The Problem With Option ARMs

The NYT’s Christmas Day installment of its big series on the financial crisis, The Reckoning, concentrates on Herbert and Marion Sandler, mortgage lenders in California who more or less invented the toxic option ARM.

The Sandlers come across as sympathetic victims of the bubble as much as perpetrators: they clearly cared more about underwriting than most mortgage lenders, and they didn’t found the Center for Responsible Lending as some kind of PR stunt.

They also believed in extending mortgages to those who had been left out of the system in its more regulated days. In principle, option ARMs are a great product for people who might earn a lot of money but who do so irregularly. That’s not just bankers with big end-of-year bonuses — the example the article gives — but also just about anybody who’s self-employed or freelance, from actors or TV producers to carpenters and, yes, many journalists.

The fundamental problem with the option ARM, I think, was one based in behavioral economics. The idea behind it is that you can get away with making small payments in lean times, and then make up for them with big payments when the large paycheck arrives. But once the product started being sold to people without a lot of financial self-discipline, those people would just make the minimum payment every month, no matter what their income. And indeed, if they had credit-card bills or other high-interest-rate debt, that would have been the sensible decision to make.

But the result was principal balances which only ever went up rather than down, especially when option ARMs started being sold to subprime borrowers — people for whom the product was not, initially, designed.

There’s another important aspect of the psychology of option ARMs: they’re really hard to understand, to the point at which Tanta once spent 3,700 words trying to explain how they work. As a result, it wasn’t only the borrowers who didn’t comprehend what they were getting into: it was also the brokers. Senior executives such as the Sandlers did understand the product, but in a weakness common to many smart people, they probably simply assumed that their staff understood it too, rather than actually checking on that. But many of their staff, like the borrowers, probably stopped at the point where the minimum payment was calculated, since not thinking about something like this is always easier than thinking about it.

It’s possible that the Sandlers were evil and predatory lenders who deliberately abused the psychology of their borrowers — but I don’t think so, especially since they kept hold of their own loans, rather than securitizing them, and that strategy, had they not sold out at the top of the market to Wachovia, was bound to blow up sooner or later. Rather, I think that the Sandlers simply let themselves get sucked into a race-to-the-bottom marketplace, especially after Wachovia put its enormous balance sheet at their disposal, and that they reassured themselves with irrelevant historical performance figures from the 1990-1 recession.

I do wonder whether a "good" option ARM can ever be devised. Maybe the trick is to force net principal repayments every year, and just leave it up to the borrower when those payments come. But it’s sad that so many option ARMs turned out so badly. Because the idea behind the product is not actually a bad one, if you ignore the psychology.

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GMAC: Who’s in Charge?

To me, the most interesting part of the Fed’s decision to allow GMAC to become a bank is the fact that it will be broken up to the point at which its owners will effectively have no control over it any more. The Fed seems to have concluded that GMAC has a strong management team in place, and that its current woes are more a function of its shareholders than they are of GMAC’s own internal mismanagement.

Which might seem sensible until one remembers the whole misadventure with ResCap, GMAC’s subprime mortgage arm. I’m no expert on the history of GMAC, but the impression I get is that the company became a key groundbreaker in securitization technologies as a result of its core auto finance activities, and that it then felt it could make a lot of money by applying those technologies elsewhere, especially in the mortgage market.

GMAC had a stellar reputation in the world of asset-backed securities for many years, and was crucial in helping to prop up its failing parent. Historically, GMAC was a wholly-owned subsidiary of GM; when the car maker ran into financial troubles in 2006, it sold a 51% stake to Cerberus, which had not yet bought Chrysler.

The Fed has strict rules on who is and is not allowed to own a bank, and neither GM nor Cerberus meets those standards. So Cerberus is going to dividend most of its stake in GMAC back to its limited partners, while GM is going to either give or sell most of its stake in GMAC to an independent, Fed-vetted trustee with instructions to sell the equity to someone else within three years.

I don’t know what kind of board GMAC is going to end up with, or who is going to sit on it. And although GMAC’s managers might have more free rein than they’ve had until now when it comes to shareholder demands, they will also have much more stringent constraints than before when it comes to capital adequacy and other demands which will surely be made by Federal regulators.

Still, at some point, a lot of big strategic decisions are going to have to be made, both about GMAC’s core business of financing GM auto purchases, and about its well-regarded but definitely non-core operations in mortgage finance around the world. Right now it’s far from clear who is going to make those decisions, and who is going to sign off on them. And I do hope it will take less than three years for someone to be put unambiguously in charge.

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Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

More on Existing Home Sales: Some great charts from CR.

How Much Has Harvard Really Lost? As much as half its total endowment, according to one anonymous source.

Latvia is the new Argentina: Reform without devaluation can only end in tears.

SEC Backs Exemptions for LCH.Clearnet on CDS: The beginning of a first central CDS clearinghouse.

Noah Millman on synthetic CDOs, ratings agencies, CPDOs, etc. And, added Dante!

