How Sticky are Wages?

David Leonhardt on deflation, Wednesday:

The drop in prices, which isn’t over yet, will make life easier on millions of people. It’s possible, in fact, that the current recession will do less harm to the typical family’s income than it does to many other parts of the economy.

The reason is something called the sticky-wage theory. Economists have long been puzzled by the fact that most businesses simply will not cut their workers’ pay, even in a downturn. Businesses routinely lay off 10 percent of their workers to cut costs. They almost never cut pay by 10 percent across the board.

Fedex press release, Thursday:

FedEx is now implementing a number of additional cost reduction initiatives to mitigate the effects of deteriorating business conditions, including:

Base salary decreases, effective January 1, 2009:

* 20% reduction for FedEx Corp. CEO Frederick W. Smith

* 7.5%-10.0% reduction for other senior FedEx executives

* 5.0% reduction for remaining U.S. salaried exempt personnel

Fedex is largely non-union, which means that most workers are taking a pay cut. I’m not sure this is necessarily a bad thing, if it avoids layoffs and reductions in service quality, instead spreading the pain around more thinly. But it does point to the possibility that this recession will indeed be different, and that it might mark the beginning of the end of sticky wages.

There’s been a huge shift in power in recent years from labor to capital: corporate profits have been rising much faster than wages for some time now. It makes sense that capital would make use of its newfound power to reduce labor costs in a deflationary environment of rising unemployment. During the boom, companies laid off workers because those workers demanded, and cost, too much money. Now that workers have lost their negotiating leverage, we might start seeing more across-the-board pay cuts.

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Extra Credit, Wednesday Edition

Can She Save the S.E.C.? Norris on Schapiro. "If anyone can force a merger of the S.E.C. and the C.F.T.C., she can."

Henry Paulson: Justin Fox’s spot-on profile.

Chasing Bernard Madoff: The WSJ on Harry Markopolos. See also the Boston Business Journal.

Resolving Lehman’s $138B mystery loan

We Have To Be Able To Laugh About This Stuff: A truly classic mixed metaphor from Chris Cox.

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Bernie Madoff, Confidence Destroyer

A large number of fund-of-funds firms and other advisory shops are crowing these days about how they looked at Madoff, saw red flags, and didn’t invest. But the fact is that every fund manager who is looked at by

fund-of-funds firms and other advisory shops gets turned down by the overwhelming majority of them. There are lots of funds to choose from, after all.

So I don’t believe that anybody deserves any special props or praise for not investing with Bernie Madoff. Otherwise substantially all of us would be praiseworthy for that reason. Different types of funds appeal to different types of people, and most advisors would turn down Bernie even if he was entirely legitimate.

Which, by the way, is entirely possible. Much as I love the concept of "kleptokurtosis", you can’t simply look at Madoff’s astonishingly regular returns and conclude that he was stealing money. In fact, it’s quite easy to replicate those returns entirely legitimately.

Here’s how you do it: You take the money that people invest with you, and you put it all in Treasury bills. Then you write short-dated deep-out-of-the-money put options on broad stock-market indices. If the stocks move against you, no problem, you’ve got lots of Treasuries to put up as your margin calls increase. But so long as those put options never go into the money, you never actually lose a penny.

Then, every month, once you’ve made 1% of your AUM (or even less, once you consider that your T-bills are paying interest too), you just stop — and go back into 100% Treasuries until the beginning of the next month, when you start all over again.

This strategy works great in up markets and even in the kind of down markets where stocks fall gradually. And then it blows up when there’s a big stock-market plunge, like we saw in October.

Maybe this is more or less what Madoff was doing, until at some point (the bursting of the dot-com bubble, perhaps) he lost lots of money and decided to go Ponzi.

But the fact is that lots of hedge funds blow up, including large ones where there was no illegal activity, like LTCM. LTCM lost billions of its investors’ dollars too — and posed a much greater systemic risk in doing so than Madoff ever did.

So if you’re an investor, yes, you should be worried about losing your money to fraud — but you should also be even more worried about losing it the old-fashioned way, by investing it with a hedge fund manager who blows up spectacularly.

If Madoff is causing a crisis of confidence in the markets, it might be for this reason: that he’s driven home the fact that you can never know for sure that your money is safe and that it will be there tomorrow. That’s always a good reason not to invest in hedge funds, even when fraud isn’t a problem at all. And it’s a problem which even the most perspicacious fund-of-fund manager can’t get around.

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Why Isn’t ProPublica Attacking Citigroup?

ProPublica got its knickers in a twist when it discovered that Goldman Sachs had put out negative research on California, which had the potential of raising California’s borrowing costs.

