Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Know When To Hold ‘Em: Why the FDIC shouldn’t have sold IndyMac.

PIMCO says too early to buy emerging markets: In Asia, at least.

Probability, VIX, Bad Math, and Reporters Who Don’t Know the Difference: How the VIX massively overestimated actual stock-market volatility.

First, Fire the Regulators: And then make them stronger.

Doom On Wheels: Where are the financial covenants in the automaker bailout?

Watching the Growth of Walmart Across America: More gorgeous data visualization.

So Long: "It’s obviously possible, in engineering terms, to construct a subway line in fewer than 23 years." Yes, Ryan, but this is LA. You have to leave extra time for traffic.

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Ecuador Craziness Datapoint of the Day

Today is clearly "crazy things people try to do while in default on their debt" day. First Friendfinder Networks tries to IPO, and now Ecuador is trying to borrow more money:

Ecuador is seeking $2.6 billion in credits from regional multilateral lenders…

Correa said his government is working on securing $1.5 billion in credits from the Inter-American Development Bank, $600 million from the Andean Development Corporation and $480 million from the Latin American Reserve Fund…

Correa’s announcement to seek loans comes only weeks after the country defaulted on $3.8 billion in global bonds.

Under no lending-into-arrears policy that I’ve ever heard of should this be remotely acceptable, and I hope and trust that the IDB and its partners send Ecuador away with a flea in its ear: this is probably just an example of the tone-deafness of Ecuador’s current administration. But if both Friendfinder Networks and Ecuador get the money they’re looking for, expect default rates to start skyrocketing further than anybody currently fears. Why not default, if you still have access to funds thereafter?

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John Paulson, Proud Short

Gary Weiss has a profile of John Paulson in the February issue of Portfolio which I misread when I first came across it. He talks a bit about Paulson being "unrepentant" about the money he’s made during the market crash and making "no apologies" for it. And as if to answer the question of what Paulson has to apologize for, he adds this:

Left unexamined is the uncomfortable moral dimension of Paulson’s achievement. If he saw all of this coming, was it right for him to keep his own counsel, quietly trading while the financial system melted down? Do traders who figure out a way to profit from our misery deserve our contempt or our admiration, however grudging?

My feeling is that Paulson is exactly the kind of person we want more of: someone who makes big directional down bets when he sees a market getting overheated. Enough of those, and the market might be able to self-correct, rather than implode. Far from having anything to apologize for, Paulson is one of the heros of this crisis, all the more so for actually putting big money on the line rather than simply waxing bearish in the financial media.

Weiss cleared this up for me: "I don’t think Paulson did a thing wrong, morally or legally or in any other way," he said. In fact, Weiss is quite the fan of short selling, as he’s explained on his blog and in his book:

Short selling is the only market force that can impede the inflated pricing of hyped stocks. Countless studies of short selling have proven that shorting improves the liquidity of the market, and is the only means by which negative information is incorporated in stock prices.

Weiss also gets an anecdote from short-seller Jim Chanos, who says that he was put under some pressure by Bear Stearns CEO Alan Schwartz to go on CNBC and defend the bank, the day before it went under. "That fucker was going to throw me under the bus," says Chanos; Schwartz’s people deny the whole thing, but the denials, coming as they do only from an anonymous person "who has spoken to Schwartz," are unconvincing.

There are precious few heroes in the story of this financial crisis, but if there are any then Paulson should probably be counted among them. Don’t hate him for his money, or for his hubris: there are lots of proud rich fund managers, and most of them have avoided receiving the kind of opprobrium which has been aimed at Paulson. As Jesse Eisinger says in his own column this month:

We need more dissidents. We need to make the world a safer place for short-sellers to criticize companies. Regulators should publicly praise short-sellers, rather than periodically ban their activities. Critics and whistleß≠blowers, no matter how self-motivated, should be regularly consulted about suspicious companies, not dismissed as cranks once they expose wrongdoing.

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Blogonomics: Wallstrip Goes From $5 Million to Zero

The message on the Wallstrip home page is upbeat:

Happy Birthday to us

That’s right, two years of pure web video stock market fun. The market’s slowing down, but we’re not!

Except, Wallstrip has slowed down all the way to a complete stop. It hasn’t updated since December 12, and now PE Week Wire says that it’s not going to come back:

A source familiar with the situation says that Wallstrip owner CBS Interactive plans to “take the DNA from WallStrip and apply it" to fellow CBS property BNet. No word on if that DNA includes current WallStrip host Julie Alexandria, or past host Lindsay Campbell (whose subsequent CBS show MobLogic also hasn’t published since Dec. 12).

CBS had acquired WallStrip for $5 million in May 2007, from a group of angels that included Fred Wilson.

For these purposes, I think it’s fair to assume that "the DNA from WallStrip" is at this point worth zero, which means that CBS has managed to blow not only the $5 million acquisition price but also whatever extra money it’s pumped into the property over the past year and a half.

