What Just Happened?

I’ve long said that end-of-day market reports are silly, since the only thing reporters can normally say with any confidence is "the market moved and we don’t know why". But what we’re seeing right now isn’t moves so much as fully-fledged earthquakes. Even during a bear market, you don’t expect three 700-point down days to come in quick succession like this: if anything, you expect big one-day rallies, followed by more grinding-yet-inexorable decline. The big one-day plunges happen at the top of bull markets, when bubbles burst. But we were already down 35% when the market opened today. Now we’re down 42%. Whatever that might be, it sure ain’t a bull market.

In any event, I have no idea what happened in the last hour of trading today. I could speculate: maybe it was that story saying that Treasury might start taking equity stakes in banks "within weeks". That might as well be next century as far as this market is concerned: I’m sure I wasn’t the only person anticipating a big equity injection into Morgan Stanley this weekend.

It’s not just the Morgan Stanley-MUFG deal which is rapidly being overtaken by events, either. It’s also Wachovia, whose stock plunged today alongside that of Citigroup and, most worryingly, Wells Fargo (down 15% on the day). The banks with the fortress balance sheets — the safest of the safe havens — are looking shaky: Bank of America was down 11%, and JP Morgan got off lightly with a fall of 6.7%. Remember that these are still leveraged institutions: even if their depositors and senior bondholders are safe, their equityholders aren’t — especially not when Hank "$10 is too high a purchase price for Bear Stearns" Paulson is the person in charge of new equity injections.

Was the market’s fall a result of the short-selling ban coming to an end? It’s possible, I suppose, that the Evil Shorts took a few hours to do their stretches and jog around the track a couple of times before unleashing their full arsenal of weaponry on the market late in the afternoon. But all stocks fell today, not just the financials on the no-shorting list. On the Dow, Wal-Mart was down 5.8%, Kraft was down 7.6%, Johnson & Johnson was down 7.7%: these are defensive stocks for hard times, and they’re being decimated.

Or maybe it was just nervousness over tomorrow’s Lehman Brothers CDS auction. There’s nothing this market hates more than uncertainty, and no one really has a clue what the aftershocks from that are going to be. Were there large financial institutions — banks, or maybe hedge funds — which had big net exposures to Lehman, writing lots of protection against it defaulting? If so, tomorrow could be the day when the CDS dominoes start falling. If a major counterparty can’t pay up on Lehman and ends up defaulting itself, there’s no knowing where it might all end.

But there is a tiny bit of good news: for the first time in many years I’m finally beginning to think that stocks aren’t overpriced any more. (Although they’re still overpriced in relation to the credit market, which is priced for Armageddon.) As Dean Baker points out, a low stock market is a gift to young workers. If we’re saddling them with hundreds of billions of dollars in new liabilities, maybe it’s just as well we’re gifting them $10 trillion in upside on equities at the same time.

The stock-market plunge is good news for Barack Obama, too. I haven’t done the exact calculation, but total US stock-market losses per household over the past year are now approaching the $100,000 level. There’s simply no way the incumbent party can win an election in that kind of environment.

One last spooky datapoint: the S&P 500 closed down 666 points from its all-time high. Maybe it’s not the terrorists doing the selling, but someone more evil still!

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When Shipping Costs Plunge

The Baltic Dry Index, which measures international shipping costs, was fixed today at 2,503, down 9% on the day and down 79% from its May high of 11,793. It’s a volatile index, and these levels are hardly unprecedented: the index was below 3,000 for a good year from mid-May 2005 onwards.

But that doesn’t stop me being astonished that we’ve suddenly woken up in a world where a Panamax ship, the Dong Sheng Ocean, is rumored to be taking iron ore from the Persian Gulf to China for free.

I think this is good news, actually. Shipping costs have for the past couple of years been a serious constraint on international trade, and if they stay low, that’s a helpful lubricant in terms of the real global economy. It’s clearly the non-financial sector which is going to pull us out of this recession, and low shipping costs will help on that front.

(HT: Kedrosky)

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Should the Fed Target Libor?

