The Invisible Stimulus

This sounds to me like it’s been filtered through some kind of Obama-transition behavioral economics screen:

The incoming administration is considering tax cuts of $1,000 for couples and $500 for individuals that will be delivered by reducing the tax withheld from paychecks.

The point of a stimulus package, of course, is to boost spending. And hiding a tax rebate in slightly higher take-home paychecks seems like a good way of doing that: even people who save a certain amount of money every month still tend to spend the rest.

The same article has some good news for New York: apparently the mooted stimulus package also includes $20 billion for mass transportation, and since New York City has more transit than anywhere else, it’s likely to get a good $4 billion or so of that money, to be spent on projects including the East Side Access project connecting Long Island trains to Grand Central.

Clearly there’s jockeying in Congress for these funds: New York’s Chuck Schumer and Jerrold Nadler have been "working with Obama’s transition team on details of the stimulus package", which sounds not dissimilar old-school pork-barrel politics-as-usual. But if Obama is successful in setting up a genuinely independent body to apportion funds, maybe even this kind of thing will come to an end.

Posted in economics, Politics | 1 Comment

What Does GMAC’s Bond-Exchange Failure Mean for Detroit?

The GMAC bond-exchange results are out, and the screws that GMAC applied on December 10 — tender your bonds or we won’t become a bank or get TARP funds — seem to have had some effect, with the percentage of bonds tendered rising from about 22% to 59%. But GMAC was very clear that anything short of 75% would constitute failure, so the first big attempt, in this crisis, to bail in bondholders outside of formal bankruptcy proceedings has clearly not worked.

This bodes ill for the future of Detroit, if the aim of management and the government is to avoid Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. The companies can bluster all they like, but it’s hard to apply moral suasion to bondholders in the way that you can with banks (and the government did, during the Chrysler bailout of 1981).

I can see why GMAC took what it could get, and accepted the 59% of bonds which were tendered into the exchange. But now those bondholders look foolish, the other 41% look smart, and GMAC simply looks untrustworthy, willing to pick off creditors one by one if it can’t get them to work together.

Given these results, why would any GM or Chrysler bondholders tender into any exchange, given that the government has even more invested in the car companies than it did in GMAC? When, they might reasonably ask, was the last time that a state-owned company defaulted?

I suspect that one legacy of the failed GMAC exchange offer will be that some kind of pre-packaged bankruptcy is still in the cards for GM and Chrysler.

Or maybe there’s a corporate-finance way of doing essentially the same thing: a new shell company is created, owned mostly by the UAW, which buys most of the viable assets of GM and Chrysler while leaving the liabilities and failed marques behind for creditors to fight over. With a carefully-written piece of legislation, Congress could probably insulate the new company from angry bondholders saying that the transfer was illegal. The govenrment’s TARP funds would be wiped out, but I don’t think anybody seriously expects those monies to be paid back anyway.

Posted in bankruptcy, bonds and loans | Comments Off on What Does GMAC’s Bond-Exchange Failure Mean for Detroit?

Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

A Crack in The System: Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3 of the Washington Post’s monster series on AIG Financial Products.

Did those people at AIG not understand anything about financial risk? AIG actually quantified its tail risk, yet took it on anyway.

Scenarios for 2009: Straight Lines, Moonshots, EKGs, etc: Kedrosky is provocative.

Travel time to major cities: Another gorgeous piece of information design. From here.

New York, New York: America’s Resilient City: Ed Glaeser looks on the bright side.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Is Buying Bonds Really a Good Idea?

The WSJ’s Brett Arends has learned his lessons this year, and shares them with us, including these ones:

4. Invest more, not less. Is that a guffaw from the peanut gallery? I don’t blame you. Your savings just fell 40% or more. But higher risk and lower returns means you need to invest more to reach your goals.

6. Your grandma was right after all. A penny saved really is a penny earned. Debt really is dangerous. And an economy where it’s easier to borrow $10,000 on a credit card than find a working electrician is heading for trouble.

8. Own plenty of bonds. Yes, they’re less exciting than stocks. Turns out, that’s the point. There’s little use keeping everything in stocks "for the long run" if they kill before you get there.

I do wish that he’d listened a bit more to his grandma. A penny saved is a penny saved; a penny invested is a penny risked. The best way to reach your goals is to save more, and to adjust your goals — not to put ever more money at risk in a desperate get-there-or-bust move.

As for the bonds, this could turn out to be a really bad time to move into fixed income — possibly the worst in living memory. Two things we know for sure: interest rates are incredibly low right now, and recovery values given default have also never been lower. A third thing we can be pretty sure about: the number of defaults is going to go up substantially before it starts coming down. Yes, spreads are quite wide, but only arbitrageurs care about spreads. Retail investors care about yields.

Put all that together, and you have a bond market where the downside is vastly greater than the upside. Yields can’t fall much further than they have already, and default rates can certainly rise. So why buy bonds? Stay in cash, and you get a very similar yield for much less risk.

Historically, bonds have been the safer alternative to stocks. I’m not sure that’s still the case. Stocks are certainly more volatile than bonds, but at least they have unlimited upside, and a couple of spectacular stock picks can make up for a lot of duds. In the bond market, however, a few big defaults can ruin an entire portfolio. So I’d treat bonds as being just as speculative as stocks. Speculative bonds are also known as "distressed", and in many ways we’re all distressed now. So if you want to be safe, my advice is to avoid fixed income, at least for the time being.

Posted in bonds and loans, personal finance | Comments Off on Is Buying Bonds Really a Good Idea?

Blogonomics: Consumerist Sold to Consumers Union

You think you can’t sell media properties in the middle of a recession? Think again: Nick Denton has managed to sell Consumerist for what Peter Kafka describes as "something in the mid-six figure range" — the kind of money that even a multi-millionaire like Denton wouldn’t mind finding in his stocking, especially when the site in question was almost certainly losing money.