Wallstrip always seemed like a reasonably good way of making money, because it managed to place itself in the sweet spot for web advertising: rich, high-end viewers watching video content — which has always sold for very high rates compared to banner ads. Its demise is bad news for the secondary market in blogs: it’s probably the most expensive blog ever to go all the way to zero. Well done to Fred Wilson et al for getting out at the top: yet again, smart investing has proven to be all about when you sell.

(HT: Kedrosky)

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Meagan Chung Pleads Innocent

In one of the longest news articles I can remember reading in the New York Post, the SEC’s Meagan Chung — the woman who investigated Bernie Madoff in 2005 and cleared him of fraud — tries, unconvincingly, to defend herself. Instead, she comes across as even less competent than we thought:

[Said Cheung:] "If someone provides you with the wrong set of books, I don’t know how you find the real books." …

Regarding Madoff specifically, Cheung said, "I never met the man."…

Markopolos gave the investigators a long memo that flatly said that "Madoff Securities is the world’s largest Ponzi scheme."…

Soon after, in January 2006, the New York branch of the SEC opened an enforcement case on Madoff based on Markopolos’ claims. The document authorizing that probe is signed by three SEC staffers: Cheung, attorney Simona Suh, and Assistant Director Doria Bachenheimer.

But after interviewing Madoff… the SEC probe "found no evidence of fraud," according to a case closing recommendation signed off by those three staffers.

The first quote here is utterly damning: Cheung seems to be saying that unless a fraudster actively cooperates with the SEC, there’s no way he’s going to be caught: the SEC just checks books against themselves, rather than against any kind of reality.

And the second is even worse: Cheung led the investigation, which included interviewing Madoff, but she herself "never met" him.

What’s most striking is that Cheung shows no remorse at all: she never even says that she wishes she had uncovered the fraud, or that she’s sorry she didn’t. Instead, we get this:

"Everyone in the New York office behaved ethically and responsibly and did as thorough an investigation as we could do," said Cheung.

Did we ever live in a world where professionals take responsibility for their actions? I guess not:

"I supervised some lawyers and I was supervised by many levels above me. I’m just mid-level management."

It’s just as well that Cheung has left the SEC already, for personal reasons. She certainly wouldn’t be happy there now.

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Taking a Bankrupt Company Public

One of the defining features of the dot-com bubble was the long line of loss-making companies coming to market with IPOs. That all came to an end when the bubble burst, and right now nobody is coming to market with an IPO. Nobody, that is, except Friendfinder Networks. Which not only is losing lots of money: it’s also in default on its debt.

Just check out the prospectus: in the first nine months of this year, the companyhad a net loss of $32 million, after losing $50 million in 2006 and $30 million in 2007; its accumulated deficit now stands at $131 million. Right now its total liabilities of $691 million significantly exceed its assets of $647 million, which means that shareholders’ equity is negative. Oh, and there’s this risk statement:

Our financial statements include an explanatory paragraph concerning conditions that raise substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern, and there is no guarantee that we will be able to continue to operate our business or generate revenue.

Friendfinder Networks has exactly one asset that anybody has any interest in: lots of (mostly insalubrious) web traffic. Just like during the dot-com boom, we’re being asked to ignore the P&L, and concentrate instead on the the eyeballs — or, as they’re known now, visitors. But unlike the dot-com boom, there’s also that debt to worry about.

If anybody really wanted to own Friendfinder Networks, all they would need to do is buy up its bonds, refuse to modify the covenants, accelerate the debt, and force the company into bankruptcy, where it would be handed over to its creditors, with shareholders being wiped out.

Given that very realistic scenario, it’s very hard to see why anybody at all should be interested in participating in this IPO. As Floyd Norris says, you don’t need moral squeamishness to stay away from this: there are "plenty of other reasons for investors to shy away".

Is Renaissance Capital really underwriting this offering in the old-fashioned sense that it’s promising to buy any shares which nobody else wants to touch? What does Renaissance intend to do with such a large slug of worthless equity? Something weird is going on here, because I simply can’t see why anybody thinks this IPO can get off the ground — especially in this market. But maybe that’s why I’m not a banker in equity capital markets.

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Why the New York Times Won’t Cease Printing

The end of the world is nigh! Or the end of the print edition of the NYT, anyway, at least according to Michael Hirschorn, in a piece which has been generally well-received by a blogosphere. For me, however, the article makes very little sense: Hirschorn seems to think that given a choice between defaulting on debt payments and stopping its print presses, the Sulzbergers might choose the latter. But they wouldn’t: for one thing that’s not a decision the NYT’s lenders would actually want, and for another thing the New York Times Company has any number of assets it could sell off, especially in Boston, before taking such a drastic move.

Hirschorn also seems to think that the newspaper might soon be up for sale, if it isn’t already, and reels off a familiar list of potential buyers: Geffen, Bloomberg, Slim, Murdoch, Google, Microsoft, CBS. But even they can’t save the print edition, he says:

At some point soon–sooner than most of us think–the print edition, and with it The Times as we know it, will no longer exist. And it will likely have plenty of company.

The second part is right: many smaller newspapers will close their print editions, which have lost the classified-advertising bread-and-butter revenue stream upon which they’ve historically relied.