Madoff Victims May Have to Return Profits, Principal: "The Florida investor, who first gave his money to Madoff five years ago, said he had no hint of fraud and would go to jail rather than give up the amount he took out."

Bernie’s histogram

A Hedge Fund Manager’s Holiday Card

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Bailouts: The Darling Approach

Robert Peston talks to UK finance minister Alistair Darling about the fateful week in October when the UK took the lead in terms of injecting massive amounts of capital into its banking system, in the process effectively nationalizing a large part of the industry.

Clearly Darling, with hindsight, knows how to present his actions in the best possible light; his mistakes, like his public statements about Iceland, are not covered here. But equally clearly Darling had a much clearer idea of where things were going and what needed to be done than did his counterparts in the US.

I was very clear even before the turbulence of that week that whatever we did, we had to do it for the entire banking system. We couldn’t get ourselves into a situation where you’re simply fixing one problem because the problem was then moved to somebody else and, you know, we just couldn’t allow that to carry on happening. We’d seen it in America where they, no sooner had they sorted one bank’s problems out than the problems transferred to the next. So on the Wednesday, I announced a general overall plan – the scheme, if you like. Things did get worse during that week because confidence was just draining out of the system and in some ways, that made it easier for us to talk to the banks and say, "look, we’re all in this together. No one’s got any choice. Everybody’s going to have to recapitalise…

I had meetings all day on the Sunday and then at ten o’clock on the Sunday night, just when you know everything was agreed as far as I was concerned, inevitably when you deal with a bunch of bankers, they started trying to re-open it. So I said about one o’clock – "okay, re-open it if you want. I’m going to my bed. If you haven’t agreed it by five o’clock, then you’re on your own". So happily, when I woke up at five o’clock, we’d got an agreement.

I like all of this a lot. First the public announcement of principles before the bailout, then the uncowed attitude to the "bunch of bankers". Maybe this is one advantage of a parliamentary democracy: the finance minister doesn’t simply give occasionally testimony to some committee or other. Instead, he has actually been a Member of Parliament for over 20 years, and is never about to forget it.

What are the chances of Tim Geithner adopting Darling’s Scottish, no-nonsense way of running things? I’d say slim: I can’t see Geithner using a four-hour nap as a negotiating device. That’s more of a Volcker move, I think.

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The Limited Usefulness of Shared-Equity Mortgages

Paul Kedrosky pleads:

I’d be delighted if someone would explain to me why we aren’t talking more seriously about shared equity home mortgages in the U.S.

The answer is very simple, I think: the perceived cost to the borrower of a shared equity mortgage is much greater than the perceived benefit to the lender.

The Fannie Mae foundation put out a paper on these mortgages last year, which looked at attitudes towards them:

Survey results suggested also that most renters saw

the SEM as a form of bridge finance that they would try

hard to pay off in the relatively short term.

At the same time, it’s hard to see any bank regulator — or bank, for that matter — considering the equity part of these mortgages to be a remotely valuable asset. It has no maturity date, it’s completely illiquid, it can’t be called, there’s no secondary market in it, and it’s fraught with moral hazard: sellers have every incentive to negotiate a low up-front price for their home and receive value from the buyer in other ways.

I’m reminded of the oil warrants and GDP warrants which were occasionally attached to emerging-market sovereign bonds in the 1990s. They often ended up costing the borrower a lot of money, but investors almost never assigned any value to them until they were very much in the money and paying out.

The most important reason why shared-equity mortgages aren’t going to be a big thing, however, is simply that they’re too small. They’re generally for about 20% of the value of the home — they’re a way of figuring something out at the margin, but not a useful way of (re)structuring an entire loan.

In an ideal world of efficient markets, renters would take some extra money which they have available for mortgage payments, and invest that money in a liquid, securitized tranche of shared-equity mortgages, which would allow their slowly-growing down payment to keep pace with local house prices. But we’re now in a world of very inefficient markets, and interest in such products is likely to be zero for the foreseeable future. Which is why they’re not going to be part of the solution to the mortgage mess.

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Celebrating Wealth Destruction

Dean Baker sees the upside of the recession:

You probably didn’t see this in the newspapers, but real wages rose at an incredible 14.8% annual rate over the last three months. The basic story is straightforward. While nominal wages have continued to grow at a modest 3.2% annual rate, prices have plummeted, hugely increasing the value of the paycheques of those workers lucky enough to still have a job…

The real lesson that the public should learn from recent experience is how the income of one segment of society is a cost to others. The wealthy understand this point very well…

If they can get low-paid workers to tend their gardens, serve them meals in restaurants, paint their homes and serve as nannies for their children, it raises their standard of living…

In the same vein, when the rich lose wealth it is a gain to everyone else. In short, they have our money.

This doesn’t feel right to me. Yes, it’s true that the working classes saw their standard of living stagnate during the years when the income and wealth of the rich was soaring. But it’s also true that the single event which most soured working-class Americans on Republican pro-rich economic policies was not the rich getting richer but rather the rich getting poorer when the stock market plunged in October.