Many thanks to Colin Barr, who saw my question about how we can bring down Libor and pointed me to a recent essay by Edwin Truman with a very specific proposal about doing just that. Truman takes the very direct approach:

The FOMC should temporarily shift its target from the overnight federal funds rate to the 3-month dollar LIBOR rate. If its notional target for the federal funds rate remains at 2.00 percent, the FOMC should target LIBOR at 2.09 percent. (A useful byproduct would be to loosen up the calibration of Federal Reserve policy from increments of 25 basis points.) If the FOMC were to reduce its notional federal funds target to 1.50 percent, the actual target of policy should be expressed as a 3-month LIBOR of 1.59 percent.

The desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) would implement this policy by aggressively providing reserves to financial institutions using the full range of its expanded facilities to provide liquidity to the market, including traditional repurchase agreements (repo). It would continue to provide reserves until 3-month LIBOR reached the FOMC’s newly expressed target. The actual federal funds rate will decline toward zero.

Note that Truman isn’t trying to get the spread between Fed funds and three-month Libor down to 9bp — that would be unrealistic. Fed funds, he says, under this proposal, would essentially go to zero. And then the Fed would continue to pump liquidity into the system, until Libor eventually came down.

Truman notes that this is not quite as crazy as it might at first seem: in fact, the boring Swiss have been doing it for years.

The Swiss National Bank (SNB) expresses its policy as the midpoint of a target range for 3-month Swiss franc LIBOR and seeks to achieve that target primarily via interventions in the market for one-week Swiss franc repurchase agreements (repos). During the crisis period, the SNB has generally been able to achieve its LIBOR target, which since late September 2007 has been a mid-point of 2.75 percent within a range of 2.25 and 3.25 percent, even as the index for the overnight repo rate has dropped to 1.58 percent from about 2.25 percent a year ago.

The inflationary consequences of this approach might be quite profound — but on the other hand, the Fed is already pumping so much liquidity into the system that there might not be a huge difference, in terms of inflation, between what we’d get with Truman’s proposal and what we’re going to end up with anyway.

I was hoping that there might be some kind of artificial way of bringing down Libor — by instituting a Federal guarantee of short-term interbank loans, for instance. But failing that, the Truman’s brute-force approach does have its appeal.

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The Last Days of Morgan Stanley

If Morgan Stanley was in distress back in mid-September, it’s much worse today, trading as low as $12.50 a share: that’s just 40% of its stated book value. For all the denials coming out of the bank, clearly the market is very skeptical that the injection of cash from Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group is going to happen — or that even if it does happen, it will be sufficient to stave off insolvency. After all, even $85 billion wasn’t enough for AIG, and MUFG is putting much less than that into Morgan Stanley, which has a similarly-sized balance sheet to AIG.

It looks like we’re getting close to one of the market’s vicious syllogisms here: without the market’s trust, Morgan Stanley is nothing. The market doesn’t trust Morgan Stanley. Therefore, Morgan Stanley is, well, toast.

My guess is that at some point over the weekend, Hank Paulson will announce that he’s using his new authorities under the TARP to effectively nationalize Morgan Stanley, following Gordon Brown’s lead in the UK. And Morgan Stanley will only be the first of many banks to suffer such a fate.

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Bank Soundness Datapoint of the Day

This has got to sting, in New York and London:

Canada has the world’s soundest banking system, closely followed by Sweden, Luxembourg and Australia, a survey by the World Economic Forum has found as financial crisis and bank failures shake world markets.

Britain, which once ranked in the top five, has slipped to 44th place behind El Salvador and Peru…

The United States, where some of Wall Street’s biggest financial names have collapsed in recent weeks, rated only 40.

Namibia is in 17th place. When Namibian banks are in better shape than those in the US or the UK, you know the global economy has changed out of all recognition.

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How Can We Bring Down Libor?

When banks get nationalized, they become much safer, right? So what on earth is overnight Libor doing at 5.09%, and three-month Libor at 4.75%? The TED spread is a new record high, 413bp, making all its previous scary spikes look like mere foothills in comparison.

Yves Smith thinks this might all be connected to tomorrow’s Lehman CDS auction, and says that "there may be some relief if the financial community passes this test". I do hope so: every day that Libor remains broken is a day that thousands of debt instruments reset to silly levels.