Just imagine what would have happened if a major bank put out negative research on a big state, and then the state’s borrowing costs rose, and then the bank itself — not even its clients — profited by lending the state $8 billion at the new, higher interest rate.

Here’s the "Overheard" bit of today’s Heard on the Street column:

Citigroup’s disclosure that it has helped lend Dubai more than $8 billion over the past few months caused a few eyebrows to be raised in the Persian Gulf. Observers of the local financial scene remember how only last month the U.S. bank produced a research note suggesting the highly indebted emirate, which has little oil wealth, was vulnerable to the economic downturn. That prompted a furious response from Dubai’s ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, who wrote a letter demanding Citi revise its opinions, according to people close to the matter. Citi won’t say how much of the $8 billion was its own money. Still, Citi’s efforts should smooth ruffled feathers in Dubai.

Obviously, the Heard people have this all wrong. This isn’t about smoothing ruffled feathers, it’s about profiting from a conflict of interest! I’m sure that ProPublica’s Sharona Coutts could phone up Columbia’s Geoffrey Heal and get an outraged quote out of him — and possibly an all-expenses-paid trip to Dubai, too, to get an equally outraged quote out of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, depending on how ruffled his feathers still are.

But I doubt that’s going to happen. Banks have conflicts all the time — it’s a necessary consequence of being an intermediary between investors and borrowers. And it feels so much more satisfying to go after Goldman Sachs than to attack poor beleaguered Citigroup. That almost wouldn’t be fair.

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Adam Levitin on Credit Card Minimum Payments

In behavioral economics, "anchoring" is a well-known phenomenon, and so it’s not surprising that when people get credit-card statements, the lower the minimum payment, the less they’re likely to pay.

According to the Economist, the minimum-payment boxes are actually a counterproductive legal requirement, rather than credit-card company deviousness:

In order to stop borrowers from being socked by an accumulation of unpaid interest whenever they fail to pay their bill, there are laws requiring credit-card companies to specify a minimum payment in each statement. But these may do more harm than good, suggests Neil Stewart, a psychologist at Warwick University.

Now this study was done in the UK, which of course has different laws to those in the US. So I asked Adam Levitin of Credit Slips what he thought of the way the Economist framed the issue. His reply was so long and interesting that I can’t hope to summarize it, I’ll just post the whole thing here. But boiled down, you can be sure that the credit-card companies would be doing exactly what they’re doing whether there was a legal requirement or not.

Here’s Adam:

I hadn’t seen the economist piece. Very interesting. Minimum payment amounts definitely have an anchoring effect. The card industry has been very quick to internalize the insights of behavioral finance and apply them to maximize profit by exploiting consumers’ cognitive biases. There’s probably no other industry that knows as much about consumer behavior, and they are constantly learning more–now as part of data security measures, the card networks are trying to get SKU data from merchants that will let them know the specific content of consumer purchases (e.g., two bags of oreos), not just that it was at a supermarket or a gas station. And card issuers will change rates depending on where you shop–see what happens if you get your tires retreaded or go to marriage counseling or a massage parlor. Behavioral pricing is what it’s called.

As for the legal requirement, there is sort of one, but it is pretty open. Card issuers must merely state "The date by which or the time period within which the new balance or any portion of the new balance must be paid to avoid additional finance charges. If such a time period is provided, a creditor may, at its option and without disclosure, impose no finance charge when payment is received after the time period’s expiration." 12 C.F.R. 226.7(j). So a card issuer doesn’t have to have a "minimum" payment–it could be the entire payment. There’s no requirement as to what that minimum payment must be. Most national banks require between 2% and 4%, and the OCC has suggested that a level that would not lead to positive amortization (but over what time frame?) would not be viewed as a safe and sound banking practice.

Notice, btw, that minimum payments can also be used to manipulate card performance metrics–some card issuers will lower payments to as low as 1% of outstanding balances when a card becomes say 5 months delinquent, in order to keep it performing and avoid having to charge off the balance when the card becomes 180 days delinquent.

More to the point, there’s no requirement of how issues must feature the minimum payment amount. While the content of credit card bills is subject to some regulation, the form the bill is entirely up to the issuer. This contrasts with solicitations, where the form is also regulated to a degree (by requiring the Schumer box). Given the lack of regulation, I’m actually surprised that issuers don’t emphasize the minimum payment more heavily than they do, but there’s probably some limit–at some point it might become deceptive. There’s probably been some market testing on this.