What’s more, it’s not easy to come up with examples of any country where the poor have seen a sustained increase in their standard of living as the rich have gotten significantly poorer. And if you’re a low-paid waiter or painter or nanny, you’re unlikely to feel better off when you’re fired by your formerly-rich patron.

Baker’s solution to this last problem is simple:

This just points to the urgency of a large government stimulus package. We need to replace the consumption of stockholders and homeowners with some other form of demand. The government has the capacity to spend enough money to replace this demand (as Fed chairman Ben Bernanke said, we can always print more money).

This obviously isn’t a permanent solution, and I wonder whether it’s feasible even on a temporary basis. Does anybody have a ballpark number for how much the consumption of the rich has declined? I suspect that the drop-off in real-estate consumption alone is greater than any stimulus plan which we’re likely to see.

But the real gain of the workers at the expense of the wealthy will come only if rents start declining. I’d love to see some numbers on the average rent paid by non-homeowners: does anybody collect that data?

Update: An email correspondent sends in some historical perspective:

In the US and much of Western Europe 1950-1980 the rich stagnated while the real standard of living of the rest improved.

In Revolutionary France the seizure of the assets of the aristocracy and the church and the elimination of many tolls, the emancipation of remaining surfs, and ending of the oppressive tithe system improved the standard of living of the middle and poor at the expense of the rich, at least those who did not die as cannon fodder.

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Housing Gets Even Worse

November is never a great month for home sales, but don’t let that fool you: today’s reports are truly gruesome, falling significantly short of very bearish expectations. New home sales, at an annualized rate of 407,000, are at their lowest level since 1991; existing home sales, which were running at a rate of over 7 million a year in 2005, are now down to less than 4.5 million.

The median home price in the US is now just $181,000 — down from $215,000 as recently as June — and total housing inventory for sale rose in months-supply terms (thanks to the drop in sales) and is now hitting all-time record levels of about one year’s supply.

All this is happening, remember, in an economy where roughly two-thirds of American households are owner-occupied. Owning one’s own home, something which for most of this decade was a definite asset, is now a serious liability. Millions of workers can’t move to somewhere with a better job market, and to make matters worse their net worth is now negative — which means that no one will lend them any money, even if they are current on their mortgage payments.

And prices have further to fall: as the commenters yesterday were quick to note, if you plug real-world numbers into a buy-vs-rent calculator, especially if you make the reasonable assumption that rents aren’t going to rise, it’s still generally cheaper to rent than to buy, plus of course you get much more freedom of movement, and the option value of being able to buy a home much more easily in the future after prices have fallen further.

I still think that trying to put an artificial floor under house prices by forcing down mortgage rates is a bad idea, even as it seems to be gaining traction with Team Obama. But you can see the attraction: it’s something, which at this point seems to be unambiguously better than nothing. And certainly the economy as a whole isn’t going to start growing again so long as house prices and home sales continue to fall at this kind of pace. But my gut feeling is that we’re in for a very long bear market in housing, and that any attempt to turn things around in the short term, if it’s successful, will prove to be short-lived.

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Extra Credit, Monday Edition

Money market funds reel as yields near zero

How India Avoided a Crisis: Nocera on the Reserve Bank of India’s YV Reddy.

The Shill Owns Up: Lereah’s very bearish.

Fool Him Twice: Jerome Fisher: Yet more evidence that successful entrepeneurs can be atrocious investors.

The Art Fag City Year End Fundraiser: The microdonations model of blogonomics, but maybe not so micro: suggested donations start at $25, and range all the way up to $5,000.

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Fund of Funds Indemnification Clause of the Day

A prescient bit of CYA was inserted into the fund prospectus for Kingate Global, a Madoff feeder fund:

Kingate warned in its fund prospectus “there was always the risk that the assets with the investment adviser could be misappropriated”.

“In addition, information supplied by the investment adviser may be inaccurate or even fraudulent. The co-managers [Kingate and Tremont] are entitled to rely on such information (provided they do so in good faith) and are not required to undertake any due diligence to confirm the accuracy thereof,” it said.

I’ll be fascinated to see whether this kind of legal small print does what it was clearly intended to do — which is to protect Kingate in court when the inevitable lawsuits arrive. My gut feeling is that either Madoff’s feeder funds will be found liable or they won’t; but that the presence of this language in the prospectus of one such fund won’t be enough to save it if all the others end up having to pay damages.

Still, the person who drafted the prospectus is probably patting himself on the back right now — and, if Kingate does end up being protected by this clause, you can be sure that it’s going to start popping up in all manner of other prospectuses from here on in.

Update: I’ve been asked, for the record, to note that Kingate and Tremont are no longer co-managers of this fund, although they both continue to have significant Madoff exposure. Dealbreaker has the Tremont private placement memorandum, which has no such language.

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The Housing Unwind: Who Suffers?

Tyler Cowen is impressed by this sentence from Paul Krugman:

Anyway, it’s striking that the worst of the crisis is hitting states that largely didn’t experience a housing bubble.