The buyer — which will take down all advertising immediately, except for ads for its own products — is Consumers Union, the publisher of Consumer Reports, and a company which desperately needs Consumerist’s younger readership:

The average age of a print subscriber is 60, and the average ConsumerReports.org subscriber is 50. About 76 percent of Consumerist’s readers are 18 to 49, according to Quantcast.

Consumers Union is making all the right noises about respecting Consumerist’s independence and snark — and it’s re-hiring two staffers who were fired earlier this year, to boot. But this does mark the end of Gaby Darbyshire’s tenure as the best lawyer that any such website could hope to have. Take for instance this classic letter, which came in response to Dell asking Consumerist’s Ben Popken to take down a post, his forwarding the request to Gaby at 1am, and then Dell emailing again at 2am complaining that the post was still up:

from Gaby

to Tracy Holland

cc Ben Popken

date Jun 15, 2007 7:33 AM

subject Re: Posting by former Dell employee

Dear Ms. Holland,

Despite some suggestions to the contrary among some of our fellow beings, most humans need to sleep. Some of us also receive hundreds of emails a day and have to deal with every one of them. I received this email at 12am last night. It is 7am now. That’s a pretty good turnaround.

Nonetheless, that’s immaterial to the matter in hand. I’ve reviewed the post, and it appears to me that it is valid, useful and apparently overwhelmingly accurate. It’s not bitter, angry or destructive. It is quite simply good and useful information for consumers. And it appears that a Dell rep has already provided updates to various sections, which we have published, which, since they have only corrected certain parts of this report, implies that the uncorrected parts must be true. If that’s not the case, please feel free to send us more clarifications and we will update the post further with your additional notes.

We came by this material entirely legally: we were provided it by a third party voluntarily, we did not use any improper means to solicit any Dell employee to breach any agreement he may have had with you. Therefore, we do not believe we are in breach of any law in reporting on this material and, as such, cannot comply with your demands.

In addition, as I am sure you must realise – and there is certainly a history of this with Dell already – consumers tend to react far better when a company responds collaboratively to criticism, than when they act heavy-handedly or dismissively. Removing this story would be far far more damaging to Dell, I assure you, than responding to it on the Dell blog or elsewhere, since in telling our readers that Dell shut down our reporting, we would unleash a chaos of fury and acres of criticism in the press. Forget any legal position you may want to take, meritorious or not, I am deadly serious when I say that I simply cannot recommend this as a course of action. I’ve seen it happen before and it is really not pretty and I have no doubt that you will regret it.

Of course, it is your decision whether you want to pursue this matter, but I advise you to talk to the team that had to deal with the falllout from the Jeff Jarvis affair before you decide to try and silence your critics. Work for the customer, not against them.

Best regards,

Gaby

It worked.

Does Consumers Union have lawyers who thoroughly enjoy writing letters like that? Does it even have lawyers who simply know about the Dell blog and the Jeff Jarvis affair and can cite them effortlessly in a formal yet entirely English-language legal communication at 7 o’clock in the morning? For Popken’s sake, I hope it does, but I suspect that Gaby is irreplaceable.

On the other hand, if Consumerist becomes a big success within Consumers Union, it might be something to add to the likes of Romenesko at Poynter as a great example of a standalone blog thriving within a corporate context. And that will increase the value of independent blogs all round, as they become increasingly desired as fill-in acquisitions.

Posted in blogonomics | Comments Off on Blogonomics: Consumerist Sold to Consumers Union

Did Derivatives Help China’s Poor?

I’ve seen some pretty strong claims on behalf of derivatives in my time, but this one, from the Economist, is definitely among the strongest:

The market for derivatives also facilitated investment in developing countries. That investment brought millions of people in countries such as India and China out of poverty.

Methinks the anonymous blogger has overreached here. Derivatives can do many things (including, of course, blow up), but poverty reduction is not on that particular list.

I spent most of the past decade writing about investment in developing countries generally, and in Latin America specifically. I heard a lot about stock markets, and even more about bond markets. I even occasionally heard about CDS markets in certain emerging-market credits. But I’m finding it really hard to think of an example of derivatives facilitating investment in emerging markets.

The closest I can come would be simple currency swaps: companies being able to borrow in dollars and swap the proceeds back into pesos to reduce their FX risk. But that’s not the kind of financial engineering that the Economist is talking about.

What’s more, the story of India and China is very much one of development financed domestically, out of savings, rather than development financed internationally — total capital inflows into the two countries were very small relative to total investment. Which would imply that if derivatives helped to facilitate investment in these countries, they would be domestic, not international. And I don’t think that India and China have particularly sophisticated domestic derivatives markets.

So color me skeptical on this claim, at least unless and until someone gives me a few empirical examples. Poverty reduction in India and China took place the old-fashioned way, through GDP growth, rather than via sophisticated financial derivatives.

Posted in derivatives, emerging markets | Comments Off on Did Derivatives Help China’s Poor?

Dubious Statistics of the Day, Toxic Mortgage Edition

Interest and pressure groups put out garbage masquerading as useful research on a daily basis; it’s the job of the press to recongnise it as such and ignore it. Most of the time, the press does a very good job of that. But there’s a false-positive problem: it only takes one journalist to give that research the imprimatur of a respected business publication.

Let’s say that a researcher in bed with some pressure group — let’s call him Samuel Bornstein — approaches a very large number of journalists with his silly research. And let’s say that the vast majority of those journalists take one look at his research and ignore it. That’s fine, until Bornstein chances upon Randall Forsyth. Next thing you know, there’s a column in Barron’s giving credence to the research, and anybody reading the article has no indication whatsoever of how weak the reasearch really is.

What’s worse, even though the Barron’s column is part of the newspaper’s online offerings, it doesn’t include any link to the research in question — which means that the readers have precious few clues that it might all be based on the crumbliest of foundations.

Here’s Forsyth, cribbing shamelessly from Bornstein and NASE:

A surprisingly large proportion of self-employed entrepreneurs used risky mortgages either to start or to expand their businesses, according to a recent study by the National Association for the Self-Employed. And millions of them face sharp increase in their loan payments — just as the economy tumbles into a freefall.