But the New York Times is not a small newspaper. It has an enormous display-advertisement inventory, and sells most of it at high rates. It’s also incredibly well placed to go national, as smaller papers close, and become a replacement for people who’ve lost their local paper and who shudder at the prospect of ever reading USA Today.

Hirschorn, by contrast, is thinking small: he calls the Huffington Post "the prototype for the future of journalism", and singles out the NYT’s DealBook blog as "a cash cow for The Times". I’m not sure what Hirschorn’s idea of a cash cow is, but that characterization just looks strange coming, as it does, in the wake of Hirschorn’s easy dismissal of the extremely-lucrative T Magazine as "lifestyle fluff". I can assure Hirschorn that DealBook’s email ads make a lot less money than T’s luxury gloss.

And then, to top it all off, there’s this:

As of December, its stock had fallen so far that the entire company could theoretically be had for about $1 billion. The former Times executive editor Abe Rosenthal often said he couldn’t imagine a world without The Times. Perhaps we should start.

Er, no. The NYT has two classes of stock, as Hirschorn knows full well: the secondary-market price of the non-voting stock can’t simply be extrapolated to get the amount that someone would need to pay for voting control. And in any case, $1 billion is still a lot of money. To put that number in perspective, over the past four quarters, the New York Times Company has lost about $30 million. I think it’s pretty safe to say that the NYT is going to continue to exist in its present form for quite a long time yet.

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Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

How to tackle foreclosures and unemployment at the same time: Get some desperately-needed empirical data on loan mods.

Doing the Math to Find the Good Jobs: Mathematicians have the top three best jobs. Economists are in 11th place, just ahead of philosophers.

Preach What You Plan To Practice: "You can get better results from using hypocrisy than any other technique."

Choice of audit firm: "Ernst and Young, KPMG and PWC all have a reasonable chance of failing as a result of auditing Madoff feeder funds."

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Quants: What Are They Doing These Days?

I was talking about quant funds this afternoon, and got to wondering what on earth they’re doing these days, given that their m.o., up until say the summer of 2007, was to find trading ideas, backtest them, try them out in real life for a while, and then pull the trigger and actually trade on them.

The question then becomes: what now? When you backtest, do you backtest through the quant blow-up of 2007 and the stock-market meltdown of 2008? If so, do you really think that’s going to give you the kind of trading idea which will make money going forwards? And if not, then what do you ignore, and why do you ignore it, and what makes you think you won’t run into a third period of high volatility which will lie well outside any reasonable assumptions you might make?

Up until 2007, the problems with quant funds was that the models didn’t remotely conceive of the world as it transpired. Now, the problem with quant funds is that they can’t help but conceive of the world as it transpired — and basing your trading strategy on black-swan events which happen only very rarely is not a way to make lots of money.

I did express some hope, over the course of a fine bourbon, that the quants in question would find something rather more useful to do, rather than try to predict the future path of the ridiculously complex system that is the global financial system. But quants, anecdotally, are still in demand — I get the feeling that many investors seem to believe that if they’ve blown up once, they’re somehow less likely to blow up again. Which is something for which there is no empirical evidence at all.

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Tribune Implosion Datapoint of the Day

How low can recovery rates go? Today the CDS auction on Tribune’s defaulted bonds settled at 1.5 cents on the dollar, which is low but in line with expectations of bondholders essentially getting nothing once the secured creditors have been paid.

Much more startling is the price on the senior secured loans: just 23.75 cents on the dollar. I checked in with Nishul Saperia at Markit, and he said that it was the lowest recovery rate he’d ever seen for a secured loan; historically, such debt would recover at 70 to 90 cents on the dollar if it ever defaulted.

A lot of the problem is that Tribune is a mess of a company, and it’s going to take a lot of time and money to liquidate the assets which will ultimately be used to pay off the loanholders. Plus, of course, the fact that most of the loans were extended during the boom years when covenants and other creditor protections had a habit of disappearing for little if any reason.

I should imagine that today’s news has been greeted with a shudder at the Chicago Tribune, the LA Times, and other Tribune properties: clearly no one on Wall Street thinks they’re worth much even without the huge pile of debt that Sam Zell loaded onto their fragile shoulders. Is David Geffen still interested in buying an uneconomic trophy property? He could turn out to be many employees’ final hope.

Posted in bonds and loans, derivatives, Media | Comments Off on Tribune Implosion Datapoint of the Day

The Deaccessioning Debate

I’ve been catching up on the art blogs this slow news day, which means catching up on a long and sometimes confusing debate about deaccessioning which was sparked by the sale of two paintings by New York’s National Academy. Ground zero for this debate is Donn Zaretsky’s Art Law Blog, but a lot of big names have been drawn in, including David Ross, the former director of both the Whitney and SF MoMA, who has been commenting chez Richard Lacayo.

Ross and Lacayo talk of a museum collection as an accretion of curatorial decisions: "museums collect most heavily when trustees and other donors are prospering," says Lacayo, adding that "in any given period a museum collection is a combination of available funds plus curator/director taste."