I would actually consider this to be one of the more intuitive artifacts of the current economic crisis. America has places where people want to live, and places where people don’t want to live. Which of those places will have a housing bubble? Which will be worst-hit by a major recession?

Alternatively, you could consider this to be prima facie evidence that mortgage securitization did indeed manage to spread risk; it just managed to spread it to those who could least afford it.

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Madoff’s Volatility

A longtime reader of this blog got himself Bernie Madoff’s return series from a Fairfield Sentry marketing document and plugged it into an Excel spreadsheet; he then graphed the one-year rolling volatility of Madoff’s returns. The results are interesting: click on them for a bigger, easier-to-read version.

madoffvolsmall.jpg

It seems to me (and the annotations are all mine) that this graph is consistent with Justin Fox’s theory that Madoff was artificially smoothing his returns until the dot-com blowup, at which point he went Full Ponzi.

In other words, Madoff was never fully legitimate — or at least, looking at this chart, he seems to have been pretty illegitimate from at least 1995 onwards. But he might not have been actively stealing his clients’ money until he blew up at the beginning of this decade, and subsequently moved from being a dishonest fund manager to the operator of a fully-fledged Ponzi scheme.

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The White House vs the NYT, Economic Meltdown Edition

In what Mike Allen calls "an unusual double-header", the White House has issued both a 100-word statement and a longer 900-word rebuttal of Sunday’s big NYT feature on how George W Bush contributed to the housing crisis.

What’s interesting to me is the narrowness of the rebuttal: it basically says "you can’t blame us, because the Democrats in Congress were crap too". But the article never lets the Democrats in Congress off the hook; it’s just not about them. It’s about the White House, which was so gung-ho when it came to the economy in general and the housing market in particular that it even overruled its own Treasury Department.

For me, the Treasury vs White House parts of the story are its most interesting bits:

Both Mr. Paulson and his predecessor, John W. Snow, say the housing push went too far.

“The Bush administration took a lot of pride that homeownership had reached historic highs,” Mr. Snow said in an interview. “But what we forgot in the process was that it has to be done in the context of people being able to afford their house. We now realize there was a high cost.” …

By the spring of 2005 a deal with Congress [on a bill to regulate Fannie and Freddie] seemed within reach, Mr. Snow, the former Treasury secretary, said in an interview.

Michael G. Oxley, an Ohio Republican and then-chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, had produced what Mr. Snow viewed as “a pretty darned good bill,” a watered-down version of what the president sought. But at the urging of Mr. Card and the White House economics team, the president decided to hold out for a tougher bill in the Senate.

Mr. Card said he feared that Mr. Snow was “more interested in the deal than the result.” When the bill passed the House, the president issued a statement opposing it, effectively killing any chance of compromise. Mr. Oxley was furious…

Mr. Snow, for one, calls Mr. Oxley “a hero,” adding, “He saw the need to move. It didn’t get done. And it’s too bad, because I think if it had, I think we could well have avoided a big contributor to the current crisis.”

Here’s how the White House responds to this:

Over the past six years, the President and his Administration have not only warned of the systemic consequences of failure to reform GSEs but also put forward thoughtful plans to reduce the risk that either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac would encounter such difficulties. President Bush publicly called for GSE reform at least 17 times in 2008 alone before Congress acted. Unfortunately, these warnings went unheeded, as the President’s repeated attempts to reform the supervision of these entities were thwarted by the legislative maneuvering of those who emphatically denied there were problems. Many prominent Democrats, including House Finance Chairman Barney Frank, opposed any legislation correcting the risks posed by GSEs.

The net effect, after reading both the article and the rebuttal, is not only of a win for the NYT but also of a lose for the White House. The NYT did a lot of work and got the likes of John Snow on the record about exactly what happened; the White House, in contrast, gives us nothing but finger-pointing at Democrats.

It seems that this White House still thinks that stewardship of the economy is a party-political issue, even after most of the opposition to its recent initiatives has come from the Republican side of the aisle. Clearly this is a group of people who will never learn from their mistakes; I hope and believe that the incoming administration will be much quicker to admit when it is wrong.

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Rent vs Buy: Buying Becomes More Attractive

I’ve been playing around with mortgage calculators this morning, after getting an email from a renter in Long Island who wants to buy but isn’t happy with falling mortgage rates:

I have saved enough for a substantial down payment – and was looking forward to taking advantage of my savings and higher mortgage rates by buying a home for a lot less then current asking prices.

Lowering rates will only keep these d_mn home prices artificially high. Prices need to come down. Why shouldn’t renters have a chance to build equity over time in a home (with 4.5% mortgage rates – you’ll never build equity, you’ll just really be renting again!)

This is actually the wrong way round. The lower your mortgage rate, the faster you build equity in your home, and the less money you waste in interest payments to the bank.