According to NASE, an estimated 3.7 million small business owners have what the group calls "toxic mortgages: — alt-A loans, alt-A adjustable-rate mortgages, option ARMs and interest-only loans.

But that 3.7 million number just doesn’t pass the smell test. Here’s what Bornstein writes in his official conclusions after conducting the survey of NASE members:

According to this survey, it is estimated that 3,709,800 small business owners hold Alt-A and “toxic” mortgages that are scheduled to “Reset” beginning in 4th Quarter 2008 and continue through 2012.  These small business owners will be at-risk for “payment shock” and default as their monthly mortgage payments skyrocket.

According to Inside Mortgage Finance, a trade publication in Bethesda, Maryland, approximately 3 million people hold toxic mortgages totaling $1 trillion. The magnitude of this Alt-A and “toxic” mortgage crisis exceeds the subprime mortgage crisis which had $855 billion of subprime loans outstanding.    

Yes, Bornstein really does say, the paragraph after telling us that 3.7 million small business owners hold toxic mortgages, that the total number of toxic mortgages in existence is just 3 million.

This discrepancy is responsible for the first line of the NASE press release, which should itself have raised any number of red flags with Forsyth:

The nation’s small businesses own ninety-three percent of all "toxic" mortgages and are at risk of defaulting on their loans/payments.

I asked Bornstein about this, and he replied:

Forget about the 93% figure. That was based upon 12.2 million self-employed in 2003 SBA figures. I found more recently released stats that had 16.2 million in 2007. NASE missed making my revisions in my submitted revised drafts.

Which completely misses the forest for the trees. Bornstein’s survey came to the conclusion that 22.9% of small business owners have toxic mortgages. If there are 12.2 million small business owners, that means that 2.8 million of them have toxic mortgages. Divide 2.8 million by 3 million total toxic mortgages, and you get the 93% figure.

But using Bornstein’s revised 3.7 million figure, one comes to the conclusion that 123% of all toxic mortgages are held by small business owners. No wonder NASE missed that revision: even they probably saw how silly that assertion was.

Once you start looking at Bornstein’s conclusions with a skeptical eye, they all start looking silly. Take this, for instance:

19.2 % (3,110,400 At-Risk) of all self-employed business owners are at-risk of “payment shock”. They do not know the monthly mortgage payment that they will be required to pay at “Reset”.

It’s unclear where the 19.2% figure comes from. But with mortgage rates hitting all-time lows, people with adjustable-rate mortgages are more likely to see their rates go down than go up at reset. Yes, there’s a handful of people with negative-amortization mortgages who might be shocked when they start having to pay back principal. But according to Bornstein’s own survey results, they only account for 3.7% of all small-business owners — nowhere near the 19.2% figure that Bornstein is throwing about.

And that bit about not knowing the monthly mortage payment they’ll be required to pay at reset? Well, of course they don’t know: their mortgages haven’t reset yet — and most of the mortgages which will reset won’t do so until 2010 or 2011. Bornstein isn’t uncovering shocking ignorance, here, he’s just saying that small business owners have no more idea than anybody else where interest rates are going to be in two or three years’ time.

Which brings us back to Forsyth’s assertion that "a surprisingly large proportion of self-employed entrepreneurs used risky mortgages". Turns out, not so much: fully 70% of them, it turns out, wound up with fixed-rate mortgages, despite the fact that their income was lumpy and hard to verify and that they were exactly the sort of people for whom option ARMs were designed.

And even that number is dubious. Bornstein refused to tell me how many people received his questionnaire or what the response rate was. He did admit that he made no attempt to determine whether the respondents were a representative sample of NASE members, or whether NASE members were a representative sample of the self-employed, or whether the self-employed constituted exactly the same group of people as small business owners. (Clearly they don’t; I’m self-employed, but I’m not a small business owner.) Instead he simply extrapolated with gay abandon from 1,687 survey respondents who hold a mortgage and belong to NASE, and multiplied the resulting percentages by a whopping 16.2 million to get his headline results, which he quite amusingly reported with five-significant-figure specificity. In other words, his entire survey is something of a joke.

My point here is not really to pick on Bornstein and Forsyth in particular. But I did receive an email from Bornstein on Sunday plugging this story, calling it "an interesting finding that impacts the current economic situation, and may provide a key to a solution to mitigate the impending losses expected in 2009". If he’s emailing me out of the blue, you can be sure he’s emailing many other journalists, too.

And so since Bornstein approached me, asking me to write about his research, and since Forsyth had already done so uncritically, I thought it might be worthwhile to show a little bit of how the journalistic sausage is made.

The lesson of this story is that if you come across any piece of journalism which cites official-sounding statistics from expert sources, treat those numbers with a very high degree of suspicion unless you already consider that source to be reliable. It’s a pity, but you can’t just simply believe what you read in the paper. And these kind of reporting errors are never going to be caught by editors — or even by media critics like myself, unless the researcher in question comes to me directly and asks me to look at his research.

Posted in housing, journalism, statistics | Comments Off on Dubious Statistics of the Day, Toxic Mortgage Edition

Property Crash Datapoint of the Day

Edmund Tadros reports:

The average price of cyber land has dropped from 12.06 Linden dollars (seven cents) a square metre at its peak in January 2007 to 1.98 Linden dollars (1 cent) last month.

I fear to think what’s happened to Second Life’s lenders, given that they were already imploding as far back as January. Poor things. But hey, they could always ask for TARP funds: Paulson seems incapable of saying no, these days.

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Property Crash Datapoint of the Day

Who Killed Frannie?

Bethany McLean, from her new perch at Vanity Fair, has delivered a 10,762-word magnum opus on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which spends most of its time giving a detailed history of what Hank Paulson called the "Holy War" between the companies’ proponents and opponents in Washington.