One thing the Economist piece didn’t spell out is why card issuers want consumers to make smaller payments. Card lending is different from say auto lending. The auto lender wants to be repaid its principal and interest on time. Not so with the card lender. The card lender often isn’t looking to get the principal repaid. Instead, the interest rate and fees returns are high enough that they cover the cost of the principal. The principal remains outstanding, and the ideal consumer makes minimum payments forever, making enough new charges to keep the balance from ever amortizing. In effect, the consumer becomes an annuity. This is the "Sweatbox" model of lending that Ronald Mann at Columbia has described in a 2007 article. (You can see Julie Williams, then Acting Comptroller of the Currency, describe the phenomenon in a 2005 speech in New Orleans. The speech is worth looking at in general as it shows that OCC was very aware of all sorts of bad lending practices and didn’t do anything to stop them.)

Again, thanks for bringing this to my attention. You know, btw, that the Fed’s UDAP regulations are due out Friday. We’ll see just how bold the Fed was in the end.

Generally I think that the Feds have been well-intentioned but ineffectual when it comes to regulating credit card lending: the banks have been too powerful up until now. Which is why I’m hopeful about Friday. But I’ve been disappointed about such things before.

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The Saddest Sentence of the Day

From Alexandra Penney, Madoff victim:

I suddenly had a lot of money. I was in my late forties, and I felt that I was just too old to have it in a plain old bank account.

(HT: Wiesenthal)

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When Monetary Policy Is Fiscal Policy

Martin Wolf is good at startling sentences. Today he preps us with this left hook:

As Robert Mugabe has shown, anybody can run a printing press successfully.

Only to follow up with this right jab:

At the zero-rate boundary, fiscal and monetary policies become one.

Is this the econowonky way of saying "we’re all Zimbabweans now"? I’m not sure. Wolf’s main point, I think, is that if you can’t cut rates, you can only conduct monetary policy by printing and spending money — and spending, at least, is normally something Treasury’s in charge of, rather than the Fed.

Which does raise an interesting political question. If fiscal and monetary policies are indistinguishable in a zirpish environment, then who’s in charge of fiscalandmonetary policy?

When overnight rates were still noticeably positive, it seemed quite clear that Hank Paulson had the upper hand over Ben Bernanke, and was calling the shots. More recently, with Paulson’s tenure as Treasury secretary coming to an end and the Fed funds rate essentially hitting zero, Bernanke seems to have more clout.

And after January 20? That’s an interesting one. Geithner and Bernanke have sat together on the FOMC since Geithner joined the New York Fed in 2003, so they know each other well; what’s more, neither of them has the kind of ego which is likely to result in turf wars or pissing matches. But they do have significantly different mandates: the Treasury secretary, for instance, concerned with the economy as a whole, will be much more inclined to do things like throw money at automakers than will the Fed chairman.

Just to complicate matters, there’s Larry Summers, too — whom I’m sure thinks that he has a role on a par, in importance, with those of Geithner and Bernanke, and who is once again being mooted as a possible successor to Bernanke in 2010. (Please, no: his mouth is far too big for that job, and there’s no indication that he’s a good chairman of anything, let alone the FOMC.)

The best case scenario is that Geithner, Bernanke, Summers, and the rest of Obama’s economic team join seamlessly to form a Committee To Save The US Economy. But when does anything work seamlessly in Washington? My guess is that there are going to be some frayed egos by the time this is all over.

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Filial Affection Datapoint of the Day

Cityfile NY reports:

Although the millions in Bernie’s foundation were managed by his own investment firm, neither son entrusted their charitable trusts to their dad. Mark Madoff’s $5 million account was parked at Lehman Brothers. Andrew’s $2 million trust was in an account at Neuberger Berman. Nice to know that unlike, say, Yeshiva University or Mort Zuckerman, both sons’ foundations will come out unscathed by the mess their father created!

They knew that if you park your money at a firm which declares the biggest bankruptcy in history, you’re fine. But letting Dad at it? Not so much.

(Via EP)

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Madoff’s Innocent Victims

The saddest aspect of the Madoff scandal is the number of people who gave Bernie Madoff money they couldn’t afford to lose. Many charities fall under this general heading: they were formed for the purpose of giving money to the needy, and ended up giving it to the greedy.

I hope that the Madoff affair will mark the point at which charities start thinking much more seriously about how they invest their money. As I wrote last year about the Gates Foundation, why do good with only 5% of your assets, while having no mandate to do good with the other 95%?

There is a big problem here, that charities generally have a strong institutional bias towards self-preservation, and therefore seek to invest the overwhelming majority of their funds in a manner which will allow them to operate in perpetuity. As a result, they end up taking quite a lot of market risk. (Not to mention Ponzi scheme risk.) Almost never do they ask themselves whether they could do more good by front-loading their disbursements now and deliberately putting themselves on a road to disappearance.