Let’s say our friend in Long Island is currently paying $1,000 a month in rent, and would rather spend that $1,000 a month on a mortgage payment instead. If he got a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at 7%, that would cover a $150,000 loan. Since $1,000 a month for 360 months works out at a total of $360,000 in mortgage repayments, on average about 42 cents of his mortgage-payment dollar will go towards building equity. What’s more, most of that is back-ended: after five years, he will have paid down his principal amount outstanding by just $8,820.64, or less than 15% of his total payments.

On the other hand, a $1,000 payment on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at 4.5% would cover a $200,000 loan — which means that 56 cents of every dollar you spend on your mortgage goes towards equity. And after five years, he will have paid down his principal amount outstanding by $17,450.82, which is 29% of his first five years’ payments.

So yes, the house is $50,000 more expensive, but it’s just as affordable, and you’re building up more equity, not less, with the lower mortgage rate.

Of course, there’s always the risk that a house bought with a 4.5% mortgage could fall in price more than a house bought when interest rates are higher — or that the cheaper house has more room for price appreciation. So the calculation isn’t really this simple. But if you look at an amortization curve for a high-interest-rate mortgage, it starts off pretty flat: most of your mortgage payments are going to interest. The lower that mortgage rates fall, the more equity you build up in the early years.

All of which is to say: take another look at that rent vs buy calculator. Even at 0% house price appreciation, buying looks much more attractive when mortgage rates plunge, as they have done recently.

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The Commercial Real Estate Bailout

I can see the case for extending Fed loans to hedge funds, when those hedge funds invest in consumer loans. The credit-card business has been built on securitization, and now that market has dried up, there’s a serious risk that the US consumer will simply run out of liquidity.

But bailing out owners of commercial property? That seems to me to be a step too far. If the US consumer isn’t able to keep on spending, the consequences for the US economy would be devastating. If a bunch of big landlords see some properties revert to bank ownership, on the other hand, the systemic consequences seem to me to be much smaller.

When the government implements any kind of plan which involves spending hundreds of billions of dollars in a short amount of time on an ad hoc basis, you can be sure that just about every interest group will line up for a piece of the pie. So if I were Barack Obama, I’d be pushing my economic team right now to come up with some clearly-defined principles for bailout funds: what they’re for, how they should be used, where they should be spent, where they should not be spent.

If nothing else, such a set of principles would make it much easier to persuade Congress not to put up too much of a fight when the Treasury secretary asks for the second $350 billion of TARP funds. But more importantly, they would impart some much-needed predictability and stability to the policymaking process. And they might help to minimize the number of desperate trial balloons floated on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.

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Extra Credit, Sunday Edition

Madoff Teaches Lessons in Due Diligence: Donald Trump on Bernie Madoff: "Just because someone is well established doesn’t mean they’re not above being a total crook."

Madoff Scandal Parallels 1905 Play: Me, on NPR, talking Mamet and Madoff.

And finally, via Freakonomics:

Zimdollars.jpg

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Extra Credit, Saturday Edition

Hedge funds gain access to $200bn Fed aid: If they buy securitized consumer loans.

I want to be a cockroach: Why many companies may be doomed.

How Long Has This Been Going On? "It’s simply amazing how much of what now seems obviously a ‘red flag’ about Madoff’s operation was known for decades."

The Three Faces of Bernie: "Representatives of certain Palm Beach country clubs, New York synagogues, and Jewish charities might be forgiven if they view old Bernie as the Jewish Neutron Bomb: a device which vaporizes its victims’ liquid wealth while leaving them, their creditors, and their rapidly depreciating real estate intact."

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Ben Stein Watch: Now on NYTimes.com

The NYT has a contributor’s page for Ben Stein; I go there at weekends to see whether he’s lobbed another softball in my direction. What I never dreamed, however, was that I could hit those balls straight back onto nytimes.com, thanks to their Blogrunner software:

bsw.jpg

Blogrunner doesn’t seem to consider Market Movers itself to be a blog, but when I’m picked up by Seeking Alpha, that’s good enough. Which means that I can probably expect all of my Ben Stein Watches, from now on, to be linked to from Ben Stein’s own home at nytimes.com.

I have had moments, in recent months, when I’ve toyed with the idea of bringing the BSW to an end — but not after seeing this!

Posted in ben stein watch, blogonomics | 1 Comment

Extra Credit, Friday Edition

The World’s Largest Hedge Fund is a Fraud: Harry Markopolos in 2005.

Vilsack: Big Agriculture has a man in the White House: Which is probably a good thing, biotechnology-wise, but a bad thing, ethanol-wise.

Hope Grows for a Taiwan Chipmaker Bailout: A genuine BusinessWeek headline.

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TARP’s Intended Beneficiaries

Tom Brown has launched another broadside against Elizabeth Warren and her questions for Treasury; it’s worth reading if only to understand just how weak the arguments against her really are. Here’s how he gets started:

Take, for example, her Question 3: Is the strategy helping to reduce foreclosures?

Not to put too fine a point on it but, when it comes to the government’s effort to stabilize the financial system, the absolute level of foreclosures is . . . irrelevant.