McLean is good on what did and did not happen at the beginning of September, when the government decided to take Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship. But was the decision payback for all the bullying that various Washington politicians had suffered, over the years, at the hands of Fannie Mae? I doubt it — especially given that the prime decision-maker, Paulson, was closer to the pro-Fannie than the anti-Fannie side of the debate. (Legendary Fannie boss Jim Johnson was chairman of Goldman Sachs’s compensation committee during Paulson’s tenure as CEO, for starters.)

I suspect that for all McLean’s narrative skills, the truth of the story is simply that, as Don Rumsfeld might have put it, "stuff happened". The conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie was not the culmination of decades of Washington infighting, it was just another case of Paulson’s ad hoc style of policymaking, where he would make a big decision over breakfast and then move on to the next crisis.

What’s more, as McLean shows, the decision was actually much less momentous than many people thought at the time. Sure, the shareholders were pretty much wiped out — but most of that wipeout had already happened before the conservatorship was enacted. But the government guarantee didn’t change much: it went from "we’ll pretend there isn’t a guarantee" to "we’ll pretend there is a guarantee", and the spreads on Frannie’s debt actually went up rather than down. And Frannie’s business model didn’t actually change at all. "Steve Ashley, former chairman of Fannie’s board, asked what the government wanted Fannie to do that it wasn’t already doing," reports McLean, and to this day no good answer has been given to that question.

In the present market, it’s very easy for Fannie and Freddie to get bigger — and that’s exactly what they have been doing, as banks are increasingly reluctant to write mortgages they can’t turn around and immediately sell to the GSEs. But under the terms of the conservatorship, they have a bit of time to get bigger, and then — in some vague and undefined manner — they have to turn around and become much smaller, very quickly.

When has any government agency ever voluntarily shrunk itself so much? I feel that Paulson ordered Frannie to do the impossible, and then happily left the implementation of that order to his successor. Which only means that this story is far from over, and that McLean will have more to tell in future.

Posted in housing, Politics | Comments Off on Who Killed Frannie?

GMAC, the Fed, and Moral Hazard

The GMAC announcement on December 10 was quite unambiguous. The headline alone told you everything you needed to know:

GMAC Announces That the Results of Its Exchange Offers Are Insufficient To Meet Regulatory Capital Requirements To Become a Bank Holding Company

GMAC went on to explain:

The Federal Reserve has required GMAC to, among other things, achieve a minimum amount of total regulatory capital of $30 billion in connection with its application. In order for such condition to be satisfied, among other things, the estimated overall participation in the offers would be required to be approximately 75% on a pro rata basis. The Federal Reserve has informed GMAC that if GMAC is unable to meet these capital requirements, it will not approve GMAC’s application to become a bank holding company.

As a result, GMAC extended its offer to bondholders until December 26, in what I thought at the time was a game of chicken between GMAC’s bondholders and its majority shareholder.

On December 24, with the tender offer over in all but name, the Fed announced that it was going to allowe GMAC to become a bank holding company after all. It was clearly in close contact with GMAC: did it have inside knowledge that the 75% acceptance level had been reached? Or was the Fed’s decision contingent on that happening?

Actually, it turns out that the Fed was happy to let GMAC become a bank regardless of whether or not the tender offer succeeded. In the game of chicken, neither the bondholders nor Cerberus needed to blink, since the Fed simply climbed down from its previous stance. Bloomberg reports today:

The Federal Reserve last week approved GMAC’s application to become a bank holding company. GMAC said yesterday that the Fed’s approval didn’t hinge on the debt swap.

Yep, a 180-degree about-face from its stance a couple of weeks ago. Back then, it was crucial that the debt swap go through in order to get Fed approval; now, it really doesn’t matter either way.

It’s actually worse than that, though. The Fed clearly spent a large amount of time approving GMAC’s application to become a bank holding company: the order announcing the fact is 15 pages long, and densely-argued. But it looks very much as though the Fed delayed making the announcement until the bond exchange was all but over: it essentially conspired with GMAC to keep the decision secret so that GMAC could continue to threaten bondholders with the Fed’s earlier statement and thereby get them to tender into the exchange.

Now the Fed is actually quite good at keeping secrets. But it’s also very close to Pimco, which was the largest of the bondholders refusing to tender into the exchange as of December 10. Did Pimco stay out of the tender offer to the end? Did they know or strongly suspect that GMAC would be allowed to become a bank holding company even if the exchange offer failed? Are they now essentially free-riding on all the bondholders who took the Fed’s earlier statement at face value, and tendered into the exchange believing that the only other option was bankruptcy?

These are important questions, because this is not the last time that bondholders are going to be asked to give up money they’re owed in order to save a company. In fact, a much bigger bond exchange is looming: one from GM itself. And nowhere are moral hazard considerations more important than when it comes to the tactics of distressed-debt exchanges. If a bailout is coming anyway, then a smart bondholder will always stay out of any exchange. And if most bondholders are smart, then no distressed company can effect a significant debt reduction without declaring bankruptcy.

The Fed has set a nasty precedent here — one which will make it much harder for GM to negotiate effectively with its bondholders. The government is now so deeply invested in both GM and GMAC that it’s hard to see how it won’t blink a second time if and when bondholders refuse to go along with their debtor company’s restructuring plans. Which raises the specter of the worst kind of bailout of all: one in which the primary beneficiaries aren’t GM’s workers and dealers, but rather its bondholders, who have been paid very well in recent years to take GM default risk.

There’s one other option. GM is still current on its debt payments, which means it is allowed to buy up its debt at distressed levels in the secondary market. Since GMAC now has access to Fed liquidity, there might be some way in which it can start buying up those bonds and cancelling them. But even that would consitute a rescue of holdouts who don’t sell at these levels and just hold on to their bonds.

This whole tale is really rather sordid — as Henry Blodget says this morning, it even approaches the level of an illegal check-kiting scheme. I do hope that come January 20 we’ll see no more deals like this one. But I’m not holding my breath, especially given that Tim Geithner must have signed off on this decision.