Alternatively, charities could at least invest their money somewhere socially responsible and do good with it, at the cost of lower returns. One example which is close to me personally: they could invest in preferred stock in community development credit unions, or just make non-member deposits at them, which are federally guaranteed. Such an investment carries much less risk than a Wall Street split-strike strategy, and fits much more cleanly into the charity’s mission.

Then there are the individuals who invested their life savings with Madoff, normally with the express intention of passing it on to the next generation. As Justin Fox says,

When I think of all the Jewish grandmothers and grandfathers (a.k.a. Bubbies and Zadies) who lost everything with Madoff I get very sad. They weren’t being greedy, and they weren’t stupid. They just wanted a steady investment managed by somebody they knew and trusted.

He’s quite right. But on the other hand, some of them — not all, by any means, but some — were being greedy, like one anonymous guest at a birthday party in Palm Beach:

Several Madoff clients were among the 70-plus guests. One had mortgaged two homes to maximize his investment.

Talk about a perfect storm: Not only are you underwater on your Palm Beach mortgage, but you invested all the proceeds with Bernie Madoff. Ouch. If only you just lived happily in your bought-and-paid-for multi-million-dollar home and didn’t try to be clever or greedy, you’d be infinitely better off.

Most of us save up money to buy a house; some people, it seems, do it the other way around. Which makes much less sense to me.

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More Evaporating Billions at Morgan Stanley

Morgan Stanley’s earnings this morning are truly dreadful. When your stock is trading around $15 a share, a quarterly loss of $2.24 per share is a big deal. But in fact it’s worse than that: the bank recorded "net revenue of $2.7 billion from the widening of Morgan Stanley’s credit spreads". That’s entirely legitimate from an accountancy perspective, but those aren’t the kind of earnings any bank wants. Take them away, and the quarterly loss becomes $5 a share. Ouch.

Yet the stock is down only 60 cents as I write this, at about $15.50 a share — it closed below $14 on Monday, and somehow the combination of Goldman’s earnings and the Fed’s rate cut have managed to save the day for Stanley.

It is worth noting that the analysts completely whiffed this one:

The average estimate of 16 analysts surveyed by Bloomberg was for a 34-cent loss, with no estimates exceeding $1.15.

Lucky no one listens to them.

On the other hand, Morgan Stanley does seem to be further along than Goldman Sachs in its deleveraging process: its balance sheet has shrunk by a third in the past three months, to just $658 billion. That compares to a decline of 18% at Goldman, to $885 billion. No one knows where either bank will end up, but John Mack seems to have grasped the nettle earlier and harder than Lloyd Blankfein. Maybe that’s why his stock isn’t falling further this morning: it’s fallen so far already.

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Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

Yale President Richard Levin Letter on the Yale Endowment: A pitch-perfect, unpanicked reaction to the endowment’s decline.

Continuing woes of FT.com: Alphaville was so broken today it had to move to Facebook.

Robust, thorough due diligence is off: The evolution of Bramdean’s website. Hempton is not amused.

Being poor for a few hours: "The moment you make one financial mistake, the chances that you will be hit with all kinds of fines, all kinds of difficulties, all kinds of financial obstacles, are much, much higher."

Free to a good home: Economics blogs directory

The Trump Blog: Yes, The Donald is blogging. (And advertising his blog in my RSS feed!) This is likely to be fun.

Word of the day: kleptokurtotic

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The Madoff Game

The Excel-based BreakingViews Bernie Madoff game, which I could never get to work, has now showed up online, which allows me my own guess at how Madoff got to $50 billion.

madoffgame.jpg

Hugo Dixon assumed an initial investment of $1 billion 20 years ago; I brought that down to $100 million 37 years ago, roughly when Carl Shapiro sold his apparel company. I also assumed that Madoff siphoned off or lost only 6% a year, rather than 10% a year — but I still managed to get to a total of $50 billion.

What’s more, my total for "amount siphoned off or lost" is $17 billion — which is the amount of money which Madoff claimed, falsely, to have under management, and which has now disappeared.

Of course, this model assumes that Madoff was a crook from the get-go; Justin Fox, for one, thinks he turned crooked only relatively recently. Still, it is quite fun — especially when the online spreadsheet starts changing its numbers on you for no obvious reason!

(Via Kedrosky)

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Did Geithner Bail Out Goldman Sachs?

Add the NYT editorial board to the Goldman Sachs conspiracy theorists. It asks some good questions about Lehman revisionism, but then ends up with this:

The revised version of the story sidesteps questions about whether the bailout of A.I.G. — arranged by Mr. Geithner — was influenced by the specific needs of some of the insurer’s counterparties, like Goldman Sachs.