In fact, I wouldn’t be averse to measures specifically designed to bring down Libor, even if interbank lending volumes remained near zero. At this point, Libor is moving from being a symptom of the crisis to being one of its central causes.

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Did Derivatives Cause the Crisis?

While I’m reading the front page of the NYT, it’s worth noting the latest installment in its crisis series: 3,000 words from Peter Goodman on how Alan Greenspan’s lax oversight of the derivatives market got us all into this mess to begin with. The nut graf comes quite a ways in:

Mr. Greenspan’s legacy may ultimately rest on a more deeply embedded and much less scrutinized phenomenon: the spectacular boom and calamitous bust in derivatives trading.

Weirdly, Goodman never seems to find the space or time to actually demostrate that there has been a "calamitous bust in derivatives trading". I guess that’s just taken for granted. This is the closest that the article gets:

As the housing crisis grew and mortgages went bad, derivatives actually magnified the downturn.

The Wall Street debacle that swallowed firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and imperiled the insurance giant American International Group, has been driven by the fact that they and their customers were linked to one another by derivatives.

But the fact is that Wall Street firms have always been "linked to one another" in one way or another. And it’s not clear what derivatives Goodman has in mind here, but I suspect he’s thinking about credit default swaps. But so far, the the CDS market has actually held up as the only efficient and liquid credit market out there; I’m far from convinced that its absence would actually have helped matters.

It’s true that CDS were the instruments that brought down AIG and the monolines, and it’s also true that Wall Street banks had to scramble to write down debt instruments they held on their books which were guaranteed by the likes of MBIA and Ambac.

But ultimately the biggest problem in this crisis was not the derivatives, but rather the fact that the banks held all those mortgage-backed assets on their books in the first place. They always claimed to be in the moving business, not the storage business — but somehow they ended up storing an enormous quantity of debt which turned out to be highly toxic.

Yes, derivatives played a walk-on part in that story: banks felt comfortable hedging their positions in the CDS market rather than selling those positions outright. And more generally, the existence of the CDS market helped banks get altogether too comfortable with the amount of leverage they were taking on. But to date I haven’t seen the "calamitous bust in derivatives trading" that Goodman talks about. Although it might come tomorrow, with the Lehman CDS auction.

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US Bank Nationalizations: One Step Closer

Yesterday, Justin Fox detected a possibly important shift in emphasis from Hank Paulson.

Did anybody else notice that when Hank Paulson was describing in his press conference today what the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act enables Treasury to do, the first thing he listed was "to inject capital into financial institutions"? …

Yesterday Ben Bernanke hinted that a change in emphasis might be in the offing for the TARP. And today Paulson seemed to confirm it. it.

None of the people asking questions at the press conference really seemed to pick up on this, of course (&%%$# Washington journalists!).

Now take a look, if you can, at the front page of today’s NYT. On the web there’s a huge headline saying "U.S. May Take Ownership Stake in Banks"; in the paper there’s an even bigger double-decker, four-column, top-of-the-page, all-caps headline saying much the same thing.

The interesting thing is that on the face of it there’s no news here, beyond a change in emphasis: the NYT could have run the same headline the day after the Tarp bill was passed. But clearly Treasury has been talking more to the NYT than to Justin: the paper talks about a Treasury plan (albeit a "preliminary" one) which "resembles one announced on Wednesday in Britain".

I’m glad that Treasury is making these noises, because the market clearly has no faith at all in Tarp as originally conceived. But most of all I’m glad that Congress insisted on giving Treasury the authority to buy equity as part of the bill. Barney Frank, it seems, has been proven more far-sighted than Hank Paulson.

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Extra Credit, Thursday Morning Edition

Emerging Europe seen key crisis flashpoint: or is it Bank Crisis Is Bypassing Central and East Europe? They report, you decide.

CME Group and Citadel to Launch the First Integrated Credit Default Swaps Trading Platform and Central Counterparty Facility, Linked to CME Clearing: This is possibly extremely good news, but we have to wait and see whether it works in practice.

Fact Sheet: President Bush Calls for Expanding Opportunities to Homeownership: From 2002: "Today, President Bush announced a new goal to help increase the number of minority homeowners by at least 5.5 million before the end of the decade." So much for blaming Clinton-era CRA expansion for the current mess.