Posted in bailouts | Comments Off on GMAC, the Fed, and Moral Hazard

A Victory for GMAC Holdouts?

It looks like anybody who refused to participate in the GMAC bond tender offer is going to end up feeling pretty smug:

The U.S. Treasury said it will purchase a $5 billion stake in GMAC LLC, the financing arm of General Motors Corp…

Separately, GMAC said it has accepted all bonds tendered in a debt swap designed to reduce its debt load.

“Once the offers are settled, which we expect to do promptly, results will be disclosed,” said spokeswoman Gina Proia in an e-mail.

In order to be able to accept the tendered bonds, I think that GMAC must have managed to reach the 75% hurdle. But the holdouts — the 25% or less of bondholders who didn’t tender their bonds into the offer — are now going to find themselves with GMAC debt which is senior to the preferred equity that Treasury is buying.

Since there’s very little chance of GMAC defaulting to the Treasury, or forcing it into a restructuring of its stake, those bondholders’ coupon payments are probably pretty safe for the time being. And, of course, they’re significantly higher than the coupon payments that the people who did tender into the exchange offer are going to receive. Intransigence and unhelpfulness, it seems, is being rewarded. Which is not a good omen for the forthcoming negotiations with GM’s bondholders.

Posted in bailouts, bonds and loans | Comments Off on A Victory for GMAC Holdouts?

Extra Credit, Monday Edition

$75 Billion Needlessly Lost in Hasty Lehman Bankruptcy Filing? Yves Smith debunks.

Tyler Cowen, Paul Krugman, and the right time to have a financial crisis: Justin Fox adjudicates; Mark Thoma and Barbara Kiviat add commentary.

Is There Really a Credit Crunch? Kiviat adjudicates.

The yield curve (wonkish): Krugman says we should take no solace in an upward-sloping curve.

Gaming in Dark Pools: Can the players trust their counterparties?

Richard Neutra, Architect: You might recall that Christie’s $16.8 million sale of the Kaufmann House in Palm Springs in May fell through. Well, as we move into 2009, the house is still for sale, having found no takers at $12.975 million.

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Monday Edition

Can GMAC Lose its Newfound Bank Status?

GMAC says it’s still "tabulating" the results of its bond exchange, which means we still don’t know whether the crucial 75% hurdle has been reached. If it isn’t, then what? On Friday morning, the answer was clear:

The deadline for that restructuring is Friday, and it must be completed for GMAC to become a bank-holding company.

Come Friday afternoon, however, things looked very different:

Becoming a bank-holding company "certainly takes the pressure off them," [fund manager] Mr. Kaufman said of GMAC…

The Fed’s actions take some of the pressure of the debt exchange, which had struggled to attract sufficient investor interest. "With the primary regulator on board, the capital-raise machinations seem almost a moot point," wrote CreditSights analysts in a note.

Is the Fed really on board? Its language can be read as saying that its approval is contingent on the recapitalization being successful:

In analyzing financial factors, the Board consistently has considered

capital adequacy to be an especially important aspect. The Board has considered

GMAC’s successful efforts to raise additional capital and that, as a result, GMAC

will be well capitalized on completion of the proposal.

That said, it would be politically insane for the Fed to allow GMAC to become a bank holding company with great fanfare on December 24, only to change its mind on the matter come December 29, two business days later. If the GMAC tender offer fails, GMAC might have to come up with some other way of achieving capital adequacy — but the stakes are too high now for the company to lose its bank holding company status altogether.

In other words, the Mexican standoff might well continue, with Cerberus, bondholders, and the Treasury all waiting for one of the others to come up with the necessary cash or debt relief. Who would blink first in such a scenario? I have no idea, but I suspect it would probably be Treasury.

Posted in bailouts, banking | Comments Off on Can GMAC Lose its Newfound Bank Status?

Living in a Mall

Do you want to live within easy walking distance of shops, restaurants, and other such amenities? Do you want to live in a condo with a doorman, its own private grounds, a screening room, and similar bells and whistles? Up until now, answering "yes" to such questions meant that you had to live in the city — something which many people don’t like doing (dirt, smells, noise, bad schools, you know the drill) and which in any case is often very expensive.

But now there’s an alternative: condos in shopping malls.

This is urban life for folks who prefer the suburbs, which, according to the U.S. Census, is the majority of us: some 47 percent live in suburbs, and 40 million of the 58 million housing units there are detached.

Some call this debut creature the new suburbia or “metroburbia,” a vertical suburbia that can appease the desire for the best parts of both urban and suburban life. “For the last hundred years that kind of lifestyle”–walkable, dense–“was only available in dense urban environments,” says Bartels. “A lot of people are hoping to get out of the cul-de-sac and get into more integrated lifestyle.”

The mall, says urbanist Joel Kotkin, presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, “is the logical place to do this. You build a town center where there wasn’t one.”

The history of the wine market in America (bear with me here) has a central role for merlot: a relatively sweet and easily-drinkable varietal which got Americans — who had been more accustomed to beer and sweet white wine — comfortable with the idea of red wine. Nowadays, merlot has something of a bad name, but it’s still hugely popular.

I think of these mall condos as the urbanist equivalent of merlot: a gateway, if you will, to the urban lifestyle, without the tannic downside. I’m not sure they’ll ever become quite as ubiquitous as merlot. But they’re clearly part of America’s real-estate future.

(Thanks to Paul Jackson for making the article linkable.)

Posted in housing | Comments Off on Living in a Mall

Overspecific Prediction of the Day

I give this one a 100% chance of being wrong:

Mr. Panarin posits, in brief, that mass immigration, economic decline, and moral degradation will trigger a civil war next fall and the collapse of the dollar. Around the end of June 2010, or early July, he says, the U.S. will break into six pieces — with Alaska reverting to Russian control.

I do like the added touch of "or early July", however. It’s like that second decimal place on Dow reports: completely meaningless, but great for giving a spurious impression of accuracy.