But that’s not really true at all. While there are isolated cases of generous benefactors leaving large amounts of cash to art museums, as Leonard Hanna did in Cleveland or David Rockefeller did in New York, most of the time it’s private collectors who do the acquiring, rather than institutions. The institutions then collect the collectors, and persuade them to leave all or part of their art to the museum.

As a result, most museums have large quantities of art that none of their directors ever particularly wanted, which ended up in their collection thanks to some bequest or other, and which will, realistically, never be shown. Even if such art is sold to a private individual it will still be seen by more people than if it’s kept in a basement somewhere. And if the sale conforms to Adrian Ellis’s proposed rule, I don’t see any downside at all. Here’s the rule:

You can deaccession and spend the money on whatever you want – a new roof, working capital, education programs, or even a boffo night out with your chums on the board — provided that you ensure that the institution or individual to whom you sell commits in some binding form to equal or higher conservational standards and equal or higher public access.

It’s a bit like a Creative Commons license for art, and it seems like a great idea to me. Consider the Eakins which once belonged to the National Academy and now belongs to LACMA: this is a classic positive-sum bargain which benefits both institutions and the general public.

Ellis’s rule even provides something of a bridge to Tyler Green, who’s very much on the side of the no-deaccessioning absolutists. Writes Green:

If an institution, such as the National Academy or someone else, can’t operate effectively enough to stay open, it should close. Then it should disperse its collection to non-profit institutions — to other museums. This way art collections held in a public trust remain held in a public trust.

If the National Academy were to adopt Ellis’s rule, then the worst-case scenario would effectively be what Green is talking about here: it keeps on selling off its collection to other museums until there’s nothing left. On the other hand, if such sales manage to keep the institution alive and thriving, attracting new artists who donate valuable examples of their own work, then we end up at a place which is unambiguously better than closing. As Zaretsky says, "meet Mr. Pareto".

I do, however, have sympathy for Green’s idea that selling off a permanent and irreplaceable part of your bequest in order to meet temporary liquidity needs is generally a very bad idea. Which is why it might be good to have some kind of "uptick rule" in place as well, which makes it much easier for flush, successful museums to deaccession than those who are in desperate financial straits. The best time to sell off extraneous art is when the market is hot, when donors are giving you and other museums lots of money, and when you can deaccession in a considered and strategic manner. The worst time to sell art is when you need to plug a fiscal hole, the market has tanked, and you flail around to find the most valuable paintings in your collection.

In any case, I do hope that this debate makes it out of the blogosphere and into the realm of the Association of Art Museum Directors, whose prissy fatwa on the National Academy is a classic example of rules-based rather than principles-based silliness. With a bit more imagination and a bit less ideological fervor, everybody in the museum world, including the all-important general public, could benefit.

Update: Lacayo asks whether "a standard of ‘equal or higher public access’ to a work of art mean that institutions in large cities could only sell to institutions in cities of roughly the same size". That’s easy: No, it doesn’t. Public access means the number of members of the public who actually see the work in question: if the work is permanently in storage, that number is zero. And it’s entirely possible that even if the work is on show, more people will see it at a big museum in a small town (like Crystal Bridges) than at a small museum in a big town (like the National Academy).

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In Favor of Arts Spending

Michael Kaiser makes some good arguments in favor of increased arts funding, but unfortunately he mixes them up with bad ones, and he glosses over the best ones. The result is that Tyler Cowen gets to take the moral high ground by saying that "culture for the rich" is "not a priority".

In reality, however, arts funding is a great way of spending any stimulus money, as anybody with a pocket calculator to hand might be able to work out from a couple of the numbers in Kaiser’s piece:

The arts in the United States provide 5.7 million jobs and account for $166 billion in economic activity annually.

I’m not sure what the source of these numbers is, but they work out at an all-in cost of less than $30,000 per worker. Compare that to the kind of infrastructure projects that are going to be funded generously in the stimulus plan, and you’ll see that there’s pretty much no area of the economy with higher jobs per dollar than the arts.

Kaiser even has a fiscally cost-free way of increasing arts spending, which seems like a no-brainer to me: "we need legislation that allows unusual access to endowments", he says. Tough times like these are exactly what endowments are made for: endowment spending should be countercyclical, and it would be silly to constrain arts organizations from tapping their endowments in any way.

But I’m still struggling with trying to work out what on earth Kaiser thinks he’s saying here:

It takes as much time to play Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony today as it did when the piece was composed, and the same number of actors are required for "Hamlet" as when Shakespeare wrote the play more than 400 years ago. Unlike other industries, the arts cannot cover the cost of inflation by improving worker productivity.

This is why subsidies — in the form of government grants or private contributions — have long been required to help arts organizations balance their budgets.

Is he saying that Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony was a happily profitable enterprise when it was composed? That arts revenues don’t keep up with inflation but costs do? That subsidies should fall in a low-inflation environment? It’s all most confusing. But it shouldn’t prevent a significant chunk of any stimulus program going to the arts.