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Lies, Damn Lies, and Intellectual Property Statistics

Welcome, Julian Sanchez, to the Alice-in-Wonderland world of trying to track down widely-cited statistics to their original source! I tried and failed with counterfeiting statistics; Julian has now tried and failed with estimates of lost jobs and money due to intellectual property theft. So if anybody, ever again, tells you that IP theft costs the economy $200 billion a year, just guffaw and point them at Julian’s article.

Julian even allows himself to get deliciously wonky at the end of his long and serious article:

All the projections we’ve discussed, the rigorous and the suspect alike, calculate losses in sales or royalties to U.S. firms. This is often conflated with the net "cost to the U.S. economy." But those numbers–whatever they might be–are almost certainly not the same. When someone torrents a $12 album that they would have otherwise purchased, the record industry loses $12, to be sure. But that doesn’t mean that $12 has magically vanished from the economy. On the contrary: someone has gotten the value of the album and still has $12 to spend somewhere else.

In economic jargon, charging anything for pure IP–which has a marginal cost approaching zero once it has been produced–creates a deadweight economic loss, at least in static terms. The actual net loss of IP infringement is an allocative loss that only appears in a dynamic analysis.

There’s much more where that came from; do go check it out. We need much more of this kind of thing — but we won’t get it, because faced with the vested lobby dedicated to entrenching the bogus statistics, no one but a few ornery journalists seems to care that they’re demonstrably false.

Posted in intellectual property, journalism, statistics | Comments Off on Lies, Damn Lies, and Intellectual Property Statistics

Beware Small ETFs

When I said this morning that "we’re only at the very beginning of the global sovereign (as opposed to financial) crisis" and that "there will be more government debt scares before this is all over", I was evidently thinking along the same lines as some major holders of the PowerShares Emerging Market Sovereign Debt Portfolio ETF, which trades under the ticker symbol PCY.

The price action today has been insane: while the value of the underlying index — the fair value of the ETF’s holdings — has fallen 20 cents from $21.69 to $21.49, the actual ETF has plunged, closing down almost 10% on the day and trading at one point at just $16.44, down 18%. At that point, the stock’s discount to net asset value was well over 20%.

It’s worth noting that there’s nothing particularly toxic in the PCY portfolio: no Iceland, no Pakistan. The biggest holding is Chile, which is about as safe and boring as you can get in the emerging markets these days: the country’s foreign debt is so minuscule there’s really no point in them ever defaulting on it, even if they were to get into trouble.

But with sovereign debt now very much on the radar screen, clearly somebody somewhere decided that it was a good idea to just bail out now rather than wait for a major PCY holding to default.

The lesson here is that small illiquid ETFs are not a safe haven in times of volatility. Yes, they’re diversified. But the total amount of money in PCY is under $100 million, and that just doesn’t give it the depth necessary to withstand someone selling a lot of shares at once. Volume today was 265,000, or about $4.7 million: not big by the standards of most stocks, but huge by PCY standards, and enough to send the share price swooning.

Check out the one-year chart of PCY over at Yahoo Finance. It bumps along happily at about $26 all year, then does a step down to about $24. And then, in mid-September when the markets start going very crazy, it goes completely batshit.

What are the chances that your ETF, like this one, will start behaving erratically, refusing to follow the index it’s meant to be tracking? My feeling is that any ETF with over $10 billion outstanding is safe, and that you’re probably OK with an ETF over $1 billion. But below that things start looking a bit dodgy, and below $100 million you’re in serious danger territory.

So while in general I’m a fan of ETFs, I’m really only a fan of the big ones. The little ones are far too scary for me.

Posted in investing | 1 Comment

Homeownership: The Ideal Which Refuses to Die

Of all the Big Ideas which have been thoroughly discredited over the course of this crisis, arguably the biggest is the concept that homeownership is always and everywhere a Good Thing. As we’ve seen over the past couple of years, that’s not at all the case: it can cause massive financial pain and suffering, and in places like Orange County and Miami there’s a whole class of Smug Renters right now who somehow managed to dodge the homeownership bullet.

So you can imagine my surprise when I pulled up John McCain’s lastest bailout plan and was confronted by its name: the Homeownership Resurgence Plan.