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From TARP to ARRP

Larry Summers channels Barack Obama in the Washington Post:

Our president-elect understands both the peril and the promise of the situation and the importance of responding to changing conditions. That is why his economic team is crafting a broad proposal, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, to support the jobs and incomes essential for recovery while also making a down payment on our nation’s long-term financial health.

The rest of the article is little more than a concatenation of political clichés, which is depressing coming, as it does, from an administration which isn’t running for any kind of re-election any time soon. This kind of thing has very little meaning during a political campaign, and even less once that campaign is over:

The Obama plan represents not new public works but, rather, investments that will work for the American public… Laying the groundwork for recovery and future prosperity will require shedding Washington habits… We must focus not on ideology but on drawing the best ideas from all quarters… Far from being an excuse for inaction or delay, the magnitude of the work ahead is all the more reason to begin that work.

In any case, it seems that TARP is going to end up either as a precursor to, or else simply a small part of, the much larger ARRP. You’d think that someone, somewhere, might have spent a bit more time coming up with a decent acronym. I’m not sure that Obama wants to go down in history as the Father of ARRP, even if it’s a roaring success.

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The Rise of Cheap Airlines

BreakingViews has launched its Poor Getting Poorer index, complete with predictable members such as Walmart and pawnbrokers EZCorp. But there’s also JetBlue:

Though leisure travel will take a hit, discount carriers like JetBlue will attract those willing to take 3 a.m. flights from obscure airports.

I’m not sure that JetBlue really fits into the euro-style "3am flights from obscure airports" category; for one thing, its hub is at New York’s JFK, where it has a very shiny new terminal complete with massage service, a steakhouse, and free wifi.

But with oil prices in the $40 range and an enormous number of airplanes being mothballed by downsizing major airlines, there would seem to be an opportunity for someone like Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary to start up precisely that kind of discount airline.

JetBlue isn’t really a discounter: I just asked Orbitz for quotes for non-stop flights from New York JFK to San Francisco SFO leaving on Saturday and coming back a week later. Virgin America and Alaska Airlines will both do it for $665; Delta is $745; JetBlue is in fourth place on $755. American is more, at $1,050, and US Airways and United don’t seem interested in competing at all: they both charge $1,825.

And more generally, JetBlue has never offered the ultracheap flights which built the businesses of the likes of Ryanair and Easyjet. Could it happen here? I don’t see why not, especially if the big airlines continue their long and seemingly inevitable decline. Once the frequent fliers lose their loyalty — something which has already started — I can’t see why a bunch of smaller, nimbler mammals shouldn’t be able to see off the dinosaurs once and for all.

Already JetBlue and Virgin America are trying to position themselves at the high end of in-flight service and quality, with mixed results. They’re more likely to want to stay there than they are to go downmarket and compete with bucket shops.

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Packaging Datapoint of the Day

It’s hard to keep up with Amazon. This morning, Tyler Cowen checked out the prices for an 8GB memory card: $24.45 but out of stock if you want Amazon’s frustration-free packaging, and $17.45 for the regular, frustrating version.

Right now, as I visit, the frustration-free version is still out of stock, but the Frustrating Card has fallen even further, to just $12.61.

It should be mentioned at this point that the Frustrating Card isn’t shipped by Amazon itself, but rather by ChiTek, at a cost of $4.50.

My prediction: if and when Amazon gets the card back in stock, the price will be substantially lower than $24.45. But this is also an interesting example of Amazon gaining from brand stickiness, after being on the losing side with respect to iTunes.

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The 2-Year Recession Optimists

It’s that time of year, when pundits get asked to prognosticate about the year ahead. The answers, as ever, are interesting mainly as sentiment indicators, rather than as any indication of what the future might hold. But the questions can be more interesting still. Here’s the first question of a survey I received this morning:

1. When will the current recession officially end?

•By January 1, 2010

•By June 30, 2010

•By January 1, 2011

•By June 30, 2011

•After 2012

Remember that the recession officially began in December 2007; the earliest date given for its end is in 2010. Which implies that the best-case scenario, at least in the eyes of whomever drew up this survey, is that the recession will last a good two years.

I don’t think that’s necessarily unreasonable, but it does go to show the degree to which the bulls are cowering right now. If you think the recession will be over some time in the first half of 2009, you don’t even have the option of expressing that view. And if you’re delusional enough to think that the recession’s already over — well, in that case you probably shouldn’t be filling out this survey at all.

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When Private Equity Companies Fail

What happens when a private-equity shop fails? Boston Consulting Group thinks that will happen a lot in coming years:

The consultants expect 50% of all companies backed by private-equity funds to default on their debt; as many as 40% of buyout firms to shutter their own operations and only around 30% of partnerships to survive intact through the next few years.

A private-equity shop which loads up its portfolio companies with too much debt naturally stands to lose control of those companies if and when it fails to service the debt. That’s not a major problem, especially if the companies in question have good businesses: if done well, bankruptcy doesn’t mean closing down, it just means a change of ownership.

But what happens when the PE shop itself closes down? Who manages the portfolio companies which haven’t gone bust? Do they just get liquidated or sold off in fire sales, with the proceeds then given to the limited partners? That could be very bad indeed. But with their portfolios underwater and little prospect of performance fees in the future, it’s easy to see why the general partners might want to give up the hard work of running their portfolio companies and retire to an island somewhere instead on all the money they’ve trousered thus far.

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The Lehman Debacle

The WSJ has a 4,800-word tick-tock on the weekend of Lehman’s demise. The main takeaways, for me, are (a) that if John Thain really thought he deserved a $10 million bonus for his decision to sell to Bank of America that weekend, he must have been delusional; (b) that if Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke really want us to believe that they tried their hardest to save Lehman but that their hands were tied, they’re equally delusional; and (c) that not enough blame has been laid upon a certain large body of water.