The Times’s Gretchen Morgenson reported that Lloyd Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman, was the only Wall Street executive at a meeting at the New York Federal Reserve on Sept. 15 to discuss the A.I.G. bailout. A Goldman spokesman said Mr. Blankfein was not there to represent his firm’s interests, but rather that Goldman “engaged” the issue because of the implications to the entire system.

Adding to the opacity, the Fed recently decided to keep confidential one of two reports that it made to Congress on the A.I.G. bailout. If the Fed had not insisted on confidentiality, that report would have been made public.

Mr. Geithner should be asked at his confirmation hearing to explain which firms were threatened by an A.I.G. collapse, in what amounts and how those entanglements justify an ongoing bailout. Mr. Geithner must also explain how such entanglements came to be the norm on his watch. His answers will help shed light on whether he is sufficiently distant from Wall Street to reform a system that has proved catastrophically unstable.

The bit about the confidential report is a classic bit of misdirection: while it’s understandable that the press is upset that the report is confidential (I’d like to see it too), there is zero chance that it contains some kind of smoking gun saying that the AIG bailout was really a Goldman Sachs bailout. The reason for the confidentiality is much more mundane: the report contains commercially-sensitive details of AIG’s positions, which would be picked over by the rest of Wall Street were they to be made public.

I do think that Geithner should be asked about the firms threatened by an AIG collapse, however, and I do think that he should reply in detail. Yes, Goldman Sachs was a big AIG counterparty, but it has stated repeatedly — and credibly — that its AIG exposure was hedged.

But Goldman is a trading shop, with risk managers who hedge anything they can measure on a real-time basis. The real damage of an AIG collapse would not have been at trading shops but rather larger, slower, commercial banks which had large CDO portfolios and less-assiduous risk-management systems.

The lion’s share of AIG’s losses have come from the credit default swaps that it wrote on banks’ CDOs. If those swaps were to become worthless — or even just worth less — then any counterparties who hadn’t hedged their AIG exposure would have to have taken enormous further write-downs on CDO holdings they thought they’d hedged.

My gut feeling is that if AIG had failed, there’s a good chance that Citigroup would have become insolvent overnight. And since Citi is far too big to fail, it was much easier for the Fed to bail out AIG than it would have been for the Fed to bail out Citi and some unknown number of other banks who had also hedged their CDO positions with AIG.

Of course, none of this would have been good for Goldman Sachs — the insolvency and/or bailout of one or more major banks would have had collateral damage on Goldman just like it did on the rest of the financial system and the economy as a whole. And there’s a good chance that Goldman’s AIG hedges would turn out to have been with counterparties who were themselves exposed to AIG, and therefore not worth as much as Goldman had thought.

But there’s no real evidence supporting the NYT’s implication that Tim Geithner bailed out AIG because he wanted to do a special favor for Lloyd Blankfein. I do hope that he can put this meme to rest at his confirmation hearings, if not before.

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Zirpish

It’s not 0%, but rather a "target range", which sounds like somewhere you go to fire a gun. I can kinda see what the Fed is driving at here: given the difficulty of using open-market operations to set the Fed funds rate when it’s so low in nominal terms, a range is easier to hit than a target.

I don’t like this — not unless the Fed really cracks down on fails-to-deliver in the repo market. If rates are at 0% and there aren’t any penalties for failing to deliver Treasury bonds, then fails are going to rise even further, and faith in the repo market could evaporate very suddenly, with catastrophic knock-on effects. There could also be nasty unintended consequences for money-market funds.

In any case, it’s not like the Fed needs to use the Fed funds target rate as its foremost monetary-policy instrument: as Alea notes, it’s good at using its balance sheet instead.

Here’s his annotated Bank of Canada chart: the smaller arrow, on the left, is Bear Stearns; the larger one, on the right, is Lehman Brothers. It’s this, just as much as rate cuts, which is really responsible for the monetary easing we’ve seen in recent months.

060.jpg

Obviously the more-than-trillion-dollar expansion in the Fed’s balance sheet has happened post-Lehman, but it’s also worth noting the $300 billion decline in the Fed’s Treasury holdings since Bear.

It’s also interesting to note that the repo operations which the Fed embarked upon post-Bear have more or less disappeared at this point. That’s not good for the repo market either. Meanwhile, the currency-swap facility, which I think is mainly with the ECB, is absolutely enormous and accounts for a plurality of Fed assets.

In any case, you can be sure that the Fed’s balance sheet is going to expand even more in 2009:

As previously announced, over the next few quarters the Federal Reserve will purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand its purchases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant. The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities. Early next year, the Federal Reserve will also implement the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses. The Federal Reserve will continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to further support credit markets and economic activity.