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The Problem of Regaining Trust

Eric Falkenstein sums up 2008 through a ratings-agency lens:

I think 2008’s problem was mainly because after the rating agencies were exposed as making an error on their AAA and AA ratings, all investors viewed such securities skeptically. What was previously an asset class that did not require much thought, now need re-underwriting: evaluating the credit from the bottom up. This is very difficult, invariably there are many assumptions (especially for derivatives), and you find very quickly that there are lots of unknowns that are potentially dangerous. Usually, these assumptions are benign, but as the mortgage crisis proved, you can’t rest on ‘usually’.

I very much like the term "re-underwriting"; I think it’s a good way to think more generally about what happens after that other buzzword, deleveraging.

Re-underwriting doesn’t just happen among institutional investors with exposure to highly-rated structured products. It happens in banks, who are revisiting all of their loan portfolios, deciding who will get their loans rolled over and who won’t. It happens in the mortgage market, of course, every time a homeowner tries to take advantage of lower mortgage rates by refinancing. And more conceptually, it happens whenever any investor, even an individual with just a few thousand dollars in an index fund, stops to really wonder, for the first time, exactly why he’s taking these risks with his money, and whether the potential upside compensates for the potential downside.

And there’s certainly lots of re-underwriting going on in the world of hedge-fund investors, as Falkenstein says:

Anyone doing due diligence needs to do the simple things, like seeing if a ‘conversion strike strategy’ is remotely plausible in generating promised returns.

It’s actually harder than that, because re-underwriting conversion strike strategies is not simple but rather impossible for 99% of the people invested in hedge funds. So those people need to re-underwrite not tractable conversion strike strategies, but rather something much vaguer: the trustworthiness of their investment advisors. And how does one even begin underwriting the trustworthiness of an institution like Fairfield Greenwich?

A well-functioning capitalist system is based on high degrees of trust. Eventually, inevitably, that trust is going to be gamed and taken advantage of. And then you get a crash, which ends in a mire of mistrust and recrimination. How to get out of that mire is the problem facing us all today.

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Extra Credit, Monday Edition

The myth of the riskometer: "The lessons have not been learned. Risk sensitivity is expected to play a key role both in the future regulatory system and new areas such as executive compensation."

Fighting Off Depression: Krugman warns that "this looks an awful lot like the beginning of a second Great Depression".

Renaissance Waives Fees on Fund That Gave Up 12%: I guess no one there really needs the money.

Hyperinflation & Powers of Ten: A monetary history of Argentina, in banknotes.

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From Crunch to Catatonia

Bloomberg has a great headline this morning:

Banks’ ‘Catatonic Fear’ Means Consumers Don’t Get TARP Relief

While it does have a little bit of on-the-other-hand, the thrust of the story is strong and clear: we’re trying to kick-start bank lending by throwing money at the financial system, and it’s not working. And the names lined up to push this thesis are big ones, including Alan Blinder, who provided the "catatonic fear" quote which got promoted into the headline.

I love these Bloomberg stories: while remaining objective and true to Bloomberg’s wire-service mission, they aren’t afraid to be provocative and contentious as well. Would that the WSJ followed suit more often. In any case, do read the piece: it’s a nice antidote to whatever piece you’ve just seen saying that there really isn’t a credit crunch at all. Of course there is:

The Fed said consumer credit fell by $6.4 billion in August, the largest drop in 65 years, and then by $3.5 billion in October, the first time since 1992 that there were two months of declines in a year.

In its most recent quarterly Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey in October, the Fed reported that about 85 percent of U.S. banks said they had tightened standards on commercial and industrial loans to companies with more than $50 million in annual sales, up from 60 percent in July. Ninety-five percent said they increased the cost of those loans. About 70 percent said they made it more difficult to obtain prime mortgages, and almost 65 percent said they did the same for consumer loans.

Yes, despite the falling interest rate environment, 95% of banks have increased the cost of their loans. Sounds like a credit crunch to me — and sounds, too, like the stated aim of the government buying equity stakes in banks simply isn’t working. As Neel Kashkari described it:

The goal of the Capital Purchase Program is to stabilize the financial system and restore

confidence in financial institutions, which will increase the flow of credit.

Even if the first has happened (and that’s debatable), the second two are clearly still a long way off.

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Broken Glass

Is Waterford Wedgwood luxury, or "masstige"? Either way, it’s bust. Its $625 million in debt is essentially worthless, it’s been losing money before interest payments for a couple of years now, and its prospects, as we enter another grim year for the retail market, have never been poorer.

My guess is that someone, somewhere, will pick up the iconic brands — Waterford, Wedgwood, Rosenthal, Royal Doulton — for a song, while laying off substantially all of the manufacturing capacity and laying plans to start over from scratch if and when the market in such things improves. While the receivers are looking to sell the business as a going concern, I can’t imagine that anybody has much appetite right now to buy a money pit with little prospect of turning profitable in the foreseeable future.

Ireland will probably end up losing a national icon — and it won’t be the last big brand to fall prey to the current economic crisis. During boom years, investors love storied brands like Waterford and Wedgwood. In bad times, they start to concentrate more on the P&L. These days, if all you’ve got going for you is a long history and a high degree of brand recognition, you’re in trouble, because those things simply can’t be monetized any more.