Thain first. Here is his first meeting with Ken Lewis, on the Saturday afternoon:

Later that afternoon, Merrill’s chief executive met Bank of America’s CEO, Mr. Lewis, in the bank’s corporate apartment in the Time Warner Center. In a one-on-one meeting overlooking Central Park, the two men agreed that it looked like Lehman would be forced into bankruptcy.

Mr. Thain made his opening offer. "How about buying a 9.9% stake" in Merrill, he proposed.

Mr. Lewis said the bank doesn’t tend to buy minority stakes. He suggested Bank of America could buy the whole firm.

"I am not here to sell Merrill Lynch," Mr. Thain responded.

The deal was finally done on Sunday evening, but it was negotiated by Merrill president Gregory Fleming, not by John Thain:

Mr. Fleming and Bank of America’s lead negotiator, Mr. Curl, hammered out a price. Bank of America would buy Merrill for $29 a share.|

Mr. Fleming informed Mr. Thain. At 6 p.m., Merrill’s top managers and directors gathered in person and by phone.

"When I took this job this was not the outcome I intended," Mr. Thain told directors. After the board meeting broke up after 8 p.m., Mr. Thain called the chief of Bank of America. "The decision was unanimous," Mr. Thain told Mr. Lewis. "You have a deal."

The general impression of John Thain is that his main claim to fame was the absence of the stubborn streak which ultimately brought down not only Dick Fuld but his entire bank behind him. Fuld was always behind the game; Thain too, but not nearly as far, and he had an ability to accept the inevitable which Fuld — to this day — lacks.

As for the Lehman revisionism, the story doesn’t seem to support the new stories from Paulson and Bernanke wherein they try their darndest to do what they can but find their hands tied by the Fed’s inability to bail out the bank. Instead, the no-bailout decision had already been made at the beginning of the marathon weekend, at a key meeting at the New York Fed on Friday afternoon. From that point on, Paulson is curiously absent from the story:

Mr. Thain gathered along with Morgan’s Mr. Mack and Goldman’s Mr. Blankfein at the New York Federal Reserve in downtown Manhattan… The three men were greeted by the masters of the world’s biggest economy — Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, New York Fed Chief Timothy Geithner and Securities and Exchange Commission chief Christopher Cox…

The federal officials told the Wall Street chiefs to return in the morning. If the mess at Lehman could be fixed, it would be the job of the Wall Street bosses. There would be no public bailout.

There is nothing in this story about the Fed looking carefully at Lehman’s books prior to this announcement, and making a determination that the quality of Lehman’s assets was so low that there was no way the Fed could legally lend bailout funds to the bank. Instead, this conforms much more with the initial story, that Paulson was drawing a line in the sand and saying "no more bailouts".

By the end of the weekend, a Barclays deal was still a real possibility. But:

One hurdle remained: To ink a Lehman deal, Barclays needed a shareholder vote. There was no way to get one on a Sunday. Barclays would need the U.S. or British government to back Lehman’s trading balances until a vote could be held.

Government approval never came, though there are diverging views on why. Some blame the U.S. government for refusing to commit resources. Others say the British government refused to entertain a deal they worried would expose England to unnecessary risk.

This is helpful, but not very: it’s hobbled enormously by the problems of anonymous sourcing, and I look forward to the point at which US and British government officials start going on the record about exactly what happened. But it seems to me that the Brits were understandably reluctant to step in where the Feds refused to tread, and that the Feds offered zero support to their counterparts across the pond.

We’re left with the question of how Barclays feels, now, about the failure of the deal to go through. On the one hand, it essentially ended up with all of the Lehman assets it wanted, unencumbered by any debt at all. On the other hand, Barclays itself was hardly immune from the financial devastation wrought globally by Lehman’s collapse.

With hindsight, I still think that a cobbled-together deal between Barclays, Lehman, Treasury, the Fed, the FSA, the Bank of England, and the British Treasury would have been a much better option to what eventually transpired. But the key negotiants were too far apart, and these kind of deals really have to be hammered out in person. Maybe we should all blame the Atlantic Ocean for Lehman’s failure. At least it never got a bonus.

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Ben Stein Watch: December 28, 2008

Ben Stein is some kind of seer:

About two years ago, a little delegation from a major investment bank arrived at my home in Beverly Hills. These nice young people were from the bank’s “wealth management division.”…

They told me that if I invested a certain sum with them, they would make sure that a large chunk of it was managed by a money manager of stupendous acumen…

I thanked them for their time and promptly looked up Bernard Madoff online. Nothing I saw was even a bit convincing that he had made a breakthrough in financial theory. Besides, this large financial firm was going to charge me roughly 2 percent to put my money with Mr. Madoff’s firm…

I checked with my investment gurus, Phil DeMuth, Raymond J. Lucia and Kevin Hanley. None of us could see how Mr. Madoff could do what his friends said he could do. I politely passed…

This whole story is very odd. Ben Stein has spent many years trying to make a name for himself as an investment guru, going on the television and writing columns and books on the subject, and acting as a prominent booster for index funds generally and for Dimensional’s funds in particular.

The delegation from the wealth management division of the major investment bank surely knew all this — and yet they went to Stein’s home and pitched him on the idea that he should just sit back and leave his money with them?

What’s more, Stein says that even before he gave them a penny, these private bankers were extolling the virtues of Bernie Madoff as a money manager. Now that’s even weirder. For one thing, "major investment banks" are conspicuous by their absence when it comes to the roster of Madoff’s victims. Look at the banks on the list — Banco Santander, Bank Medici, Fortis, UBS, HSBC, Natixis, and so on. There are lots of them, but none of them can really be considered investment banks. Some of them have investment-banking arms, but those arms don’t, to my knowledge, have their own wealth-management divisions.

In any event, faced with some suits offering to manage his money for an annual fee of 2%, Stein didn’t simply say no; he invited them into his home, took their offer seriously, and then roped three of his friends into looking into the offer and trying to replicate Madoff’s returns.