Did we really need a zero interest rate policy, or Zirp, on top of this? It would be great if we could get some reassurance from FOMC members that they understood the downside of today’s move and know what they’re doing. Because it really worries me.

Update: The FT reports on the parlous state of the repo market. (Via Matt Tubin, in the comments.)

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The Diet Soda Paradox

John Gapper worries that taxing non-diet sodas would be regressive. I worry that it wouldn’t even do what it is designed to do, which is reduce obesity: all it would do is increase the amount of diet sodas consumed, and there’s a strong link between diet-soda consumption and increased obesity.

Unless and until there’s some empirical evidence that switching from non-diet to diet sodas helps people lose weight, this should be filed under "very bad ideas".

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Lehman Revisionism Watch, Unexpected Loan Edition

Andrew Ross Sorkin seems to have caught Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke out in a bit of a fib. They couldn’t bailout Lehman, said first Paulson and then Bernanke, because Lehman didn’t have the collateral needed to put up against a Fed loan.

But it turns out that the Fed did lend Lehman money: a whopping $87 billion, to be precise, on the Monday it collapsed. And the official (if anonymously-sourced) explanation makes almost zero sense:

People involved in the process said that the Fed only lent the money as part of “an orderly wind-down,” which would have been different from lending money to an ongoing, or in this case, insolvent concern.

What seems to have happened is that while Lehman Brothers Holdings, the listed company, declared bankruptcy, its brokerage subsidiary, LBI New York, did not. The Fed lent some emergency money to LBI New York, and then that liability was transferred to Barclays when it bought the brokerage.

But the our-hands-were-tied argument, which was never very convincing to begin with, now looks completely shot to pieces. Paulson and Bernanke made a decision to let Lehman fail; if they really wanted to, they could have rescued it.

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Vegas Q: 0.26

MGM Mirage has sold its Treasure Island casino for $775 million to Phil Ruffin Sr:

"I knew to build a 3,000-room hotel today would cost $3 billion," Mr. Ruffin told The Wall Street Journal. "I think it’s a good value."

Which puts the Vegas hotel Q ratio at 0.26. No wonder Sheldon Adelson’s in so much trouble.

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Is Carl Shapiro a Madoff Victim?

The WSJ has found what seems, on its face, to be one of the most tragic stories of the Madoff affair:

Carl Shapiro, a 95-year-old apparel entrepreneur and investor, had $545 million with Mr. Madoff — creating what could become the largest personal loss yet in the scandal. Carey O’Donnell, a spokeswoman for the family, confirmed that Mr. Shapiro’s charitable foundation, the Carl & Ruth Shapiro Family Foundation, invested $145 million with Madoff.

But then Shapirio puts out a weirdly defensive statement:

In a statement yesterday, Mr. Shapiro said that "at no time did I ever formally introduce individuals as potential investors with Mr. Madoff." Mr. Shapiro said he had been friends with Mr. Madoff for more than 50 years, and "any decisions I or my family foundation made to invest with him were based on his apparent business acumen, sense of integrity and commitment to sound investing principles."

A bit of math shows that Shapiro, far from suffering "the largest personal loss yet in the scandal", might actually have been the single largest personal gainer from Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.

Madoff has been reporting pretty consistent returns on the order of 13% a year; Shapiro sold his company in 1971. If he invested $6 million with Madoff in 1971, and it compounded at 13%, that would bring him up to $545 million today.

In the interim, Shapiro has become a major philanthropist, and has surely taken out of his Madoff account orders of magnitude more than the money he originally invested. The damage to his foundation is immense, and horrible. But there’s a good chance that many of the recipients of his largesse over the past few decades have in fact been paid out with Ponzi money, and that Shapiro has managed to give away much more than if he had never been invested with Madoff at all.

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Goldman Starts Getting Smaller

Thanks to the tactical leak to the WSJ a couple of weeks ago, today’s Goldman Sachs results are not particularly surprising, even if they are genuinely atrocious. And it’s also not news that all of the losses came from the fixed income, currencies, and commodities group. But there are still some surprises:

Moody’s Investors Service lowered its long-term credit rating on Goldman Sachs to A1 from Aa3 after earnings were released, citing the "ongoing credit-market crisis" and a "persistent difficult operating environment."…

Compensation and benefits, the biggest expense, fell to a negative $490 million in the quarter, bringing the full-year cost to $10.9 billion, down 46 percent from a record $20.2 billion in 2007.

One might expect that a bank holding company would be considered a better credit than a wild-west investment bank: one would be wrong. And one might also expect that earnings would be stickier than this: bringing payroll down 46% in one year is no mean feat, even when the CEO and six of his deputies all forego bonuses.

