proposed a $500,000 cap on compensation for banks that take new TARP money. Many of you have privately complained that you will lose your top talent. Are these the same people that helped lose your banks billions? And can you quantify the impact on your earnings without such “talent?”

Yes. No. But the question’s largely moot, since the cap applies only to a handful of very top executives — no more than four or five at any firm. The rest of the company can still be paid millions.

9. Mr. Blankfein and Mr. Mack, both of you have been outspoken about your firm’s intention to repay the TARP money that you received as fast as possible. Mr. Blankfein, you have also hinted that you have little intention of changing your firm’s business model despite being granted bank holding company status and access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Please explain whether we should have provided you the money in the first place and whether your status as a bank holding company should be rescinded? If both took place, could you survive?

The bank holding company status allows Goldman to be regulated more assiduously, and its leverage to be capped. You really don’t want that? As for getting TARP funds in the first place, we had no choice in that matter: Hank Paulson gave us a take-it-or-take-it offer. Ask him.

10. Please explain how you feel about the newest TARP proposal from the Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner. Would you be willing to sell toxic assets into a “bad bank” if you are forced to realize serious losses? At what price would you be willing to sell your toxic assets?

I’ll sell toxic assets at a loss so long as I can do so without violating my minimum capital requirements. You can buy those assets off me or you can simply recapitalize me directly: the net effect is similar, but in the latter case, of course, you risk ending up owning the bank, and you wouldn’t want that. Would you.

Posted in banking | 2 Comments

Extra Credit, Monday Edition

The case for bonuses: "The answer is the one given by the Tory leader David Cameron today, which is that if taxpayers hadn’t rescued those banks then those employees wouldn’t have jobs, let alone bonuses."

CNBC vs. Barrons: The Complete Cramer Pissing Match: Another one of those battles you wish both sides could lose. In this case, it seems as though CNBC comes off slightly less badly, although it’s close.

Time to Hang Up the Pajamas: Dan Lyons on why blogs don’t make money. "Last year the total spent on blog advertising in the United States was a mere $411 million, according to researcher eMarketer. That represents only a sliver of the $23.7 billion spent on U.S. Internet ads last year… More money was spent on e-mail advertising last year than was spent on blog advertising—yet you don’t see anyone touting e-mail as the next big billion-dollar media business."

Subcomittee on Financial Services Accepts Surprise Testimony by Bernie Madoff: Hell, if he’s going to plead guilty, why not?

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The CNBC Cacophony, Taleb-Roubini Edition

Josh Marshall points to a classic case of people talking past each other, when Nassim Taleb and Nouriel Roubini appear on CNBC to talk about big-picture economic crisis, while the anchors in the studio are interested in things like why "the financials are rallying today". After Taleb talks about the need for massive global deleveraging and deep-rooted systemic change, he’s immediately faced with an absolute classic of a question:

"How is this actionable? How is this actionable? Nassim, Nassim, how do I sublimate that into action today?"

Well, you could start by switching off CNBC and doing something more useful instead, like bashing your head repeatedly into a brick wall until it bleeds.

Posted in Media | 1 Comment

Why Micropayments Won’t Work for the NYT

I’m not sure why the micropayments-as-the-savior-of-journalism meme seems to have taken off of late, but I’m glad there are lots of people trying to squash it: I’d particularly recommend Gabe Sherman and Clay Shirky. But in the case of Steve Brill’s "secret memo" on the subject, it’s worth responding to some of his specifics; a few points are worth making beyond those of David Cay Johnston.

First, Brill frames the question in an utterly bizarre manner, through the parent of a journalism student:

As one parent put it to me last fall, "why are you luring my daughter into something that will never pay her loans when she could go to work for McKinsey?" I have been trying to construct an answer for her.

The answer is simple: "madam, if your daughter wants to go work for McKinsey, she’s more than welcome to". You want to make lots of money? Don’t become a journalist. In fact, if you’re the kind of person who would make a great management consultant, don’t become a journalist: the skillsets are just too different.

Brill’s also a bit too fond of the sweeping assertion:

There is simply no example, not one – in print, on line, in television – of quality content offered for free ever resulting in a viable business.

Well, I suppose that if you define "quality" narrowly enough, this might be defensible. But there is actually quite a lot of quality network TV. Online, Yahoo might be having troubles right now, but no one denies that at its core is a viable business. And as for print, the problem with giving it away for free is the enormous printing and distribution costs — but pretty much all consumer magazines and newspapers subsidize those and ensure that the consumer pays much less than the real cost of the physical product they’re consuming.

Brill also frets that newspapers’ websites aren’t good at delivering "specialized content for vertical audiences". Um, duh? Newspapers have never been good at specialized content for vertical audiences: that’s simply not what they do. If Brill is interested in cost-per-acquisition, then I daresay he’s quite right to go somewhere other than a newspaper when he’s spending ad dollars. But not all advertisers are looking for something quite so direct in terms of getting a return on their ad spend.

Brill’s plan goes into loads of detail on the numbers — how much per month, what the free content would look like, how Google would spider it, etc etc — but never stops to ask how people would pay all of this money. His ideas reek of Web 1.0: there’s no indication that an online property needs to take part in the conversation, and that subscription firewalls are a way of shutting that conversation down. Hell, he even says that "there would be a five cent charge to forward an article to someone else". Way to kill stone dead the best advertising a paper can get!

In the age of blogs, the NYT has carved out an enviable place for itself as the paper of online record: if I want to comment on a commodity news story, there’s a very good chance that the version of the news story that I use will be the NYT’s. I do that because I know that the NYT doesn’t break permalinks, that all my readers will be able to read the story without difficulty, and because the brand is simply authoritative.

The minute the NYT stops doing that, I will immediately start linking to someone else: the Guardian, perhaps, or Reuters. The fact is that although Brill might care very much about the difference between the NYT’s content and everybody else’s, most of the world doesn’t. There’s enormous amounts of journalism available for free, much of it better than the NYT’s. Maybe a NYT subscription firewall would serve only to help drive the internet to someone better — an aggregator, perhaps, which finds the best free coverage of every story. I’m sure that Daylife, for one, would pay lots of money to get the NYT to take Brill’s advice.

I do however like Brill’s idea of giving or selling shares to subscribers — it’s something I’ve been pushing for a while. It’s a great way of raising new permanent capital while ensuring that the incentives of the owners are absolutely to put out the best possible journalism. I’d happily buy a couple of dozen voting shares tomorrow, even if they lost their voting rights the minute I transferred them, or even if I wasn’t allowed to sell them at all. So long as such payments are voluntary, there’s no problem. The difficulty comes when you start trying to force people to pay for your product. When you do that, they tend to disappear with startling rapidity.

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