Why would Stein spend so much time listening to and second-guessing the claims of private bankers promising improbable returns? After all, he knows full well (or says he does) that such claims never pan out:

I belong to a number of country and town clubs. In all of my years at them, I have never gotten an investing tip that made money. In fact, as far as I can recall, I have never gotten a tip from any source that made me money, except for my former agent’s wife mentioning Berkshire Hathaway, Mr. Buffett’s company, 30 years ago.

Does Stein really think that the wealth management division of a bank is any more likely to have discovered a great investing tip than anybody else? After all, he tells us that even hedge fund managers — who are paid vastly more money than private bankers — generally fail:

One great advantage of being 64 is that I can remember the early hedge funds of the 1960s. They, too, were supposed to turn water into wine, but they fell hard in the stock market meltdown that also laid low the Nifty Fifty — another 1960’s idea that 50 carefully selected stocks could long beat the indexes.

I can still recall visiting an early hedge fund pioneer. He had a small stereo playing rock music in his office as he tried to make millions. That’s how cool he was. I don’t know where he is now and I don’t want to know.

Clearly Stein isn’t giving us the whole story here — if he was, he would have named the bank in question. But he’s not the only person telling "I said no to Bernie Madoff" stories. He should be treated like anybody else with such a story: pay very little attention. People turn down investment opportunities, both good and bad, every day. And the main thing we learn from Stein’s story is not how smart he was to say no to Madoff, but rather how much he wanted to believe: when he thought it was too good to be true, he still went to three different friends in the hope that they could change his mind.

Then again, it’s public knowledge that Stein believes in fairy tales like Intelligent Design. So none of this should be much of a surprise.

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Why give Nobels for Financial Economics?

Pablo Triana sends me an open letter he’s written to the Swedish central bank, telling them to please stop giving out Nobel prizes in economics to "flawed, unworldly, and

dangerous theoretical finance constructs":

At least two of the theories awarded with the Economics “Nobel” have been behind the very

worst financial crises to have afflicted the world since the 1929 crash; Black-Scholes-Merton was

the inspiration for the strategies that gave us October 1987ߥs Black Monday, the most

devastating one-day drop in the history of Wall Street (which gravely threatened to sink the

system); while Portfolio Theory was the inspiration for the creators and adopters of VaR, which

outrageously misguided guidance and capacity for forcing destabilizing liquidations were to

blame for the 1998 LTCM crisis and the current malaise (both of which, certainly, put us in

great peril).

Triana has co-authored letters with Nassim Taleb in the past, and this is very much consistent with Taleb’s views. It’s not such a bad idea: right now it’s pretty hard to say that, in aggregate, recent advances in financial economics have been, on net, a good thing. So why encourage them with Nobels?

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Retail Sales Datapoint of the Day

The WSJ has quite the chart this morning, taken from MasterCard’s SpendingPulse data:

retailplunge.jpg

These are huge numbers, especially the 35% drop in luxury sales: it wasn’t all that long ago that the luxury segment was supposed to be immune from the plebeian woes of the economy as a whole.

The WSJ explains that the biggest fall of all was in jewelry:

Luxury goods, once considered immune from economic turmoil, were hardest hit, with sales falling 21.2%, compared with a jump of 7.5% a year ago, when the economy had just begun to sputter. Including jewelry sales, the luxury sector plunged by a whopping 34.5%.

A large chunk of that plunge in jewelry sales is surely non-luxury, mass-market jewelry, but still the numbers are much bigger than you could possibly explain away by pointing to bad weather or the reduced number of days between Thanksgiving and Christmas this year.

The most telling datapoint in the article, I think, is this one:

Shopper traffic fell 27% compared with the same time last year, while sales declined 5.3%, according to ShopperTrak RCT Corp., which tracks sales in retail outlets nationwide.

What this says to me is that shopping has moved from being a pleasurable activity — think mall-as-destination — to being an unpleasant chore. For many years, America’s retailers were successful in making people want to go shopping, even if they didn’t end up buying anything. Now, shopping is something to avoid where possible, and it’s interesting that Amazon — the shop for people who hate going shopping — managed another record year.

As a European, I retain a small measure of incomprehension when I look at America’s insatiable demand for stuff — demand which has been growing unsustainably until now. It’s still there, if you drop your prices enough:

Michelle Culang, 26, a doctoral student at City University of New York, stopped by Macy’s Herald Square store in Manhattan before Christmas because the store was having a big sale on pillows. "Once I saw the prices I bought more than I would have," said Ms. Culang, who spent $130 on a satin-sheet set and two extra-firm pillows for $29.99 each, marked down from $100.

And of course it’s very good news that the entire country hasn’t turned German overnight. But I do think that we’re seeing the beginning of a secular downshift in the percentage of the US economy accounted for by retail sales. That’s a good thing, in the long term, but it’s going to be a painful adjustment for the time being.

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What is the Point of Fannie’s Directors?

In a world where an AIG offsite meeting can cause a public uproar, it’s interesting that so few people seem to care very much about the sums of money being paid to Fannie Mae’s directors. Dean Baker, of course is one of them:

Keep in mind that this is a newspaper that is absolutely apoplectic over autoworkers getting $27 an hour. If we assume that the board members on average will devote 500 hours a year to their board duties, this puts their pay rate at $320 an hour.

I very much doubt that the average Fannie Mae board member is going to spend 500 hours a year on this $160,000-a-year job. (The chairman might, but he’s getting $250,000.)

In any case, Fannie Mae is owned by the government now. Is Treasury really incapable of governing Fannie Mae itself? Does it need to pay $1.7 million per year to insert a layer of not-very-accountable governance between itself and management? There’s an entire staff at the Federal Housing Finance Agency which knows intimately exactly what Fannie Mae is up to; they also have the power to insist on real change at the operational level. And I’m sure that precious few of them are pulling down $160,000 a year.

So Fannie’s board does seem to be a throwback to its former status as a public company. Under the terms of the conservatorship, there might need to be a board. But it doesn’t need to be nearly as well-paid as this, especially given that the board isn’t really in charge anyway.

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