Posted in bankruptcy, consumption | Comments Off on Broken Glass

How Did Madoff Fool the SEC?

Kara Scannell has been looking at the SEC’s Madoff memos:

The 2005 review and Mr. Markopolos’s report prompted the SEC to open an enforcement case, a notch more serious in the SEC’s world than the previous examination. "The staff is trying to ascertain whether" the allegation that Mr. Madoff "is operating a Ponzi scheme has any factual basis," according to the SEC case memo…

"The staff found no evidence of fraud," according to the SEC case memo.

Henry Blodget asks the obvious question: how on earth can you fail to uncover a Ponzi scheme when it’s right in front of your face and it’s exactly what you’re looking for? He concludes:

The SEC made mistakes, but Madoff’s combination of broker-dealer, reputation, track record, happy clients, twin sets of books, sophisticated explanations, and patient approach would have required a highly aggressive investigation to uncover.

I’m not entirely sure about this. If you’re looking for a Ponzi scheme, you only really need to ask one question: is the money there? Madoff at this point was admitting to the SEC that he was running billions of dollars, so the SEC just needed to ask to see the money. If the SEC got in return statements from Madoff’s own brokerage, then that implicates not only the investment-advisory group on the 17th floor, but the main brokerage as well, including Madoff’s brother and sons.

In the case of Madoff, it should have been even easier, since he claimed to be extremely liquid and mostly invested in Treasury bills whenever there was a down market. Where were the Treasury bills? Did it not occur to the SEC to ask? I’m not sure such a question really counts as "highly aggressive" — it’s the first question you ask if you’re investigating the thesis that all of the funds are in fact fictitious.

Still, the main lesson here is highly sobering: investors simply cannot rely on regulators to protect them. Either there’s an explicit government guarantee, like the one on bank and brokerage accounts, or you’re basically on your own.

Posted in fraud, regulation | Comments Off on How Did Madoff Fool the SEC?

Art Auction Datapoint of the Day

Remember those furtive seller’s rebates from auction houses? Georgina Adam says that in at least one instance they might have risen to include the entire buyer’s premium:

In some cases the whole of the buyer’s premium was given to the seller, as well as the vendor’s premium being waived entirely. This is believed to be the arrangement David Rockefeller made with Sotheby’s when he sold Mark Rothko’s 1950 “White Center (Yellow, Pink and Lavender on Rose)” for $72.8m (ߣ36.7m) in May last year.

If anybody can pull off that kind of negotiation, it would be David Rockefeller — good for him, for not only selling at the very top of the market, but also getting Sotheby’s to act as a middleman for free.

Adam goes on to say that there’s still uncertainty over the identity of the buyer of one of the most expensive paintings ever sold at auction:

The best known is the 2006 sale of Picasso’s 1941 “Dora Maar au Chat”, for which a buyer buried half way down Sotheby’s saleroom put in an unexpected and winning bid of $95.2m. The painting’s owner is believed to be Russian or Ukrainian, but nobody, even most of the people at Sotheby’s, knows for sure.

I thought it was pretty well accepted at this point that the buyer was Boris Ivanishvili — the chap who also famously spent $11.3 million on a Peter Doig in 2007. Ben Lewis and

Jonathan Ford, in their excellent article on the contemporary art bubble, even have the kind of details it’s hard to make up:

The Georgian Boris Ivanishvili spent $95m on Picasso’s Dora Maar au Chat–a work of art that he still hasn’t unpacked. When it was flown back to Tbilisi, the airport was closed down and the army turned out to ensure the work’s transfer to a secure warehouse.

I do hope though that the art press will pay attention to another of Adam’s points:

Estimates can be meaningless. Vendors’ expectations can be too high; the auction house may have agreed to an inflated estimate on one work in order to bag others. Alternatively, the estimate can be unrealistically low, to attract potential buyers. Proving the point, Christie’s buries this disclaimer in its conditions of sale: “Estimates of the selling price should not be relied on as a statement of the price at which the item will sell or its value for any other purpose.”

It would be great if reports on art auctions concentrated only on the final price including the buyer’s premium, and pretty much ignored both the hammer price and the estimate. Failing that, we should at least end the ridiculously silly practice of comparing the total amount spent at the auction to the sum of the low estimates in the auction catalogue — a truly apples-to-oranges comparison which sheds no light on anything. Estimates are like training wheels for the auction houses’ more unsophisticated buyers. They shouldn’t be needed by anybody qualified to report on the auctions.

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Extra Credit, Sunday Edition

The End of the Financial World as We Know It: Part 1, Part 2. Lewis and Einhorn are right; it’ll be interesting to see whether Tim Geithner moves in the direction they suggest.

Risk Mismanagement: Nocera on VaR.

A second tulip mania: The contemporary-art bubble. "As Kindleberger has shown, it is a condition of a speculative mania that new ‘assets’ be manufactured to meet raging demand—so the recent bubble has focused on the works of living artists such as Hirst, Koons, Prince and Murakami" who produce work in bulk.