All in all, the fact that Goldman made any profit at all this year, even if it only made $4.46 per share, is reasonably impressive given the financial and economic environment: it’s clearly one of our healthier banks, not that that’s saying much. But whether it can continue to operate at anywhere near its size of the past few years remains to be seen. Total assets are at $885 billion; that’s down 18% quarter-on-quarter, but it’s still hard to see why that number needs to be remotely that big. And it seems inevitable that as assets fall in size, book value will too.

Goldman’s executives have shown that they can manage boom years well, and also that they can outperform during this spectacular bust. But can they manage a long and slow downsizing? That’s the question all shareholders have to be asking right now.

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Extra Credit, Monday Edition

Profitable Until Deemed Illegal: "About as close to pure, distilled evil in a business plan as I’ve ever seen."

A Pennsylvania Save, Funded by Tarp: TARP saves 9,000 jobs! There, that was surely worth $350 billion.

Fairfield Greenwich Group: We Thought Bernie Madoff Was Best Money Manager In World: Blodget takes apart Fairfield. But how many investors were simply using Fairfield to get access to Madoff?

How I Got Screwed by Bernie Madoff: "I think everyone knew the call would come one day. We all hoped, but we knew deep down it was too good to be true, right?"

Posted in remainders | Comments Off on Extra Credit, Monday Edition

Madoff’s Trading Statements

One of the things which reassured Bernie Madoff’s investors was the detailed trading records he sent to investors.

Zachery Kouwe has one such document, and thinks even that one smells a little fishy:

A spot check of the November statement shows some discrepancies. Google, for example, is listed at a price of $337.40 on Nov. 12. Yet according to Yahoo Finance, the Internet search giant’s stock only traded between $312.49 and $287.76.

I don’t think it’s worth reading all that much into that — Madoff was known as a key market-maker in out-of-hours trading, and if someone wanted to buy Google shares before the market opened or after it closed, Madoff might well have been able to persuade them to pay $337.40.

But if all the trades are real, then wouldn’t the money still be there today? Not necessarily.

My gut feeling is that Madoff did enter into many trades, just with less money than he said he had. He would then do two things to the statements before sending them off to clients. First, he would remove a bunch of losing trades, so that the montly statement showed a trading gain. And second, he would apply some kind of multiplier to all trades, so that the total amount under management would line up with the sums people thought they had invested.

But this kind of thing is harder than it looks. Reader Nicholas Weaver emails:

I could do this, quite easily, by going "what gain do I want to show, go back through the records for the past month, and find a series of trades which would match".

But to do this would take a significant amount of computer experience and hackery. Someone like me (A Ph.D. computer scientist) would be able to do it, probably in a few days with current resources. Someone with just good programming skills would, if they were told what to accomplish.

But I doubt someone of Madoff’s generation and background would have the computer chops to do it.

And doing it manually (which some of the mistaken-price for Google suggests, since it wasn’t always correct on the prices, which suggests some significant manual intervention) would be a heck of a lot of work, probably too much work for one man.

Madoff was always known as being ahead of the curve, technologically; I think if there was a way of automating the fraud, he might well have found it. But I think that Weaver’s right that he almost certainly had help, at the very least on the coding front.

I suspect that quite a lot of accomplices will emerge in coming weeks and months, possibly including Madoff’s own family. The large amount of detail in Madoff’s trading statements is itself circumstantial evidence of conspiracy.

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The Difference Between Televisions and Pianos

Costco sells televisions. Here’s what its CFO had to say on the subject of recent sales, as reported by Jeff Matthews:

Our television sales have been way up in November…. [W]e had unit sales up over 50% in the four weeks, but that translated into a dollar sales increase of only 3%.

Steinway, on the other hand, sells pianos:

For the first nine months of 2008, Steinway said piano revenues increased 5%. Steinway grand unit shipments declined 6% and mid-priced piano unit shipments decreased 2%.

Clearly Steinway has much more pricing power than Costco. But which of these two companies is better positioned for recession? Costco stock is down 24% year-to-date; Steinway, which trades under the rather-too-cutesy ticker symbol LVB, is down 39%.

Makes sense to me. People spend money at Steinway; they save it at Costco. Which makes Costco’s prospects rather healthier than Steinway’s.

Posted in consumption | Comments Off on The Difference Between Televisions and Pianos

Ecuador Own-Goal Datapoint of the Day

Just how much damage can one president do by defaulting on a single $30 million coupon payment? Well, he can cut off his country’s access to US markets, via the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, and he can cause growth forecasts to turn into recession forecasts:

The ATPDEA gives Ecuador duty-free access to the United States for 5,000 products. However, its ATPDEA benefits run out in December next year and may be cut earlier as the U.S. Congress reviews its status as a result of a recent wave of actions against U.S. investors. The latest debt default doesn’t exactly boost Ecuador’s chances of keeping the ATPDEA.