It’s weird that Brown is quite sure what the stabilization program isn’t designed to do, but never quite comes out and says what it is designed to do. He does write for a website called bankstocks.com, maybe he thinks that the purpose of the program is to increase the value of his equity. He’s wrong. It’s designed to help real Americans, by giving them access to credit and by keeping them in their homes. If foreclosures continue to rise, it will be a failure.

Brown continues:

For a lender, the foreclose/don’t foreclose decision ought to be a matter of straight economics. A lender should not foreclose (and should offer the borrower a loan modification instead) when it expects the modified loan to generate a higher net present value of cash flows than an immediate foreclosure would. Modifications on more liberal terms would simply be a giveaway from the lender to the borrower–which is not what the TARP program was intended to fund.

There’s a micro objection to this, and a stronger macro objection. The micro objection is that Brown is living in some kind of "ought makes an is" world, where lenders don’t foreclose if they can get themselves a better deal through a sensibly-worked-out loan mod. But that’s not the world as we know it. Lenders (or, rather, servicers) simply don’t have the staff to modify loans intelligently and effectively on a case-by-case basis, so they foreclose instead; the fact that many loans have been sold into mortgage pools and securitized only serves to vastly complicate the situation.

In other words, a government plan to reduce foreclosures and encourage loan mods might well actually help the lenders, not hurt them.

Especially when you consider the macro effect of lots of lenders all deciding to foreclose. Even if Brown is right and it makes sense for any given bank to foreclose on any given loan, it still makes sense for the government to try to minimize foreclosures, because if every bank does that for every loan, we end up in house-price Armageddon. Foreclosures might be a consequence of falling house prices, but they’re a major cause of them as well, and preventing foreclosures is a great way of preventing house-price declines.

Brown’s rhetoric is all of the "what’s good for banks is good for bank customers" flavor, which gets extremely tiresome after a while, especially for anybody who, well, has ever dealt with a bank. But he marries those arguments with an extremely narrow view of what TARP can possibly be asked to do:

If Prof. Warren and her group want the federal government to tighten regulation on consumer lending, they should sign up for a different oversight board.

Why? The government represents its consituents, and its consituents are bank customers, not the banks themselves. The government now holds a large amount of equity in banks, some of which would certainly be bankrupt right now were it not for Treasury’s intervention. So it has every right to make any demands that it likes, pretty much, on behalf of its constituents.

Brown also has a peculiar take on the sweetheart deal given to AIG:

The Treasury thought it was getting a fair deal from AIG when it loaned the company $85 billion at Libor plus 850 basis points, as part of the initial bailout plan. The subsequent interest burden was so crushing the government later had to agree to easier terms, for fear of a bankruptcy.

There was zero chance that AIG was going to declare bankruptcy while having de facto unlimited access to government funds. When have you ever heard of a state-owned company declaring bankruptcy?

It’s ridiculous for Brown to say that taxpayers should have no interest in getting a fair return on their investment — after all, TARP was sold as an investment rather than a money pit. I’m sure that bankstocks.com’s Brown would love it if the government simply tranferred hundreds of billions of dollars from the public fisc to the shareholders of big banks. (I have no idea what he thinks about using TARP funds to bail out Detroit; he probably doesn’t like it, given that he’s not autostocks.com.) But he should hardly be surprised if Elizabeth Warren pushes back at any such attempt. And yes, that is her job.

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Madoff Fallout Datapoint of the Day

From Robert Peston:

A well-known wealthy entrepreneur told me last night that he’d lost about 1% of his net worth on an investment in Madoff and is setting about getting his money back from every hedge fund that he’s invested in.

I’m sure that this chap is well aware that hedge funds are not Ponzi schemes, etc etc. But it doesn’t matter, he’s taking his money out anyway, and I can’t blame him one bit. He’s already wealthy. Why take even a small chance of losing it all, for the sake of extra returns which you’ll never spend anyway?

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Blogonomics, Grey Lady Edition

Five years after blogging went mainstream and more than seven years after the WSJ’s editorial page launched Best of the Web Today, the Grey Lady is finally dipping its toe into the editorial blogosphere. If you saw this news story without a date on it, what are the chances that you’d guess it came out at the very tail end of 2009?

NEW YORK The New York Times is planning to launch a new "Instant Op-Ed" next month that will allow the paper’s Web site to post immediate expert viewpoints on breaking news, according to Editorial Page Editor Andrew Rosenthal.

"Our Op-Ed now is very rapid response, but it is at the most the next day," said Rosenthal. "We are looking at a way to take advantage of the expandability of the Internet, the back and forth of it and the instantaneous nature of the Internet."

I’m old enough to remember when a next-day editorial could be considered "very rapid response", but the readers who will make or break the future of the NYT are not.