The last thing we need right now is a resurgence in homeownership. Too many people own their homes already, including a lot of families who really shouldn’t. Let’s start thinking in terms of affordable housing, and not in terms of home equity. But I guess I can’t really expect too much along such lines from a man who has literally lost count of how many houses he owns.

(Earlier installments in this series are here, here, and here; also see Justin Fox, who charitably calls the McCain plan "half-baked".)

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Iceland’s Best-Laid Plan Falls Apart

Here’s how fluid things are: last week, Iceland nationalized Glitnir, the country’s third-largest bank. Today, it unnationalized Glitnir, putting it into receivership instead: clearly the bank’s liabilities were too large for the Icelandic government to take on.

Yesterday, Iceland pegged its currency to the euro; today it unpegged the currency, saying "there is insufficient support for this exchange rate".

And all those promises about Iceland backstopping deposits at its banks?

"The Icelandic government, believe it or not, have told me yesterday they have no intention of honoring their obligations here," [British Chancellor Alistair] Darling told the British Broadcasting Corp.

In other words, pretty much the entire we’re-all-in-this-together plan that I lauded on Monday has unravelled by Wednesday.

And still Iceland looks in better shape than Pakistan, and we’re only at the very beginning of the global sovereign (as opposed to financial) crisis. There will be more government debt scares before this is all over.

Posted in iceland, sovereign debt | Comments Off on Iceland’s Best-Laid Plan Falls Apart

The Sovereign Default Race Heats Up

You thought Iceland was in dire straits? Maybe Pakistan will beat it to the first-to-default finish line!

Pakistan’s economic crisis deepened on Monday after the rupee sank to an all-time low and Standard & Poor’s, the global rating agency, downgraded the rating on the country’s sovereign debt to CCC-plus – a few notches above default level.

Just be thankful that as bad as the credit crisis is getting, this kind of thing is still unthinkable in the US:

Pakistan’s illiquid money markets saw volatile call money rates surge to 40 per cent before settling back below 30 per cent.

(HT: Alloway)

Posted in bonds and loans, foreign exchange | Comments Off on The Sovereign Default Race Heats Up

Can the TARP Work?

I’ve got a piece at the main Portfolio.com site today called "Rolling Out the TARP", going into a bit of detail about whether and how this whole reverse-auction thing might work in practice. It’s based largely on a paper by Ausubel and Cramton which I first discovered chez Cowen; a big hat tip there.

I think we’re also the first people to use that headline. I’m quite sure we won’t be the last.

Posted in auctions, bailouts | Comments Off on Can the TARP Work?

TED Breaks 400bp

So much for unprecedented global coordinated rate cuts, not to mention a UK bank bailout which could reach a mind-boggling 500 billion pounds. TED’s at 403bp, European stocks are sharply lower across the board, and the US stock market, after a truly horrible Tuesday, looks as though things aren’t going to get any better on Wednesday (down 1% at the open).

I’m a sunny optimist by nature, and so I’d love to believe Doug Kass when he says that this is all driven by hedge funds selling stock-index futures and that we’re in for "a reverse panic to the upside". But I’ve learned my lesson, so I’d rather be pleasantly surprised by such a thing than actually place any hope in it. This certainly looks like a sell-off based on fundamentals to me, rather than anything easily explicable by technical factors to do with futures activity. Unless and until that TED spread stops going up and starts going down, the big market forces are going to be to the downside, not the upside.

Posted in bailouts, bonds and loans, stocks | Comments Off on TED Breaks 400bp

Extra Credit, Tuesday Edition

How to handle the crisis in your 401K: Good advice from Megan. If you have long-term investments (and all stock-market investments should be long-term investments) then mark them to market no more than once a year.

Never Enough Lessons on Forward PE: It’s useless if you have no real idea what forward earnings are going to be.

Stock (-Market-Crash) Photos: "At six percent, you want to show that no earthly action is going to stem the tide of losses — get the trader looking wearily upward at about a 20 degree angle, at the "Big Board", or at The Sun Potentially Setting On An Era, or something."

The Nouriel Roubini Halloween Facemask

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How CDOs Are Like Stocks

I had lunch today with Moe Tkacik; I was talking about how I’ve always been much more comfortable in the world of bonds, which can be valued quite easily, rather than stocks, which are essentially impossible to value with any kind of certainty.