As a result of the debt default, Credit Suisse has revised down its growth forecast for Ecuador’s economy next year from 2.0 percent to minus 1.0 percent.

To put this in perspective, Ecuador’s GDP is about $100 billion, so a drop of 3 percentage points means a fall in GDP of about $3 billion — more than all of Ecuador’s bonded debt combined.

What’s more, you can be sure that somewhere down the line, a few big fund managers are going to appoint themselves creditor representatives, as far as the media is concerned; there will probably even be some kind of formal Ecuador Creditors’ Committee. They will be loud, and they will be right, and they will have much more heft in Washington than Ecuador does.

Eight years ago, during the last Ecuador default, Tim Geithner did a reasonably good job at ignoring Ecuador’s noisy creditors and siding, as sovereign debtors are wont to do, with the sovereign debtor. Now I think his sympathies are more likely to lie on the other side, since Ecuador’s government is destroying much of the basis of sovereign finance by simply refusing to pay what it owes not because it can’t pay but just because it wants to make some score political points.

Remember that US Treasury debt is considered risk-free despite the fact that the Treasury could cease making payments any day it liked. When Ecuador last defaulted it really was suffering major economic difficulties, thanks to El Niño and $10-a-barrel oil. This time is very different, and Ecuador’s likely to find itself with precious few friends going forwards.

Posted in bonds and loans, emerging markets | Comments Off on Ecuador Own-Goal Datapoint of the Day

National Lampoon’s Farcical Market Manipulation

From the SEC complaint against National Lampoon:

The complaint alleges that Laikin and Barsky paid at least $68,000 that went to Rodriguez, Dougherty, and the CW to cause the purchase of at least 87,500 shares of National Lampoon stock. Through these efforts, Laikin and Barsky sought to artificially push National Lampoon’s stock price from under $2 per share to at least $5 per share, in part, to keep the company’s stock price above the minimum listing requirements of the AMEX, and to increase National Lampoon’s ability to enter into possible "strategic partnerships" and acquisitions.

NLN stock hasn’t traded today; it closed yesterday at 73 cents per share. The last time it was over $5 was in October 2001. Its market capitalization is about $7 million; it’s hard to see how the purchase of $150,000 in stock could really increase the value of the company by $40 million. But maybe logic was never a National Lampoon core competency.

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Can Hedge Funds Be Fraudulent?

I’ll be on NPR’s Planet Money podcast today, trying my best to explain what a hedge fund is. As John Gapper says, it’s crucial to understand that Bernie Madoff did not have a hedge fund, and that hedge funds tend to have prime brokers, which act as an extra pair of eyes and help to prevent outright fraud of the Madoff variety.

On the other hand, there’s no shortage of hedge funds which invested in Madoff’s fund. Fairfield Sentry was one of them, and its investors are unlikely to be particularly mollified by the fact that Fairfield Sentry was not itself fraudulent: it sent their money off to Bernie Madoff just it said it would.

In fact, the involvement of Fairfield Sentry as a middleman almost certainly made things worse for investors. Not only did they need to pay Fairfield Sentry’s fees; they might also have felt reassured by the fact that Fairfield had independent auditors and other common indicia of trustworthiness.

Similarly, in England, people who neither knew nor trusted Bernie Madoff — people, indeed, who had never heard of the man — were happy handing over their money to Nicola Horlick’s Bramdean. They trusted her, and Bernie managed to piggyback on that trust.

Which goes to show that people who invest in hedge funds should always ask questions about where and how that hedge fund is investing their money. There’s not much difference between investing in a black-box fund like Madoff’s, on the one hand, and investing in a transparent fund like Fairfield Sentry, on the other, if that entirely transparent fund is only transparent until it reaches Madoff’s doors.

Of course, it’s not quite as simple as all that: Madoff would construct elaborate and fictional trading statements detailing, ex post, how his returns were achieved. There was an illusion of transparency; he didn’t simply tell his investors that he had a black box and they could know no more.

But it’s worth tweaking Gapper’s point just a little bit: yes, if you’re investing your money with a hedge fund which does its own investing, you can have quite a lot of faith it isn’t an outright fraud. (Although fraudulent hedge funds, like Bayou, do exist.) But if you’re investing with a hedge fund or a fund-of-funds which outsources its investing, you can have no such peace of mind. As Michael de la Merced says, the Madoff affair can — and should — erode confidence in hedge funds generally, even if Madoff himself was not technically a hedge-fund manager.

Posted in fraud, hedge funds | Comments Off on Can Hedge Funds Be Fraudulent?