In a way, this is a little bit heartening. The NYT newsroom has successfully embraced the web to a degree that few newspapers can match (and has many excellent blogs of its own), and the NYT homepage is my favorite one-stop shop for a quick news hit on the web. The fact that the op-ed side of things has been so blissfully removed from the online revolution for so long does go to show how independent it really is. And the world needs late adopters as well as their early brethren.

But if I were Rosenthal, I would just do this, rather than make a song-and-dance about launching something which is clearly years behind the curve. Maybe it will take off, maybe it won’t — my guess is that if this gets lots of links from the nytimes.com homepage, it probably will. But don’t set yourself up for needless criticism by implying that you’re going to have a polished final product before the inauguration. These things always take time to evolve and grow into some kind of steady state.

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Paulson Grasps the Automaker Nettle

Last night, I asked Hank Paulson, in a submitted question for his appearance at the 92nd St Y, why he was dilly-dallying over an automaker bailout and whether or not to ask for the second tranche of TARP funds, after having been so decisive all the way up to the election.

I should ask these questions more often: today I get the news that Paulson is not only releasing TARP funds for Detroit, but has kindasorta asked for the rest of his TARP money too. Here’s the relevant bit of his statement:

It is clear, however, that Congress will need to release the remainder of the TARP to support financial market stability. I will discuss that process with the congressional leadership and the President-elect’s transition team in the near future.

This is less than crystal-clear, but Damian Paletta says that it "signals a shift from recent statements when he suggested he wouldn’t ask for the rest of the money". It seems to me that Paulson is saying that the only way he’ll formally ask for the second tranche is if he has the support of Barack Obama’s transition team.

I am surprised that George W Bush, MBA, said this:

He said that bankruptcy was not a workable alternative. “Chapter 11 is unlikely to work for the American automakers at this time,” Mr. Bush said, noting that consumers would be unlikely to purchase cars from a bankrupt manufacturer.

So much for the pre-pack, but this is going to make things very hard on the automakers’ managers, who need to impose a swingeing 67% haircut on their bondholders without having the help of a bankruptcy judge to enforce such a thing. I’ll be very interested to see how they try to do that; expect a huge fight, and no guarantee of success. Yes, the bondholders are well aware that if they say no, the only other option is liquidation, and zero payout. But that doesn’t mean they’ll be remotely complaisant.

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Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Brilliant: Credit Suisse To Pay Top Execs With Illiquid Mortgage Securities: It really is an astonishingly good idea.

This one Goes to Eleven: "It doesn’t make a lot of sense to look for the X,Y,Z ’causes’ of the crash because when feedback is present X,Y,Z may not be a problem even though X,Y,Z + epsilon creates a disaster."

Madoff ‘n’ Jeff: The ramblings of Bernie Madoff’s auditor.

That might be it for today, I’m travelling to California. Tomorrow I’ll be sunnier!

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Thursday Edition

Alan Greenspan, Perennial Optimist

Alan Greenspan has a solution to the economic crisis: a rising stock market!

What, then, will be the source of the new private capital that allows sovereign lending to be withdrawn? Eventually, the most credible source is a partial restoration of the $30 trillion of global stockmarket value wiped out this year, which would enable banks to raise the needed equity. Markets are being suppressed by a degree of fear not experienced since the early 20th century (1907 and 1932 come to mind). Human nature being what it is, we can count on a market reversal, hopefully, within six months to a year.

Well, there you have it. Give things six months to a year, there will be a healthy market rebound, especially in financial stocks which will suddenly find themselves able to raise affordable equity capital again, and all will be right as rain.

The problem, of course, is that "hopefully" is not a plan, especially when it’s attached to the idea that stocks will go up when they’re still overvalued relative to pretty much any other part of corporate America’s capital structure.

Greenspan has convinced himself that America’s banks are solvent, and that therefore a relatively modest cash injection should solve all the economy’s financial problems. But hang on:

The insertion, last month, of $250 billion of equity into American banks through TARP (a two-percentage-point addition to capital-asset ratios) halved the post-Lehman surge of the LIBOR/OIS spread. Assuming modest further write-offs, simple linear extrapolation would suggest that another $250 billion would bring the spread back to near its pre-crisis norm.

Yes, once again he’s "assuming modest further write-offs" — that is, assuming his conclusion.

It’s very easy for Greenspan to say that if there isn’t much in the way of future write-offs, and if stocks start going up rather than down, then our problems will largely be solved. It’s easy, but it’s not particularly helpful. Is this really how he conducted monetary policy when he was at the Fed? If so, he was a much worse Fed chairman than anybody suspected at the time.

Posted in economics, fiscal and monetary policy | Comments Off on Alan Greenspan, Perennial Optimist

Against Lower Mortgage Rates

Glenn Hubbard and Charlie Mayer have a WSJ op-ed saying, in the clear words of their headline, that "Low-Interest Mortgages Are the Answer"; Brad DeLong agrees, and yes, he’s more astonished than anybody else that he’s siding with Hubbard.

I, however, find the argument unconvincing.

First, Hubbard and Mayer imply that the house-price decline is now in overshooting territory: "while fundamental factors clearly played a role in driving down house prices that were at excessive levels two years ago," they write, "house values are today lower than what is consistent with the average level of affordability in the past 20 years".