Responses to Questions of the First Report of the Congressional Oversight Panel for Economic Stabilization: Kashkari gives pro-forma replies to Elizabeth Warren, rather than really engaging with the substance of her report.

Credit Card Companies Willing to Deal Over Debt: Another for the schadenfreude files. "Landmark changes to bankruptcy legislation passed in 2005, for which the industry aggressively lobbied, seem to have hurt card debt collections."

Housing Prices vs. Wildfire Acreage in U.S.: An correlation with a colorable case for causation.

High Concept/Alan Partridge: ER: The Finance Department.

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Remunerating Managerial Talent

Robert Frank is quite certain about executive pay:

Why not limit executive pay? The problem is that although every company wants a talented chief executive, there are only so many to go around. Relative salaries guide job choices…

If C.E.O. pay were capped and pay for other jobs was not, the most talented potential managers would be more likely to become lawyers or hedge fund operators…

The market-determined salary of a job generally offers the best — if imperfect — measure of its importance.

So many empirical statements! Are there really "only so many" talented chief executives? Does a salary of, say, $25 million a year really attract someone struggling by on $15 million or so? What on earth makes Frank think that the most talented potential managers would also make excellent hedge fund operators? What, exactly, is the "market" which determines job salaries, and where can I short it?

The whole column is steeped through with the idea that there’s a rare and innate quality of talent which can only be found in certain special individuals and which, if married to a company of sufficient size, can result in untold millions of dollars in extra profit. For all I know, this is actually true. But I would love to see some kind of empirical demonstration of it, rather than bald assertions. Given former Top Managers’ ability to spectacularly revert to the mean, I do suspect that there might be rather more luck and happenstance involved than Frank would like to admit, and that any old middle manager will, on average, be just as good in the CEO’s job as the average spectacularly-remunerated superstar.

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Financial One-Liner of the Day

The comfort you get from a triple-A rating is like the comfort you get from locking three car doors.

(Thanks to CaptainJJack for the inspiration)

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Ecuador’s Ingenious Descending Auction

There’s something quite elegant about Ecuador’s proposed bond auction. It’s not doing a typical old-bonds-for-new-bonds exchange, which no one would tender into. And it’s not trying to buy up its debt in the secondary market, where it could be picked off by mercenary Wall Street trading desks. Instead:

The South American country will seek to repurchase the 2012 and 2030 bonds, which were issued as part of a 2000 debt restructuring, in a series of auctions, [Economy minister Diego] Borja said. He said the government will lower the price it offers with each subsequent auction. He declined to specify at what price the buybacks will start.

Looking at the history of bond holdouts against Argentina, which is full of legal victories but which from a financial perspective has largely been a bust, it’s easy to see how litigation-averse creditors would opt to take jam today rather than a hope of more jam tomorrow.

But I do see one big obstacle: Ecuador is still going to need some kind of an exchange agent, a Wall Street bank which will run the offer, make sure it goes smoothly, get it lawyered up so that it conforms to SEC regulations, and generally act as an intermediary between Ecuador and its bondholders. And I can guarantee you that desperate as they are for funds, Wall Street’s banks are not exactly knocking down Borja’s door vying for this mandate.

If this auction isn’t run transparently and efficiently, it could easily descend into farce. So Ecuador’s first big task will be to persuade its bondholders that the exchange is credible. And given the country’s demonstrated ability to bugger these things up — not to mention the fact that it’s lost its longstanding counsel, Cleary Gottlieb — I’m not holding my breath.

Posted in bonds and loans, emerging markets | Comments Off on Ecuador’s Ingenious Descending Auction

Taleb vs Merton, Cont.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb is angry. Not in the YouTube clip of the same name, but rather at Nobel laureate Bob Merton, whom Taleb attacked in a paper he co-wrote with Emanuel Derman of Columbia.

In the wake of that paper appearing, Merton sent Taleb a detailed and equation-filled eight-page note, dated December 2005, taking issue with the paper. "His argument was that my argument was not compatible with portfolio theory," says Taleb, who says that Merton assumed, in his paper, the very constructs — things like beta — which Taleb criticized; which are as meaningful for him as astrology; and which have no place in the world of financial economics.

Merton never published that note. Rumor has it, however, that he posed Taleb’s paper as a problem set for his students. And a few months later, a paper appeared under the names of Doriana Ruffino and Jonathan Treussard, defending Merton, and saying, in its abstract, that Taleb’s paper "is inconsistent with modern equilibrium capital asset pricing theory" — the same portfolio-theory concepts which Taleb rejects and which Merton had used in his own note.

Treussard was working for Merton at the time, at Integrated Finance Limited (IFL) in New York, and Taleb takes Treussard’s paper to be no less than Merton writing under someone else’s name: "it was written by Merton and published by one of his employees," he says.

Taleb responded to Ruffino and Treussard in a footnote in a paper co-written with Espen Haug and entitled "Why We Have Never Used the Black-Scholes-Merton Option Pricing Formula", which rapidly became one of the most downloaded papers of the year at ssrn.com. In the footnote, Taleb and Haug accused Treussard (and, by implication, Merton) of being "scientists lecturing birds on

how to fly, and taking credit for their subsequent performance

– except that here it would be lecturing them the wrong way."