Moe had a very powerful insight: the advent of CDOs essentially turned conceptually easy-to-value debt instruments into something so complex and opaque that it might as well have been a stock, for all that anybody could realistically forecast what its cashflows were going to be.

Why anybody thought this was a good idea, I have yet to work out.

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Great Moments in Punditry, Kudlow Edition

Larry Kudlow, July 2007:

If you ask folks on Wall Street what their biggest worry is, most will say it’s another 9-11. They rank another attack far ahead of passing sub-prime mortgage problems or wiggles in consumer spending…

I have long believed that stock markets are the best barometer of the health, wealth and security of a nation. And today’s stock market message is an unmistakable vote of confidence for the president.

(Via Krugman)

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Mortgage Repayment Datapoint of the Day

The real-world consequences of an elevated Libor:

The average subprime borrower facing an adjustable payment for the first time next month would face a monthly payment increase of about 18 percent based on Libor rates as of Sept. 30, rather than the 10 percent that would have occurred based on the rates on Sept. 15, the analysts wrote. The payment would be $1,951, instead of $1,807, they said. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans would be boosted to $1,021 on average, instead of $904.

Naturally, higher mortgage repayments mean more defaults. Not exactly what we need right now. On the other hand, the payment streams from those mortgages might well be higher than expected, which could at the margin help out the higher-rated tranches of subprime MBS.

In any event, I think it’s pretty clear at this point that Libor has reached the end of its useful life, especially when it comes to semi-fictional constructs like 3-month and 6-month Libor. When was the last time that any bank got any significant funding in the six-month interbank market? And it’s just plain silly, in a world where mortgages are securitized and sold off to non-bank investors, that repayment rates should be tied to interbank funding costs or any measure of financial-industry credit risk. Whatever happened to the Prime rate? That would be a much better benchmark.

(HT: Free Exchange)

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The Burst Commodity Bubble

Do you remember the food and commodity bubble? Sure you do. It wasn’t that long ago. The rise of India and China was inexorable, and the supply of food in general and meat in particular was never going to keep up with demand. As a result, a formerly-sleepy outfit known as Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan did a Nortel and briefly became the most valuable company in Canada.

Not any more.

In three-and-a-half months, the company has gone from the most valuable in Canada – worth $77-billion at its apex – to losing its place in the top 10, standing at [Thursday’s] close at No. 11, worth $31-billion.

Since then, POT has fallen further still, from $93.51 to $86.86, although it does look as though the carnage has slowed down a little. Meanwhile, its fellow fertilizer company Mosaic is now trading below $34 a share, down from a high of $163 in June.

Now that’s what I call a bursting bubble. But the poor in India and China are still becoming middle class, there’s still enormous demand for fertilizer — and the actual price of fertilizer is still, for the time being, high. As a result, John Burbank of Passport Capital made a strong case for MOS at the Value Investing Congress yesterday: what used to be a momentum stock has, in the space of a single quarter, become a deep-value stock. After all, it’s not like these are dot-coms without earnings: all of these companies are enormously profitable.

If it’s true, as analyst Terence Ortslan is quoted saying, that "nothing has changed fundamentally," then now could be a great time to buy all those commodity stocks which looked ridiculously overpriced a few months ago even though the long-term fundamentals seemed compelling. Vale, for instance, closed at $12.48 a share today, down a whopping 14% on the day and down 72% from its May high.

Of course, percentage-off-highs is a really, really stupid basis on which to buy anything. Stocks should be valued based on their future earnings, not on their past stock prices. But if you’re really looking for bargains these days, I suspect you’re much more likely to find them in the wreckage of the commodity stocks than you are in the financials.

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The Iceland-Dow Connection

Josh has been watching the Icelandic krona:

This morning, the ISK reached a nadir of 350 ISK to the EUR, and I was placing phone calls to travel agencies trying to book the cheapest holiday of my life.

Then, suddenly – a 4 billion EUR loan from Russia (which might or might not exist?) and the imposition of a currency peg, and ISK traded as high as 140 to the EUR. Think about that for a sec: the value of the Icelandic economy doubled in less than an hour.