This is an argument which basically says that nominal house prices don’t matter — all that matters is "affordability", which is code for low interest rates. In other words, they’re assuming their conclusion. Of course nominal interest rates matter: house-price declines, as we’ve seen, can cause massive delinquency and default. As a result, no one wants to live in a world where house prices would plunge if and when interest rates rise substantially.

Indeed, the authors’ own research, which shows relatively low levels of affordability 20 years ago when interest rates were high, only proves that nominal prices do matter. And as a glance at the Case-Shiller indices will show you, nominal house prices are still very high by historical standards.

There’s really no fundamental reason why Americans could and did become so comfortable with the concept of the million-dollar house, even while the average household income remained stubbornly in the five-digit range. And there’s no fundamental reason either why most families should essentially have to use one full-time salary just to pay the mortgage, and rely on a second full-time salary to actually spend and live on. If you’re looking at affordability in terms of household income, you’re missing the fact that many households have had to take on extra jobs just to afford their homes.

The op-ed continues:

A 4.5% mortgage rate is not too low. The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield closed at 2.3% on Dec. 12, 2008. Hence a 4.5% mortgage rate is 2.2% above the Treasury yield, above the 1.6% spread that would prevail in a normally functioning mortgage market.

But a 4.5% mortgage rate is too low, and as someone who sits on the board of a credit union which does a lot of real estate lending, I’m very aware of the fact.

Hubbard and Mayer, here, are careful again to ignore nominal levels: they look instead only at spreads over the bubblicious Treasury market. Yes, when Treasury yields are artificially low, then spreads over Treasuries are going to look wider than normal. But a 4.5% mortgage rate is unprecedented in modern times, if ever, and for good reason.

If banks could originate to distribute, like they did during the bubble, then they could happily lend out at 4.5% and not worry about the consequences of having an asset yielding 4.5% sitting on their books for 30 years. But as we’ve seen, the originate-to-distribute is a recipe for fraud and lax underwriting. Private-sector investors are now sensibly wary of it, and Frannie should be too.

On the other hand, if banks are really lending out 30-year funds at 4.5%, they’re taking an enormous amount of interest rate risk, which is not at all easy to hedge. Remember that the first round of Frannie scandals centered on the agencies’ inability to effectively hedge their interest-rate risk; there’s no reason to believe that private-sector mortgage lenders will be any better. When Fed funds goes back over 5% — which it’s bound to do at some point in the next 30 years –and banks have a whole bunch of 4.5% loans on their books, we’ll just have yet another banking crisis on our hands.

Hubbard and Mayer go on to calculate that lowering mortgate rates to 4.5% could lead to 2.4 million additional owner-occupied homes in 2009. That’s an enormous number, and it worries me greatly. We have too many owner-occupied homes already — one of the reasons we had a housing bubble in the first place was that a lot of people who had no business buying property went ahead and did so anyway.

In order for buying a home to be sensible, you basically need a predictably steady income and you need to expect to stay in the same place for the next 5-10 years. Are there 2.4 million non-homeowners who really fit that bill and who are remotely willing to buy a house in the next 12 months? Of course not. So if that many people do end up buying houses, a lot of them will end up either losing money — because they have to sell when they move and they’ll get hit with all the attendant fees and costs — or else missing out on opportunities which are too far from where they are stuck because they own a home somewhere. Or, of course, they’ll simply default.

The authors even go into a reverie about a $100-billion-a-year "housing wealth effect" — haven’t we learned anything from the bubble? The housing wealth effect is a by-product of home equity lines of credit and cash-out refinancings — the very instruments which caused the bubble and burdened Americans with far more debt than they could afford. There’s no housing wealth effect if you can’t borrow against your housing wealth — and, frankly, people shouldn’t be able to borrow against their housing wealth, certainly not as easily as they did over the past few years.

Hubbard and Mayer do have one good argument:

The 4.5% mortgage rate that the Treasury is considering also should be available for present homeowners who want to refinance, because of the benefits for the economy as a whole. We calculate that up to 34 million households would be able to do so, at an average monthly savings of $428 — or a total reduction in mortgage payments of $174 billion. This is a permanent reduction in payments and is thus likely to spur appreciable increases in consumption.

Moreover, trillions of dollars of refinancings would retire a large number of the existing mortgage-backed securities. This would reduce uncertainty about the value of existing mortgage-backed securities. It would flood the market with additional liquidity that the private sector could deploy to other uses such as auto loans, credit cards, commercial mortgages and general business lending.

The multiplier here, however, is tiny: the cost to the government of reducing mortgage payments by $174 billion would be a good three times that sum.

There are much more effective ways for the government to spend half a trillion dollars than buying up mortgage-backed securities. Throwing it all at homeowners and leaving everybody else out in the cold is neither fair nor sensible.

Posted in economics, housing | Comments Off on Against Lower Mortgage Rates