More recently, on Tuesday, the Economist’s economics blog reignited the debate, saying unambiguously that Treussard had disproved Taleb’s theories. The author of that blog entry didn’t write it on the direct instructions of Merton, but she, too, worked for Merton at IFL, and considers him a mentor.

Taleb, a former options trader, smells weakness. "It is quite distressing for Merton that he can’t find anybody to defend him in financial academia, other than his minions," he says. "The man invented a fantasy world in which his argument is airtight, and then he said my argument doesn’t hold. But in his fantasy world, LTCM [the hedge fund which Merton co-founded and which blew up in 1998] couldn’t happen."

And so, on a quiet Friday, I’m letting myself be pulled into a clash of egos between Taleb and Merton. For the record, although I’m sympathetic to Taleb’s side of the debate, I have no reason to believe that Merton is waging some kind of deliberate proxy campaign against him.

The interesting thing for me about this particular academic feud, however, is that that for all its viciousness, the stakes really aren’t low at all. Taleb is working towards nothing less than the outright dismantling of Black-Scholes, portfolio theory, and the enormous financial edifices which have been built upon them; if he’s successful, essentially all the quants on Wall Street would be out of a job. Which I think is probably reason enough for many people to defend Merton right there: the man himself doesn’t need to direct anything at all.

Posted in economics | Comments Off on Taleb vs Merton, Cont.

The Riskiness of Bonds

Yesterday I questioned the wisdom of retail investors buying bonds in this market, and boy did I get an earful back, especially from many of the commenters at Seeking Alpha. They accused me of not drawing the distinction between Treasuries and credit, and of not appreciating the record spreads being seen in the bond market.

This morning, Henry Blodget gives us a useful chart, showing that the Lehman Aggregate bond index — which is the benchmark for most of the bond funds that retail investors buy — rebounded sharply in the last two months of this year, and ended solidly in positive territory. Which is quite an achievement for any asset class in 2008.

Now yes, the rebound is largely a function of the Treasury bubble — but so are record spreads in the credit market. And since retail investors don’t short Treasury bonds, they can’t play spreads. Instead, they have just three choices: going long Treasuries; going long credit; or some combination of the two.

Clearly the Treasury market is treacherous right now, and could implode as quickly as it rose. I can assure you that this kind of chart (from a very useful blog entry by Richard Shaw) is not the kind of thing that dealers in US debt ever expect to see:

20yr.jpg

Yes, that’s a 35% annual return on long-dated Treasury bonds, in a year which started with pretty low interest rates. So clearly anybody buying Treasuries right now is doing so at extremely frothy levels.

But what about credit? The flip side of Treasury outperformance has been a collapse in prices of credit, and in general the riskier the credit, the more it has fallen. Junk bonds and emerging-market debt cratered in 2008, but the bulk of the bonds that retail investors are likely to buy — US investment-grade corporate bonds — actually staged quite an impressive rally at year-end.

invgrade.jpg

If you believe that mid-October’s bond-market panic was overblown and that we’ll never see such levels again, then feel free to dip a toe into this market. But if you do so, be clear that you’re entering into a speculative trade: you’re not putting your money in a safe place like an FDIC-insured CD. (And you can do that with any amount of money, not just $250,000, thanks to CDARS.)

But bonds certainly aren’t any kind of hedge against stock-market underperformance. If the stock market goes down from its present levels, it will do so because of a wave of defaults wiping out the equity in a wide range of companies. The bond market is pricing in an uptick in defaults, but no one knows just how much of an uptick, and there’s a very good chance that if a few large and heavily-indebted public companies go under in quick succession, the bond market could lurch back down to its October lows and possibly even fall further still.

None of this makes investing in bonds a bad idea for a sophisticated investor: they do seem to be more attractive, from a risk-return standpoint, than stocks, just as they have been since the summer of 2007. And there’s a strong moral hazard play right now as well: there’s a very good chance that Treasury will step in to prevent America’s largest companies from going bust. But if you’re looking for safety, cash is still very much your friend. And if you’re investing in bonds, know the risks that you’re taking.

Posted in bonds and loans | Comments Off on The Riskiness of Bonds

Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Three Banks Complete Deals: BofA’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch has now closed; so has Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia. That sigh of relief you’re hearing is coming from arbitrageurs who were long MER and WB.

Relitigating 1998 at the end of 2008: Setser on Cowen and moral hazard.

Zero Is Not A Lower Bound For Interest Rates: I’m not sure I agree with this, but it’s an interesting idea.

Economics Makes My Brain Hurt: Wilmott has little time for economists.

A Year Ticks Over, and Zunes Get Hiccups: Zunes stopped working on January 1, and Microsoft’s reputation takes yet another blow.

Good morning 2009: "The smart money expected a correction back to 1931, or 1974, or 1982. 2009 wasn’t even in the running. But here we are. Anybody got a road map?"

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