…and then the ISK promptly slumped back to 220-ish, because you can’t impose a peg if you don’t have anything to defend it with.

Iceland is in truly dire straits: the headline in the Times this morning is "Terror as Iceland faces economic collapse", over a story which includes this sentence:

The country’s state surgeon even warned politicians and the media to ensure that they did not alarm old people.

There’s a British angle, of course: Icelandic banks have been taking Brits’ deposits. This is not exactly reassuring:

Times readers reported yesterday morning that they could not withdraw their money from Icesave accounts over the internet. But a spokesman for the bank said that Icesave was now operating normally and depositors could withdraw money. He added that the Icelandic Government had ample foreign reserves to cover the £4bn of British deposits in the event of any collapse.

Er, no, it doesn’t. The Icelandic government has 374 billion kronur of foreign exchange reserves; if you convert that at 188 kronur to the pound (as plausible an exchange rate as anything else, and the one I get from Yahoo), that works out at less than £2 billion. Even with an extra €4 billion from Russia (Russia!), Iceland’s foreign-exchange reserves aren’t enough to last a day, if the locals sensibly decide they’d really rather be in any currency but kronur.

Willem Buiter says the government should simply bite the bullet and let its banks fail, lest it fail itself:

A government should only nationalise a bank (let alone most of its banking sector) if it has the fiscal strength to support the bank (or its banking sector). If it does not have the fiscal resources, now and in the future, to restore the banks to solvency, a private sector insolvency problem is transformed into a government insolvency problem. On the whole, the consequences of state default are more serious for the residents of a country than the consequences of a private bank default.

According to the CDS market, Iceland’s going to take Buiter’s advice:

Insurance against default on Iceland’s sovereign debt now trades at $1.5 million upfront, with a $500,000 annual payment, to protect $10 million in bonds against default, according to Markit. Landsbanki and Kaupthing are trading at $4.5 million and $5 million upfront, respectively.

Could the imminent collapse of tiny Iceland help explain the whopping 60-point fall in the S&P 500 today, to below 1,000? Maybe — we’ve had many big failures in this credit crisis so far, but we haven’t had the implosion of an entire European economy — one which is home to systemically-important international banks, too. That kind of thing could cause stock-market jitters at the best of times; right now, I can easily see how it’s good for 500 Dow points.

Posted in iceland, stocks | Comments Off on The Iceland-Dow Connection

Cap-and-Trade in the US

Did you know that September 29 saw the largest carbon auction the world has ever seen? OK, it was pretty small on an absolute level — it raised just $39 million, and the price per ton of carbon emitted was very low, at $3.07. But it’s a good start, especially because of where the auction took place: right here in the US.

The auction was part of the RGGI initiative, whereby ten states in the Northeast agreed to cap the carbon emissions from power plants, bringing them down 10% by 2018. It’s a fully-fledged cap-and-trade system, and although it has weaknesses — foremost among them the fear that emissions will simply "leak" over into Pennsylvania, which isn’t takeing part — it’s already raising money for the states concerned.

Was leakage the reason why the price of the offsets was so low? It’s hard to tell for sure. But there are three other reasons which I think are at least as compelling. The first is the economy: it’s going to slow down in 2009, and that means fewer emissions anyway. The second is the fact that the RGGI cap is not very stringent: electricity generators will be able to stay within it quite easily, even if the economy were to grow next year. And the third is high oil prices.

Richard Domaleski, the CEO of World Energy, which administered the auction, explained to me that the Northeast is a unique market in that many energy customers have dual fuel switching capability. When oil gets too expensive, they switch to natural gas, which has a lot less carbon emissions. So maybe the bidders at the auction simply reckoned that emissions would never reach the cap anyway, just because so many of their customers had switched.

I also talked to Wiley Barbour, the co-founder of the American Carbon Registry, about the auction. "We now have a mandatory cap-and-trade in the US, and that’s a good thing," he said. "It’s coordinated across 10 different state legislatures, and it went off without a hitch."

We got into a conversation about where the best place to measure carbon emissions is, from a cap-and-trade perspective. I’ve long been a proponent of measuring as far upstream as possible: it makes measuring them much easier, and makes it less likely that important sources of carbon emissions will end up being excluded.

But Barbour explained that although there are good reasons to measure the emissions upstream, there’s also a decent argument on the other side. If you measure emissions upstream, the only mechanism you have to reduce them is the price mechanism. It’s admittedly a very powerful mechanism, but if you measure emissions further downstream, you get something else as well: companies actually need to go out and buy carbon emissions permits for all the carbon they emit.

The difference is quite large, from a behavioral perspective. If you’re buying the emissions rights yourself, that makes you very conscious of how much carbon you’re emitting, and it focuses the mind on how you can reduce those emissions. If that money is buried in things like electricity bills, you’re more likely not to notice, even if it’s the same total amount. Said Barbour:

The further upstream you go, the more it looks like a tax. The further downstream you go, you’re sending a clearer signal. When you put the burden of compliance on the operator of the fossil-fuel power plant, that’s the person who can decide. You’re putting the burden on one of the key decision-makers. It’s a different signal that you’re sending.

It’s an interesting argument — and I’d love to see some empirical research on how much of a difference such things make. Until then, it’s all theoretical, and no one knows how important such factors are.

And the good thing about the introduction of RGGI is that we can now start getting real empirical data on a lot of things which have hereunto been theoretical, like leakage. A lot of people are going to be paying close attention to Pennsylvania’s power production over the next few quarters, and comparing it to power production in the RGGI states. If the former goes up while the latter goes down, that should give a pretty good idea of how much leakage there has been. And the more leakage, of course, the more important it is to implement national-level or even global-level cap-and-trade schemes.

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Ask Not What Your Country Can Do For You, Spanish Banknote Edition

During WWII, plucky Londoners tore down their beautiful Victorian cast-iron railings, sending them off to be recycled into guns and tanks. Today, Spaniards are being asked to do something similar:

Spanish officials were yesterday reported to be looking for ways of encouraging Spaniards to remove the estimated 108m €500 notes they have hoarded in safes or under floorboards and take them to the bank. That averages out to at least two per Spaniard, or a total of €54bn, circulating outside the country’s banking system.

We can trust, I hope, that the banknotes won’t end up at the bottom of the Thames Estuary, as the railings did.

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Roubini was Right

I asked Nouriel Roubini this morning whether there was any way of getting institutions to start lending to each other, rather than the Fed being the only game in town. I got this in response: savor it, it’s probably the shortest thing by Nouriel you’ll ever read.

We are near total financial and corporate meltdown dude.

At this point the ony institution able and willing to lend is the Fed. That is why I suggested last week the CPFF to avoid this meltdown.

First you avoid a systemic collapse that was literally a couple of days from occurring. Once things have calmed in a few weeks you can start thinking about ways to restore lending among private institutions.

Yep we have reached the point where the Fed is the only bank in the land or, better, in the globe as the huge swap lines now allow the Fed to lend dollars to non-US banks outside the US.

That means that the Fed will now lend to banks, to non-banks in the shadow banking system, to corporations and to state and local governments. There is no one else lending now as counterparty fear is extreme.

Read my February 12 steps to a financial disaster paper. We are now as I predicted at step 12

Sorry if I now say I told you so…

Feeling a little chastised for giving me so much shit on your blog for the last year and siding persistently with those who missed the boat and said all wil be fine? Should I expect a public mea culpa?

It would be useful if you would publicly admit you got it totally wrong for the last year.

I’m happy to oblige: Nouriel was right, and I was wrong. The more apocalyptic you were, the more correct you were. And there were precious few people as apocalyptic as Nouriel.

And so, at this point, I’m liable to trust Nouriel — who has been right so far — about the necessity of the CPFF, rather than trust someone like TED, who says that the non-financial CP market was just fine as of October 1, and that therefore there’s nothing to worry about.

At some point, Nouriel will be too bearish. But that point hasn’t arrived yet, and I’d much rather prepare for the worst and be pleasantly surprised on the upside, than hope for the best and get my legs cut out from under me. There’s no doubt that Paulson and Bernanke have been consistently behind the curve so far, because they just couldn’t conceive of things getting as bad as they did. So maybe it’s long past time to start listening to someone who not only conceived such things, but went so far as to actually predict them.

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